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This thesis examines the determinants and effects of leverage and debt maturity on corporate 
performance from corporate governance perspective, making use of a large panel of Chinese 
listed firms over the period 2003-2010. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
the potential endogeneity of regressors, we use the system Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator in our studies. We examine the following three main themes. 
First, we examine the impact of managerial ownership and other corporate governance 
variables on firms‘ leverage. We document that the ownership structure plays a significant 
role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, controlling for traditional determinants 
of leverage, unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure 
decisions, we report that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on 
firms‘ leverage.  
Second empirical chapter is debt maturity and the effects of growth opportunities and 
liquidity risk on leverage. No single study has focused on this issue in the context of 
emerging markets. We find that the proportion of short-term debt attenuates the negative 
effect of growth opportunities on leverage in emerging markets, particularly in China. 
Additionally, we also report that the proportion of short-term debt negatively affects 
leverage as predicted by the liquidity risk hypothesis. When we distinguish between state 
owned firms and private controlled firms, we also find evidence that these effects are only 
relevant to private controlled firms.  
Third, we examine the impact of capital structure on corporate performance. The agency 
theory suggests that leverage affects agency costs and thereby influences firm performance. 
We find clear evidence of a positive relationship between leverage and the proportion of 
long term debt on firms‘ performance, as measured by ROA, ROS or productivity. Yet, 
when distinguishing between state and privately controlled firms, we find that leverage and 
proportion of long-term debt only affects the performance of private firms.  
Our research has significant policy implications for managers, owners, potential investors 
and the government. First, it suggests that the Chinese government‘s recent policies aimed at 
reforming ownership structure and encouraging managerial ownership in  listed firms have 
been successful in providing managers with incentive to adopt  risky financial choices. 
Further, our study extend Diamond‘s liquidity risk hypothesis by showing that institutional 
factors (e.g. government ownership) have significant influence on the liquidity risk faced by 
firms when they use more short-term debt in their capital structure. Finally, our research 
suggests that long term debt is more effective in improving performance of listed private 
firms in China.  
Our study recommends that while managerial ownership should be further encouraged in the 
state-controlled sector which helps to overcome weak managerial incentive problem faced 
by them, the government ownership which weakens incentive mechanisms for managers in 
them should be further reduced so as to enable these firms to make appropriate financial 
choices. The board of directors, especially independent directors do not seem to influence 
firms‘ important decisions such as capital structure choices. Thus, our study recommends 
that a strong and truly independent board structure should be encouraged in the Chinese 
listed corporations in order to improve effectiveness of their corporate governance. Further, 
lenders such as banks may extend more long term credit to private sector which helps to 
improve performance of these firms. 
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1.1. Research background 
The choice of debt level and the maturity structure of debt are key elements of 
corporate financial policy.  Although Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that under 
perfect capital market conditions, capital structure is irrelevant to the value of a firm, 
the prevalence of a variety of market frictions (such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, 
asymmetric information and  agency problems) make capital structure decisions 
relevant to the value of firms. Following the seminal works of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977) on agency costs and asymmetric information problems, the 
theoretical and empirical finance literature not only recognize debt financing and 
debt maturity choice as important governance mechanisms to mitigate agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders, but also analyse issues associated with 
the use of desired level of debt and maturity structure in corporations.  
A unique feature of a modern corporation is that its ownership and controls are 
separated. This, in turn, creates a principal-agent relationship in the corporation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The principal agent relationship offers some benefits: 
professional managers have specific knowledge or skills, which allow them to fulfil 
the functions more effectively than the firm‘s investors; and risk of business can be 
shared among vast number of minuscule investors. However, corporations often have 
to meet challenges such as differences in preferences between shareholders and 
managers, asymmetric information, managers‘ opportunistic behaviour, and 
inefficient use of resources (i.e. moral hazard, shirking duties, for example managers 
may prefer to make investment and financing policy choices that maximise their own 
wealth at the expenses of shareholders) as well as conflicts of interest between 
different claimholders such as equity holders and bondholders. An essential role of 
corporate governance is to mitigate agency problems and resultant agency costs 
arising from the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Mackling, 1976; Fama, 1980, and Fama and Jensen, 1983a) as well as those between 
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the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997 
and Gillan 2006), thereby maximizing the value of the firm.  
Corporate governance issues pervade almost every area of research in the arenas of 
economics, business and finance. Scholars with different perspectives have given 
various definitions for corporate governance. For example, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997, p.737) define corporate governance from the perspective of suppliers of 
capital to corporations as ―…the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment‖. This definition of 
corporate governance, thus, reflect firms‘ financing pattern. By contrast, Gillan and 
Starks (1998) take a broader perspective and define corporate governance as the 
system of rules, laws, and factors that control operations of a corporation. Yet, the 
most widely used definition of corporate governance is ―the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled‖ (Cadbury, 1992). From a broad perspective 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1997: p.7) 
describes that ―corporate governance relates to the internal means by which 
corporations are operated and controlled,  while governments play a central role in 
shaping the legal, institution and regulatory climate within which individual 
corporate governance system is developed.‖ 
The agency theory is the dominant theory underlying capital structure and corporate 
governance issues. The foundation of agency theory was laid by Berle and Means 
(1932) by raising their concern on the separation of ownership and control in a large 
corporation. They observed two main features of US large modern corporations: (1) 
a large proportion of corporate assets are controlled by managers with small 
ownership stakes in their firms; (2) managers pursue self-serving actions that come 
at the shareholders‘ expenses as a consequence of separation of ownership and 
control of the firm. Based on the insight of Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) formally developed the agency theory which addresses the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders under dispersed ownership structure.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers‘ interest is not fully aligned 
with shareholders‘ interest when ownership and control of the firm are separated. 
The main sources of agency conflict between the management and the shareholders 
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are: (1) moral hazard; (2) earnings retention; (3) time horizon; and (4) risk aversion. 
We will next analyse these four sources in turn. 
Moral hazard 
Managers with minimal ownership stakes of the firm consume more private benefits 
(i.e. pursue their own self-interest) at the cost of their owners rather than taking value 
maximizing decisions (i.e. undertaking positive NPV projects). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) assume that moral hazard problem between managers and shareholders are 
likely to arise in a corporation since there is a high level of information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders, and managers do not own the corporation‘s 
resources. Moral hazard is represented by the lack of effort in management (e.g. 
shirking duties to enjoy leisure time and hiding inefficiency to avoid loss of 
rewards). This arises because managers prefer making investment decisions that are 
best suited to their own personal skills to enhance their own wealth at the expenses 
of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
Earnings retention 
Different types of conflicts of interest take place between managers and 
shareholders. For instance, managers focus on increasing the size of the corporation 
(i.e. empire building) in order to enhance their reputations and compensation rather 
than maximizing shareholders‘ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Brennan (1995) 
also expresses the concern that managers focus on increasing firm size than 
increasing the value of the firm since their compensation is usually tied up with the 
size of the firm, and not with shareholders‘ returns. Moreover, shareholders prefer 
higher dividends, while managers prefer to retain earnings, so as to get a higher 
remuneration (Jensen 1986, 1993).  
Time horizon 
With respect to the timing of cash flow, shareholders are concerned with future 
benefits over a long time horizon, whereas managers are concerned with benefits 
within their employment terms, often at the expenses of long-term positive projects 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). For example, McColgan (2001) reports that 
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shareholders require increasing the investment in R&D while managers prefer the 
opposite.  
Managerial risk aversion 
Shareholders and firms‘ managers bear quite different levels of risk. Typical 
shareholders usually hold a well-diversified portfolio (i.e. they invest relatively small 
portion of their wealth in one particular firm‘s project). The advantage of the 
diversified portfolio is that if an investment/project fails, there will be relatively 
small negative effects on their overall wealth.  
By contrast, the managers of that firm are unable to minimize their risk of 
investment since the majority of their human capital (and possibly some of their 
financial capital as well) is tied up in the firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981). If a project 
fails, managers lose much more than shareholders. This situation also creates the 
potential for conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Therefore, 
firms‘ managers may not be willing to undertake projects that are worthwhile to 
shareholders (Denis, 2001). One way for reducing the non-diversifiable risk faced by 
managers is by decreasing the use of debt financing (Friend and Lang, 1988). The 
use of a high debt ratio increases in fact the bankruptcy or financial distress risk of 
the firms, resulting in the loss of the managers‘ employment, and potential 
impairment of their future employment, and lowering their earning capacity. For 
these reasons, self-interested managers tend to reduce corporate leverage to a lower 
level in order to secure their own position.  
1.1.1 Corporate governance mechanisms  
In essence, good corporate governance consists of a set of governance mechanisms. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are generally divided into two categories: 
internal and external governance mechanisms. Internal mechanisms mainly include 
ownership structure and board structure (board size and composition). Primary 
external mechanisms consist of takeover market (i.e. the market for corporate 
control) and the state regulatory system (legal system). Our first empirical 
investigation in this study mainly focuses on the link between internal governance 
mechanisms and leverage. A brief description of the two major internal governance 
mechanisms is as follows.  
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1.1.1.1 Ownership structure 
Ownership and control are two completely separate organs in any corporation. While 
ownership refers to the attributes of the owners (for example, size of their equity 
positions), corporations are controlled by professional managers (controllers) who 
own little or none of the equity of the firms they control. Ownership structure, 
intended as the size of the owners‘ equity positions and the identities of the firm‘s 
equity holders, represents therefore an important element of corporate governance. 
A typical problem in most corporations is that small shareholders have no or little 
incentive to monitor management in widely dispersed firms since they have very 
small ownership stakes on the firms. Moreover, the free-rider problem reduces the 
incentives of these dispersed shareholders to coordinate their actions.  Yet, those 
who have more significant ownership stakes on the corporations (i.e. the largest 
shareholders/ controlling shareholder) have greater incentives to expend resources 
and to monitor management effectively. In many countries, including China, the 
state is a significant owner of corporations and plays an important role in their 
governance.  
The most important internal governance mechanism is direct equity ownership by 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the 
interests of shareholders and managers are better aligned when managers become 
owners. Increased managerial shareholding therefore not only reduces managers‘ 
motive for discretionary spending (excess consumption of perquisite and empire 
building) but also encourages risky policy choices such as using leverage in the 
capital structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and firms‘ leverage based on this convergence of interest 
hypothesis.  
1.1.1.2 Board of directors   
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the major responsibility of boards of directors is to 
minimize the costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations. The functions of the board are to hire, fire, monitor and compensate 
managers, and ensure that shareholders‘ wealth is maximized. Jensen (1993) 
indicates that board size is an important determinant of corporate governance 
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effectiveness. Since larger boards are able to commit more time and effort to 
overseeing management, and bring in the skills & expertise needed to operate the 
company effectively, they can not only increase monitoring effectiveness but also 
improve the quality of managerial decision-making which lead to better firm 
performance (Adams and Mehran, 2003). Furthermore, Coles et al. (2008) argue that 
since large and complex firms (in terms of size and business diversification) need 
directors‘ advice, counsel and expertise, they can benefit by having larger number of 
directors on their boards. However, the boards become less effective when they 
increase in size because coordination, communication, decision-making and the free 
rider problem become more severe in large boards (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 
1993). 
Another important aspect of boards of director is the presence of independent (non-
executive) directors who are considered to be more ‗objective‘ on business policy 
and the long-term strategic development of the company. The independent directors‘ 
participation on the board is an important mechanism since they monitor the action 
of the executive directors and ensure that the executive directors‘ decisions are 
consistent with shareholders‘ interest (Fama, 1980). 
Independent directors are professional directors with experience in business and they 
are more likely to be effective at monitoring managers‘ behaviour because of the 
concern with their reputation (Weisbach, 1998). While executive directors are 
experts in their field and provide overall strategic guidance, independent directors 
are more effective at monitoring the board‘s activities and directing management‘s 
choices, among other things, there should be an appropriate balance between 
independent and executive directors on the board.  
1.1.2 Focus of the study 
The Chinese corporate governance system has evolved and developed significantly 
over the last three decades, and especially in the last decade. In addition, China‘s 
banking system which is the main source of external debt finance for Chinese listed 
firms has undergone significant changes during the last decade. However, there is a 
very limited academic research available to assess how these changes have affected 
firm behaviour in recent years. This study hopes to fill this gap and contribute to the 
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understanding of the determinants and effects of debt and its maturity structure on 
the performance of Chinese listed firms, especially from the agency costs 
perspective. 
Making use of data from Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010, we 
investigate the determinants of capital structure decisions (i.e. debt versus equity 
choice) and debt maturity decisions (short-term debt versus long term debt) and 
effects of these financing choices on corporate performance. Among other things, 
this will enable us to shed light on the linkage between corporate governance and 
capital structure decisions, on the attenuation (i.e. attenuating the negative effects of 
growth opportunities on leverage) and liquidity risk effects (potential for bankruptcy 
and associated costs) of short-term debt on leverage, and finally on the effects of 
leverage and maturity structure on firm performance. Specifically, making use of a 
large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010, we investigate three 
main themes. Our first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) examines the impact of 
managerial ownership and other corporate governance variables on firms‘ leverage, 
which is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets (i.e. the use of debt 
financing in the capital structure). The investigation in our second empirical chapter 
(Chapter 4) focuses on attenuation effects and liquidity risk effects of short-term debt 
on leverage. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) is devoted to analyse the impact 
of debt financing and debt maturity on corporate performance, which we measure by 
profitability measures (namely, return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS)) 
and a labour productivity measure proxied by total real sales divided by number of 
employees.  We next discuss the motivations behind each of the empirical chapters 
contained in this thesis. 
1.2. Motivation of the study  
Chinese corporate governance system has undergone many changes during the last 
decade. In addition to the introduction of a corporate governance code and 
independent director system, Chinese firms‘ ownership structures have changed 
tremendously following the 2005 split share structure reform in which a large part of  
non- tradable shares have been converted to tradable shares. Furthermore, number of 
privately controlled listed firms has steady increased (Conyon and He, 2011). As part 
of these reforms, managerial shareholding has also increased considerably after 
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2005. See Chapters 2 for a detailed discussion on evolution and development of the 
Chinese corporate governance system. In the light of these developments, it is 
increasingly interesting to see how internal governance mechanisms impact on 
capital structure decisions in the Chinese context. This is the main objective of our 
first empirical study (Chapter 3). To the best of our knowledge, no study has 
examined the impact of corporate governance on leverage after the 2005 split share 
structure reform in China. It is also interesting to examine the extent to which 
managerial ownership has played a more significant effect on firms‘ leverage decision 
during the post reform period (2005-2010). 
Using debt financing to deal with the agency costs of equity is not costless: it creates 
agency costs of debt, which arise from the conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and debtholders over the growth options of the firm (Myers, 1977). Yet, Myers 
(1977) suggests that short-maturity debt can mitigate this agency problem. Growth 
opportunities are therefore an important determinant not only of the firm‘s leverage 
decisions but also of its debt maturity choices. A vast body of research which 
examines the determinants of capital structure decisions has identified a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and firm‘s leverage (Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Stulz, 1990; Smith and Watts, 1992; Rajan and Zigales, 1995; Frank and 
Goyal, 2003), while studies based on debt maturity choices find a positive 
relationship between short-term debt and growth opportunities (e.g., Barclay and 
Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996). This is consistent with Myers‘s (1977) 
prediction. However, Diamond (1991) argues that a greater use of short-term debt 
leads to rollover/liquidity risk through the threat of premature liquidation. Johnson 
(2003) empirically shows that while short-maturity debt can mitigate the negative 
effect of high growth opportunities on leverage, it can also reduce the total level of 
leverage due to increased rollover risk for the average US firms. In the context of 
China, previous studies have provided empirical evidence suggesting that listed 
firms face underinvestment problem, by showing a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage (Zou and Xiao, 2006; Haung and Song, 2006; 
Moosa et al., 2011), as well as a negative relationship between leverage and 
investment (Firth et al., 2008). Furthermore, even after considerable development in 
the commercial bank lending environment in China (Firth et al., 2009; Tsai et al., 
2014), short-term debt still account for more than 80% of the total debt of listed 
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firms. To the best of our knowledge, no single study has focused on the attenuation 
and liquidity risk effects of short-term debt on leverage in China. The main 
motivation of our second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) is therefore to fill this gap in 
the literature by examining the attenuation and liquidity risk effects of short-term 
debt on leverage in the Chinese context. Another motivation for the same empirical 
study is to see how the attenuation and liquidity risk effects of short-term debt differ 
between state and privately controlled firms using China‘s unique institutional 
environment where a considerable number of listed firms are still controlled by the 
state or state agents. 
Agency theory suggests that debt financing can be an important governance mechanism 
to mitigate conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 1986; 
Stulz, 1990). Following McConnell and Servaes‘s (1995) empirical contribution to 
the analysis of effects of leverage on corporate performance, a handful of studies 
have developed empirical evidence on the relationship between capital structure and 
firms‘ performance in developed countries (e.g., Dessi and Robertson, 2003; Berger 
and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). Additionally, studies 
based on debt maturity choices suggest that long-term debt helps improve firms‘ 
total factor productivity (TFP) because it may allow firms access to better and more 
productive technologies, which the firm may be reluctant to finance with short-term 
debt because of fears of liquidation (e.g., Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 1996; 
Schiantarelli and Jaramillo, 1996; Schiantarelli and Srivastava, 1996).
1
 Even though 
there is no systemic study focused on the effects of debt and maturity structure on 
firm performance of Chinese companies, Tian and Estrin (2007) and Firth et al. 
(2008) provide evidence on the impact of debt financing on agency costs faced by 
firms, and conclude that the Chinese government‘s ownership of both banks and 
firms, and the resultant soft budget constraints make debt an ineffective governance 
mechanism in reducing agency costs  particularly for state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). However, following a series of reforms of the banking system (which we 
discuss in the Chapter 2), the governance of the Chinese financial sector has 
                                                 
1
Total-factor productivity (TFP) is a variable which measure effects in total output growth relative to 
the growth in traditionally measured inputs of labor and capital. 
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significantly improved and banks now use more and more commercial judgment and 
prudence in their lending decisions (Cull and Xu, 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2008; Firth 
et al. 2009). Loan officers in banks and other financial institutions are now held 
responsible for their poor lending decisions (Allen et al., 2012). In light of these 
developments, recent research using data on Chinese listed firms suggests that bank 
financing no longer facilitates unwise investment and the overconsumption of 
perquisites in SOEs. By contrast, it now acts as a governance mechanism that 
constrains managers‘ misconduct and thus help improve investment efficiency in 
both state controlled and privately controlled firms (Chan et al., 2012; Lin and Bo, 
2012; Tsai et al., 2014). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no study has focused on 
examining the direct effects of debt and maturity structure on firm performance of 
Chinese companies in recent years. It is also interesting to assess the extent to which 
the effects of leverage and maturity structure on firm performance differ between 
privately-controlled and state-controlled firms. These considerations motivate our 
third empirical study (Chapter 5). 
 
1.3. Potential contributions  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. Our empirical 
studies contribute to the agency and information asymmetry literature. Our first 
study (Chapter 3) examines the impact of managerial ownership and other corporate 
governance variables on firms‘ capital structure decisions. Although a limited 
number of empirical studies have examined the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and firms‘ leverage in the context of Western countries, such 
as the US and the UK, there is lack of research in this area in China. By integrating 
the corporate governance and capital structure literatures, this study documents for 
the first-time a linear relationship between managerial ownership and leverage in 
China.  
Our second empirical study (Chapter 4) examines debt maturity and the effects of 
growth opportunities and liquidity risk on leverage. Firstly, we test whether the short 
maturity of debt can attenuate the negative effect of growth opportunities on 
leverage. Secondly, this study advances existing literature by providing the first 
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empirical evidence on the attenuation effect of short-term debt in a dynamic 
framework in the context of China. Using a recent data set, our study documents that 
the proportion of short-term debt in total debt helps mitigate the negative effect of 
growth opportunities on leverage. More importantly, our study shows that even 
though Chinese listed firms use a large proportion of short-term debt, the liquidity 
risk faced by these firms seems to be economically less important than that reported 
for US firms due to the unique institutional setting (characterized by  state ownership 
and personal networks) in which they operate. 
Our third empirical study (Chapter 5) contributes to the existing literature by 
providing the first evidence for China of a direct relationship between leverage and 
the proportion of long-term debt to total debt  on the on hand, and firms‘ 
performance, measured by return on assets (ROA), on the other. Although previous 
studies have looked at the effect of capital structure on performance in the context of 
developed markets (McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Dessi and Robertson, 2003), to 
the best of our knowledge, no single study has focused on this issue in China. Our 
findings suggest that debt financing works as an effective mechanism through which 
Chinese listed firms can alleviate agency problems, and concludes that leverage and 
the proportion of long-term debt in total debt are an important determinant of firms‘ 
performance in China. Our study also addresses endogeneity problem through the 
use of a system GMM estimator in the empirical analysis.  
Our research contributes to the literature along following additional dimensions. 
First, it contributes to the growing literature on the effects of managerial incentives, 
and in particular managerial ownership, on firms‘ capital structure decisions in the 
context of emerging and transition economies (Kato and Long, 2011). 
Second, it distinguishes itself from previous studies by differentiating the effects of 
managerial ownership on firms‘ leverage, between the pre- and post- reform period, 
and thus contributes to the research on the effects of the split share structure reform 
in China. Recent empirical studies examine the direct effects of the reform on firms‘ 
behaviour (Lin 2009; Chen et al., 2012), ignoring how corporate governance 
mechanisms can differently affect firm behaviour in the pre- and post-reform period. 
We show that the increased managerial ownership which followed the reform, is 
associated with increased usage of leverage in Chinese listed firms.  
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Finally, our research help to disentangle for the first time not only the impact of 
managerial ownership on the leverage of privately- and state-controlled firms, but 
also the effects of leverage and maturity structure on these firms‘ performance.  We 
provide evidence that managerial ownership and debt financing work as effective 
governance mechanisms only for privately-controlled firms. These results are 
consistent with the argument that private ownership is superior to state ownership 
(Alchian, 1965; Shleifer, 1998; Green, 2004; Chen et al., 2010). Our research 
therefore also contributes to the literature that favours privatisation (see Megginson 
and Netter, 2001, for a survey). 
Overall, our research examines the determinants and effects of leverage and debt 
maturity on corporate performance with a special emphasis on the prospective of 
corporate governance. It also provides an opportunity for the comparison of the 
efficacy of different governance mechanisms in the pre- and post-reform periods, as 
well as between state- and privately-controlled firms. By integrating the corporate 
governance and capital structure literatures, our research contributes to further our 
knowledge on the effectiveness of managerial ownership, debt financing and other 
internal corporate governance mechanisms for Chinese listed firms. The outcomes of 
the research will help policy makers and government agencies, economists, as well 
as local and foreign investors to improve the corporate governance of Chinese listed 
firms.  
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
This thesis mainly consists of three empirical studies examining the determinants of 
leverage and debt maturity and their effects on corporate performance from a 
corporate governance perspective. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the institutional reforms in China. It first 
describes the ownership structure of the corporations and other internal governance 
mechanisms. It then provides a historical background of corporations and financial 
markets in China. Chapter 3 presents our first empirical study, which examines the 
impact of managerial ownership and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
firms‘ leverage. Chapter 4 represents our second empirical study, which examines 
debt maturity and the effects of growth opportunities and liquidity risk on leverage. 
Chapter 5 presents our third empirical study. It examines the impact of capital 
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structure decisions and maturity structure on corporate performance, measured using 
ROA, ROS, and labour productivity. Finally, Chapter 6 presents concluding remarks, 
identifies some potential limitations of our research, and suggests some potential 








Overview of China’s corporate governance and financial system  
2.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an institutional background of the Chinese 
Listed firms which underpins each of our empirical chapters that follows. 
Understanding how Chinese corporate governance system and financial system have 
evolved and developed is important to our understanding of the behaviour of the 
firms in China.  
 
2.2. Corporate governance system in China 
In this section, we briefly discuss the evolution of stock markets and corporate 
governance of Chinese listed corporations 
2.2.1. Evolution of stock markets and modern corporations  
Chinese financial market began to emerge in the early 1990s with the establishment 
of two stock exchanges, namely Shanghai Stock Exchange (established in December 
1990, SHSE), and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (established in July 1991, SZSE). 
This was one of the most significant economic reforms. Since then, both stock 
exchanges have been growing rapidly in terms of the number of listed companies, 
trading volume, total market capitalization and fund raising capability. In China, the 
history of modern listed corporations which began with the inception and growth of 
these two stock markets is very short as compared to other developing countries. The 
objective of establishing and developing stock market was to raise capital for 
financing. Chen (2005) notes that more than 480 billion Yuan new equity was issued 
in 2000. By early 2004, China‘s stock markets emerged as the eighth largest 
emerging market in the world with about 1300 listed firms and a market 
capitalization of over $550 billion (Liu, 2009). As can been seen in Table 2.1, total 
number of listed companies has been increasing continuously every year since 2000 
and at the end of 2010, a total of 2063 companies were listed on the two Chinese 
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stock exchanges. The total market capitalization of these companies was 26.54 
trillion RMB. The combined market capitalization of these two stock exchanges in 
2010 accounted for about 66.69 % of China‘s GDP (CSRC, 2010). At the end of 
2013, a total of 2489 companies were listed on the two Chinese stock exchanges. 
Now China is the world‘s third largest stock market after the US and Japan in terms 
of combined market capitalization. Furthermore, China‘s securities market is open to 
foreign investors. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is responsible 
for monitoring stock exchange activities. The Chinese stock markets exhibit some 
prominent characteristics when compared to mature financial markets (Gordon and 
Li, 1999). For example, the state or government plays a dual role as an owner of 
firms (dominance owners) and regulatory agency. While dividend income in China is 
subject to graduated tax rates based on the length of time the shares have been held, 
capital gains are generally taxed at the corporate income rate. 
 
Table 2.1 Important features of Chinese stock markets 

























2000 1088 114 52 3792 48091 60827 
2001 1160 112 60 5218 43522 38305 
2002 1224 111 75 5875 38329 27990 
2003 1287 111 93 6428 42458 32115 
2004 1377 110 111 7149 37056 42334 
2005 1381 109 122 7630 32430 31663 
2006 1434 109 143 14926 89404 90487 
2007 1550 109 148 22417 327141 460556 
2008 1625 109 153 24523 121366 267113 
2009 1718 108 159 26163 243939 535987 
2010 2063 108 165 33184 265423 545634 
2011 2342 108 171 36096 214758 421650 
2012 2494 107 179 38395 230358 314667 
2013 2498 106 185 40569 239077 468729 
Sources: Annual reports of CSRC  
 
China‘s corporate governance mainly draws from both the 1994 Company Law of 
the People‘s Republic of China and the guidelines and codes issued by Chinese 
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Securities Regulations Commission (CSRC). The 1994 Company Law improved 
property rights by establishing the firm as a legal entity that owns assets. It also 
defines the functions and responsibilities of shareholders, board of directors, and 
board of supervisors.  A fundamental review of Chinese company law was enacted in 
2006 and this generated two types of limited companies: the Limited Liability 
Companies (LLC private companies) and the Joint Stock Company (JSC public 
companies). This brought the legal context much in accordance with the company 
law of other countries.  
To achieve its main objective of protecting investors, the CSRC, along with other 
authorities, has issued supplemental regulations, administrative rules, guidelines and 
codes (e.g. the Provisional Regulations on Public Offering and Trading, and the 
Measures on the Administration of Futures Exchanges). A corporate governance 
Code for listed companies was formulated for the first time by the CSRC in 2002. 
While the guideline and code require a listed company to appoint independent 
directors to its boards, it discourages the combination of the positions of chairperson 
of the board of directors and general manager (CEO duality). The code also 
prescribed basic principles for the protection of investors‘ rights, as well as basic 
rules and standards for directors, supervisors, and senior management. The code was 
intended to be the major measuring standard for the evaluation of listed companies‘ 
corporate governance structure. 
2.2.2. Ownership structure of Chinese listed companies  
China has unique ownership and governance structure (Chen, 2005; Bhabra et al., 
2008). Before mid-2005, A-shares were classified into tradable shares and non-
tradable shares. The non-tradable shares were mostly owned by the SOEs and other 
state owned legal person. Non-tradable shares were not allowed for public trading at 
two exchanges, but it could be transferred via negotiation or auction to domestic 
institutions upon approval from the CSRC.
2
  Tradable A-shares were mainly offered 
to domestic individual investors only in Chinese currency, Chinese Yuan, by the 
SHSE, and the SZSE after the IPOs. Foreigners have also been allowed to invest in 
                                                 
2
 After 2005 split-share reforms non-tradable shares can be converted into tradable shares. 
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the A-shares through the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) scheme 
regulated by CSRC since December 2002.  
The B-shares are held exclusively by foreign investors and are traded in foreign 
currency, (U.S. dollars), but, national individual investors have also been allowed to 
invest in B-shares since February 2001. In addition to the A-shares and B-shares, 
Chinese listed companies have also H-shares and N-shares. H-shares and N-shares 
are similar to B-share in nature, but they are listed and traded on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and the New York Stock (NYSE), respectively
3
. Chinese listed firms 
thus have issued mainly four types of tradable shares; each with its own unique. All 
shares, in spite of the different currencies and different shareholder types, are entitled 
to the same cash flow rights (i.e. dividend) and voting rights.  
As explained above, a typical listed company in China has a mixed ownership 
characteristic. Before the 2005 reform, the government held the majority of non-
tradable A shares (approximately a two-thirds of total shares) in the corporations by 
direct and/or indirect shareholding through state-owned institutions (such as state 
assets management agencies, investment companies, and state holding companies) 
and this significantly affected the liquidity of the China‘s stock market. The rest of 
shares (i.e. only one third of total shares) issued by the companies were tradable A- 
shares and they had little power for decision-making.  
 2.2.2.1. The 2005 split share structure reform 
In April 2005, the CSRC and Chinese government initiated the reforms of non-
tradable shares. The Chinese‘s government recognizes that removing the non-
tradable share structure is vital to the future development of China‘s capital market 
due to the following reasons (Li et al., 2011): Firstly, split-share structure induces a 
severe incentive conflicts between non-tradable and tradable shareholders. The main 
agency problem in Asian emerging markets is the expropriation of small investors by 
the largest shareholders (Shlifer and Vishny, 1997). Secondly, the market for 
corporate control is a major external governance mechanism for improving corporate 
governance system. In China, since the state is as predominance shareholders, any 
                                                 
3
 The shares of companies in Singapore are called S-shares.  
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other owners cannot acquire controlling interest through open market transaction and 
this situation creates the market for corporate control an inefficient mechanism. 
Thirdly, a small public float (only one-third of total tradable shares) for a listed 
company in the stock market made shares illiquid. Finally, the rights of minority 
shareholders are frequently violated.  
Thus, the main aim of the split share reform is to eliminate the differences between 
non-tradable and tradable shares, and to balance the interest between the two types of 
shareholders in a market-oriented way.   
In June 2001, non-tradable shares were sold at market price. However, this first 
attempt did not provide any positive market reaction since extra supply of tradable 
shares in the market created a severe bear market and this led to a significant decline 
in the share prices. For example, share prices felled by more than 30% (Kim et al., 
2003). In light of these strong adverse reactions, Chinese government had to 
withdraw from the reform system in October 2002. Then, on April 29, 2005, the 
CSRC and Chinese government launched another attempt to implement the split-
share reforms with introducing a compensation scheme by inviting four companies.
4
 
This required that non-tradable shareholders had to negotiate a suitable 
compensation plan with tradable shareholders who held shares of the same company 
and implemented that plan before the non-tradable shares could be traded on the 
market.
 5
  The reform is completed when the proposal of each listed companies is 
approved by at least two thirds of the tradable shareholders and two-thirds of all 
shareholders at shareholders‘ meeting. If the first proposal is not accepted then the 
non-tradable shareholders have to come up with another proposal and negotiations 
begin afresh. The first official document, ‗Measures on the Administration of split-
share Structure Reforms of Listed Companies‘ provides guideline for the 
implementation of the reforms issued by the CSRC on September 5, 2005.  
Initially the split-share reform program was launched with four companies. Three of 
the four companies successfully accomplished the program in 35 days. The second 
group comprised 42 firms (28 from Shanghai and 14 from Shenzhen Stock 
                                                 
4
 They were: Tsinghua Tongfang, Hebei Jinniu Energy Resources, Shanghai Zijiang Enterpsise Group 
and Sany Heavy Industry. 
5
 Compensation can be a one-time cash payment and warrants. 
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Exchanges), that took 47 days to finalize the process.
6
 Then, the reform program was 
to be extended to all remaining listed companies. By the end of 2007, 1,298 listed 
companies, representing 98% of the total listed companies, had either initiated or 
completed the process of non-tradable share reform (Li et al., 2011). In addition, all 
new IPOs taking place since mid-2006 no longer have non-tradable shares. 
As can be seen Table 2.2, as a consequence of 2005- split share ownership reform 
state ownership and legal person ownership of Chinese listed firms decreased 
significantly after 2005, while they show a decreasing trend throughout the sample 
period of 2003 to 2010.  
 
Table 2.2 Ownership structure and board structure of Chinese listed firms over the 
period 2003 to 2010 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
State ownership 0.362 0.353 0.336 0.286 0.254 0.217 0.118 0.081 
Legal person ownership 0.218 0.218 0.216 0.182 0.145 0.122 0.089 0.091 
Foreign ownership 0.041 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.034 0.030 0.029 
Managerial ownership 0.005 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.029 0.037 0.049 0.081 
Board size 9.799 9.677 9.556 9.446 9.414 9.234 9.173 9.108 
Proportion of independent directors 0.334 0.344 0.348 0.351 0.356 0.358 0.360 0.360 
Source: Compiled by researcher from the data collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database.  
Note: See appendix A3.1 for definition of variables 
 
2.2.2.2. Managerial ownership 
 
Another important feature of ownership structure related to the 2005 reform is a 
significant increase in managerial ownership in Chinese listed firms. In January 
2006, the CSRC issued ―The Administrative Rules of Equity Compensation of 
Listed Companies‖, which allow the listed companies those who have successfully 
completed their split-share-reforms adopt equity based compensation plans with 
restricted stocks and stock options for their managers. In order to maintain true 
independence of independent directors, they were not included from any stock 
incentive scheme; instead, they were asked to provide independent opinions on the 
fairness and effect of proposed stock incentive schemes. It is expected that equity 
based compensation plans not only help to increase the income standards of the 
                                                 
6
 This group includes some large firms and comprises around 10% of market capitalization. 
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management, but also align their interest with shareholders‘ interest and with the 
long-term development of the enterprise. As we can observe from Table 2.2, in 
contrast to state and legal person ownership, shares owned by top management 
increased from 0.5% in 2003 to 8.1% in 2010. This shows that after series of 
ownership reforms, equity ownership by managers has emerged as an important 
governance tool in Chinese listed companies as discussed in Conyon and He (2011) 
and Walder (2011). 
2.2.3. Board of directors 
Another important internal governance mechanism that has undergone significant 
changes during the last decade in China is board of directors. In accordance with 
1994 Chinese company law, companies have adopted a two-tier board structure, a 
board of directors and a board of supervisors.  
Like in the Western countries such as the US and the UK China‘s company law also 
identifies the board of directors as the top level decision-making body of a company 
and thus the board is responsible for the strategic operations of the firm. Directors 
are appointed by shareholders at general shareholders‘ meetings. The board of 
directors is mainly expected to implement resolutions passed at the shareholders‘ 
meeting. However, unlike in the Western countries where the boards of directors 
with majority of outside directors have enormous power in appropriating and 
dismissing top executives and in determining their compensation, the board of 
directors of Chinese company has fewer powers and less prestige (Chen 2005; Su, 
2005). This is due to the fact that the government is the major shareholder of the 
majority of listed and thus almost 90% of the board members of these firms were 
government officials who lacked the necessary knowledge or experience (Su, 2005).  
In order to improve the corporate governance of listed firms and ensure better 
investors protection, the CSRC issued Guidelines for introducing independent 
directors in the boards of listed companies in 2002. The guidelines are mandatory 
and required all listed companies to have at least two independent directors on their 
boards by 30 June 2002, and at least one-third of the board members had to be made 
up by independent directors (including at least one professional in accounting) by 
June 2003.  Independent directors are appointed by the board of directors, the board 
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of supervisors, or any shareholder holding 5 percent of the shares. According to the 
Guidelines, the independent directors are not allowed to ―hold posts in the company 
other than the position of director‖ and were asked to ―maintain no relations with the 
listed company and its major shareholders that might prevent them from making 
objective judgment independently.‖  While the independent directors are entitled to 
vote on managerial and financial decisions, they are required to provide independent 
opinions on substantial decisions and connected transactions. These decisions and 
transactions can relate to merger and acquisition activities, the nomination, 
appointment or removal of directors, the appointment or removal of senior managers, 
the compensation of directors and senior managers, related party transactions, major 
investments, information disclosure, and financial statements. Yet, many empirical 
studies show that independent directors are an effective corporate governance 
mechanism in developed countries (e.g. Weisbaeh, 1988), it has been argued that in 
China, many independent directors are, however, appointed by controlling 
shareholders and are politically connected and therefore, their independence from the 
management is not certain (Clarke, 2003; Su, 2005; Liao et al., 2009). 
Table 2.2 shows that there is a slight decrease in the number of board of directors of 
listed firms over the period 2003–2010. The number of board of directors declined 
from 9.8 in 2003 to 9.1 in 2010. On the other hand, we can see a steady increase in 
the proportion of independent directors of the companies which increased from about 
0.33% in 2003 to about 0.36% in 2010.   
2.2.4. Board of supervisors 
According to the Company Law, Chinese companies should have a board of 
supervisors to oversee finances, ensure diligent actions of the directors and senior 
management, and report any impropriety, abuse of discretionary power, or action 
that affects the firm. The Company Law requires that at least a third should be 
worker representatives on the board of supervisors but does not specify the 
proportion of representatives of shareholders or employees. Clarke (2006) points out 
that the board of supervisors lacks powers to effectively carry out its monitoring 
activities in Chinese listed companies. Unlike in the German corporate governance 
model where the supervisory board sits between the shareholders and the board of 
directors and can appoint board of directors, in the Chinese corporate governance 
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model, the supervisory board does not have the power to hire and fire directors.  
Thus, the supervisory power of Chinese supervisory boards is relatively soft and 
seeks to act through influence. Research suggests that Chinese supervisory boards 
are often ineffective; their meetings are not well attended and have little influence on 
firms‘ decisions such as capital structure decisions, since most of their members are 
politically connected, and lack professional qualification or experience (Dahya et al., 
2003; Tricker, 2009).  Furthermore, since board of supervisors do not usually 
involve in the management of the business, the supervisory committee is more 
decorative than functional (Yang et al., 2011). Therefore, in our study, we do not 
include supervisory board characteristics in the analysis of capital structure decisions 
of Chinese listed firms. 
2. 3. Public debt (bond) market 
China‘s public debt market is still under-developed and lags far behind the 
development of the equity market. In China, bond market is dominated by 
government bonds and by bonds issued by policy banks. Corporate bonds issued by 
non-financial corporations in China account for a mere 1% of Chinese GDP, 
compared to an average of about 50% in other emerging markets. This undeveloped 
corporate bond market is mainly attributed to the lack of sound accounting and 
auditing systems and high-quality bond-rating agencies in China (Allen et al., 2012). 
Although bonds were first issued in 1986, the bond market has only begun to expand 
after 2000, when new rules governing issuance were implemented. Apart from the 
giant SOEs, local firms are also encouraged to issue corporate bonds and market 
forces increasingly determine the spread on bonds. Yet, China‘s bond market is still 
very small compared to its huge banking scoter.   
 
2.4. The banking system in China 
Chinese firms mainly rely on banks for their external financing (Allen et al., 2005; 
Cull and Xu, 2005). Recent studies suggest that following the liberalization of 
China‘s financial system and the improvement in the corporate governance of the 
banking sector, Chinese banks play a significant role in monitoring corporate 
activities and improving the efficiency of corporations. It is, therefore, important to 
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understand the Chinese banking system, and its development in order to understand 
its implications for firm behaviour. 
Prior to economic reform in 1978, China‘s financial system had only one bank 
namely the People‘s Bank of China (PBOC), which played both the role of central 
bank and commercial bank. China launched significant structural changes in its 
banking sector from the late 1970s though it was gradual in line with its economic 
reforms. As a first step, to take over all the commercial banking functions from the 
People‘s Bank of China (the central bank), the government established four wholly 
state-owned banks (known as the Big Four)
7
.  
Aiming to make the Big Four real enterprises, a sequence of further reforms have 
been undertaken by Chinese government: (i) allowing them engage in business 
outside of their designated economic sector since 1985, (ii) three specialized ―policy 
banks‖ were established in 1994 to take over the policy lending functions from the 
four state owned banks,
8
 (iii) they have also been subject to reform in terms of 
managerial and mechanistic aspects
9
. From that point onwards, the Big Four, known 
as commercial banks, were expected to operate in accordance with market principles. 
Other subsequent developments made in the reform process during the 1990s include 
(i) the transformation of urban credit cooperatives into commercial banks (ii) 
permitting to establish non-state commercial banks in order to provide competition 
to state banks, (iii) introduction of standard accounting and prudential norms. (iv) to 
resolve the problem of the accumulated large non-performing loans (NPLs) of the 
Big Four,  the government injected RMB 27 billion of capital into the four state-
owned banks and transferred the NPLs to four newly established asset management 
companies.  
                                                 
7
 The Big Four are: the Bank of China (BOC) which took over the transactions related to foreign trade 
and investment; the People‘s Construction Bank of China (PCBC) which specialized in transactions 
related to fixed investment; and the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) which specialized in all 
banking business in rural area and finally, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was 
established to take over all commercial transactions (deposit-taking and lending business) of the 
PBOC. 
8
 These include State Development Banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of China and the 
Export and Import Bank of China. These banks are responsible for financing economic and trade 
development and state-invested projects, and promoting export and food productions. 
9
 For instance, the importance of risk management has been reinforced and their managers are held 
responsible for their lending decisions (Allen et al., 2012) 
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Furthermore, in 1995, the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law were 
promulgated, in an effort to improve bank lending standards and make bank 
managers accountable for bank performance. The Chinese government also began to 
establish joint stock commercial banks and city banks.  
After these reforms, the Chinese banking system comprises the central bank, four 
large state-owned commercial banks, three policy banks, then national joint-stock 
commercial banks, regional commercial banks, and urban and rural credit 
cooperatives. During the 1990s these banks were the type of financial institutions in 
the market and as such were actively involved in providing capital for corporate 
sector growth, but under supervision from the People‘s Bank of China.  Yet, since 
the largest shareholders in most of joint-equity banks are usually SOEs, almost all 
the banks were directly or indirectly controlled by the Chinese government. The key 
issues that the Chinese banking sector still faced were: the state control of banks, 
more loans going to unproductive SOEs (i.e. poor lending decisions made for SOEs), 
and the larger amount of nonperforming loans (NPLs) within the four largest state-
owned banks due to political or other non-economic reasons (Cull and Xu, 2003; 
Allen et al., 2005). 
Yet, many additional changes were introduced after China‘s entry into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. These include further liberalization of interest 
rates, fewer restrictions on ownership, increased operational freedom and partial 
privatization. In line with commitments of the WTO agreement, China has further 
opened up its banking sector to foreign banks in full scale in the following five-year 
period. From 2003 onwards, foreign banks in 13 cities were allowed to conduct 
local-currency business with domestic firms. Large foreign banks were allowed to 
acquire significant stake and become strategic partners of major state-owned banks.
10 
 
By 2006, there were over 300 foreign bank branches in China (Lin, 2011). 
The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the Central Huijin 
Investment Company were set up in 2002 in order to provide closer scrutiny and 
better monitoring of banking activities, and to facilitate restructuring, reform, and 
                                                 
10
 For example, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) acquired a 19.9% stake of 
the Bank of Communication. The Bank of America and the Royal Bank of Scotland have become 
strategic partners of the China Construction Bank and the Bank of China, respectively. 
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initial public offerings of state-owned banks, respectively. Until 2004, the Big Four 
were SOEs solely owned by the Chinese government. However, in 2005, the 
government started to privatize these banks through the recruitment of strategic 
investors (by providing minority foreign ownership stakes) and by listing them on 
the stock exchange
11
. Qin (2007) points out that China‘s accession to WTO has 
institutionalized the process of China‘s domestic reform externally through the force 
of WTO obligations. 
In light of these developments, more recent research suggests that participation of 
foreign capital and management in Big Four state banks, listing of these banks and 
many other city commercial banks on stock exchanges from mid-2000, has exerted 
external market pressure on banks to follow commercial judgment and prudence in 
their lending practices and thus becoming more efficient in allocating credit to 
private firms (i.e. Chinese banks‘ traditional lending bias in favor of state-owned 
enterprises is less likely to prevail) (Jia, 2009 and Lin, 2011 Lin and Bo, 2012; Tsai 
et al. 2014).
 
Allen et al. (2012) note that now loan officers in banks and other 
financial institutions are held responsible for their poor lending decisions. Consistent 
with these developments, Firth et al. (2009) provide evidence that Chinese banks 
provide loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms. Ayyagari et al. 
(2008) suggest that unlike financing from alternative channels, financing from 
China‘s formal financial system (e.g., bank financing) is associated with faster firm 
growth.   
Finally, it is worth noting that, as Allen et al. (2012) point out, although Chinese 
banking system has become efficient in allocating resources, it is still mainly 
controlled by the ‗Big Four‘ banks which have become publicly listed and traded 
companies in recent years, with the government being the largest shareholder and 
retaining control. 
 
                                                 
11
 The CBC which went public through IPO in Hong Kong in October 2005, followed by the 
BOC in June 2006; the ICBC in October 2006 (both in Hong Kong); finally ABC took an IPO 
in Shanghai and Hong Kong in July 2010. 
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2. 5. Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that China has made significant progress in introducing a 
formal corporate governance system for listed firms, and in liberalizing its financial 
sector, improving governance of state owned banks. However, Chinese government 







Capital structure decisions and corporate governance: Evidence 
from Chinese Listed companies 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Corporate capital structure decisions are not only important for firms to maximize 
their value but also for the growth and stability of firms and the corporate economy 
as a whole (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Firm financing patterns have long been the 
object of study in the corporate finance literature (Haris and Raviv, 1991). Capital 
structure choices of corporations have traditionally been analysed in the Modigliani-
Miller (1958) framework, expanded to incorporate taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency 
cost, and asymmetric information issues (such as signalling, adverse selection). 
Early studies use the trade-off theory, pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Myers, 1984), and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to explain the 
use of leverage. Many recent studies have also related financing patterns to product 
market structure, firm performance, market timing, ownership structure, corporate 
governance, and financial crises (Baker and Wurgler, 2001; Dessi and Robertson, 
2003; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Data et al., 2005; Pandy, 2006: Baum et al., 2007;  
Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Guney et al., 2011, Sun et al., 2015).  
A large number of studies, for example Titman and Wessels (1988), and Wald 
(1999), have empirically examined determinants of capital structure in the context 
of developed economies. Most early papers  examine the case of US companies (see 
Haris and Raviv, 1991, for a detailed review), whilst Rajan and Zingales (1995) test 
the theoretical and empirical lessons learnt from the US studies for the G7 
countries. These authors find a similar behaviour of leverage across countries, thus 
refuting the idea that firms in bank-oriented countries are more leveraged than those 
in market-oriented countries.
12
 Rajan and Zingales (1995) also find that the 
determinants of capital structure that have been reported for the USA (size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, and tangible assets) are important in other countries as 
                                                 
12
 Market-oriented countries include the UK and the USA. Bank-oriented countries include Japan, 
France and Germany. 
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well. They show that a good understanding of the relevant institutional context 
(bankruptcy law, fiscal treatment, ownership concentration, and accounting 
standards) is required when identifying the fundamental determinants of capital 
structure.
13
 Recently, there has been a growing body of literature on capital 
structure decisions from developing countries, for example Wiwattanakantang 
(1999), Booth et al. (2001), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Kim et al. (2006), and Črnigoj 
and Mramor (2009).  
In the context of China, a handful of empirical studies examine capital structure 
decisions (for example, Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006; Zou and Xiao, 2006; 
Qian et al., 2009; Moosa et al., 2011). A common feature of all these studies based 
on Chinese listed companies is that they use data before 2005
14
. Therefore, these 
studies do not consider changes occurred after the major split-share reform initiated 
by Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC hereafter) and Chinese 
government in 2005.  The aim of the 2005 split-share structure reform is to convert 
non-tradable shares into tradable shares in order to facilitate the liquidity in the 
secondary market. Before implementing the reform, the non-tradable shareholders 
of a firm have to negotiate with tradable shareholders to ensure that they get a 
suitable compensation package before trading occurs.
15
 Moreover, they do not 
consider the possible effects of agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders or governance mechanisms on the capital structure in a unified 
framework and they have failed to consider potential endogeniety and the dynamic 
nature of firm‘s capital structure decisions.
16
  
In recent years, much of the attention of academics and practitioners has been focused 
on corporate governance issues, in particular, the impact of corporate governance issues 
on several important decisions (primarily investment and financing decisions) made by 
managers and the resultant performance and valuation of firms (See Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Brown et al., 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012). The significance of research 
                                                 
13
 Note that capital structure, leverage and debt capital or debt financing are used interchangeable 
throughout the paper. 
14
 One exception is Chang et al. (2014) who use data from 1998 to 2009, however, they do not take 
into account differences in the pre- and post-reform periods.  
15
 The compensation package/ plan should be approved by 2/3 of the total voting shareholders and the 
voting tradable shareholders.  
16
 One exception is Qian et al. (2009) who use of 650 Chinese publicly listed companies over the 
period 1999 to 2004 to examine the dynamic nature of capital structure model of Chinese listed 
companies.   
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on corporate governance has its origins in the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
They argue that there is potential for substantial agency costs resulting from the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders when the ownership and control of the 
firm are separated.
17
 One of the important agency problems discussed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) is professional managers‘ tendency for excess consumption of 
perquisites and empire building (i.e. rather than maximising shareholders wealth, 
undertaking negative net present value (NPV) investments on the expansion of the firm 
to enhance their reputation and compensation).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that agency problem between managers and 
shareholders can be reduced by the use of debt capital as a governance mechanism,  
since this can help to prevent dilution of equity ownership of insiders and provides 
additional monitoring from the debt holders, resulting in reduced the agency costs of 
outside equity. Therefore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that even in the absence 
of a tax shield advantage, debt financing increases firm value by reducing agency 
costs of equity. The subsequent theoretical development in the agency theory 
(Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen 1986; Stulz, 1990), suggests that leverage indeed 
can be an effective corporate governance mechanism that mitigates the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders by disciplining managers (i.e. debt is an effective 
mechanism in curbing the self-interested behaviour of mangers). The rationale behind 
this is threefold (1) managers are closely monitored by debt-holders and the financial 
market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rajan and Winton, 1995; Stulz, 2000) (2) fixed 
interest payment to the debt holders disgorges the free cash flow available to the 
managers‘ discretionary spending (Jensen, 1986) and (3) potential for risk of 
bankruptcy and the resulting loss of reputation and jobs for managers (Fama, 1980; 
Grossman and Hard, 1982; Williams, 1987). However, the crucial empirical question is 
how to encourage managers who consider leverage as constraining their discretionary 
power, to choose the optimal level of leverage that maximizes shareholders‘ wealth. 
That is, the leverage choice itself is an agency problem: managers may deviate from 
value –maximising capital structure choices and thus make themselves comfortable to 
                                                 
17
 The main reason is that the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers arises when 
managers have very small ownership stakes in the firm, while a large proportion of corporate assets are 
controlled by them (Berle and Means, 1932). This situation may create moral hazard issues in 
corporations. Another reason is that high level of information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders (Myers, 1977) 
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pursue their own self-interest. 
Several empirical studies provide evidence that corporate governance mechanisms 
are associated with the use of debt capital in the capital structure. For example, 
Friend and Lang (1988) use data of 984 NYSE firms over the period 1979 to 1983 
to show that the level of leverage is negatively related to management‘s 
shareholding, implying that managers who have large stakes in the corporation use 
less corporate debt in order to reduce their non-diversifiable firm specific risk 
associated with their human capital vested in the firm. That is the use of higher debt 
ratios results in greater agency costs to management than to public investors.
18
 In 
contrast, using data of 124 manufacturing firms from COMPUSTAT annual 
industrial files over the period 1979 to 1980, Mehran (1992), reports a positive 
relationship between equity owned by managers and firms‘ leverage, meaning that 
equity ownership provides managers with the incentive to use more debt capital so 
as to maximise their own wealth and outside shareholders‘ wealth. 
In addition, many empirical studies (e.g., Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Merhan, 1992; 
Berger et al., 1997; Brailsford et al., 2002) show that other governance mechanisms 
such as the monitoring by outside bock-holders and independent directors  are 
positively associated with the increased use of debt-equity ratios in firms. A positive 
relation between external block holders and leverage suggest that large shareholders 
have greater incentives to monitor the management, resulting in decreased 
managerial opportunistic behaviour and thus lower agency costs.  
Taken together, theoretical and empirical studies from western countries suggest 
that conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders and the corporate 
governance mechanisms devised to solve them have impact on the use of debt in 
firms‘ capital structure.  
Additionally, research based on emerging markets where minority shareholders‘ 
protection is rather weak suggests that leverage can be used by controlling 
shareholders to fund resources to expropriate without diluting his or her control over 
                                                 
18
 This is consistent with an argument by Amihud and Lev (1981). According to which managers are 
unable to minimise their risk of investment since their investment ties up with un-diversifiable 
human capital vested in the firm whereas public investors can diversify their investment through 
investing in a well-diversified portfolio. 
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the corporation (Ellul, 2008; Faccio et al., 2010).
19
 Faccio et al. (2010) investigate 
controlling shareholders‘ expropriation of outside shareholders‘ interests in East 
Asian and European economies. They argue that the governance role of leverage 
depends on the structure of firm ownership and control. That is leverage could 
constrain managers‘ expropriation of the resources owned by diffused shareholders 
like in Western countries, but it could facilitate the expropriation of minority 
shareholders‘ rights by controlling shareholders of firms that are prevalent in Europe 
and Asia. Their findings also suggest that Asian institutions appear ineffective 
because they allow controlling shareholders of firms lower down a pyramid to 
increase leverage to acquire more resources for their expropriation. These arguments 
predict a positive relationship between controlling/largest shareholders and leverage 
of the firms. Conversely, a counter argument is that concentrated ownership may 
substitute for the disciplinary role of debt financing, suggesting a negative 
relationship between them (Grier and Zychowicz, 1994; Deesomsak et al., 2004). 
 
In sum, theoretical and empirical studies using agency theory as a theoretical 
framework suggest that managerial incentives, controlling shareholders‘ motives and 
the existing corporate governance structure in the firm have significant influence on the 
capital structure choices made by managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Berger et al., 
1997; Faccio et al., 2010). Therefore, a firm‘s observed capital structure is the result of 
the combination of managers‘ incentive, controlling shareholders‘ objectives and the 
robustness of the governance mechanisms in place to ensure the interest of outside 
shareholders or minority shareholders as well as the traditional financial determinants 
that have been typically used to explain capital structure choices. 
 
Yet, empirical studies on the impact of corporate governance on corporate financing 
decisions of Chinese listed firms are very limited. As an early study on the topic, 
Wen et al. (2002) use a sample of 60 Chinese listed firms over the period 1996 to 
1998 and show that there is a lower leverage level when the percentage of outside 
directors on the board is higher and the tenure of the CEO is longer. Huang and Song 
(2006) show that while leverage decreases with managerial shareholding, 
                                                 
19
 For example, state agencies raise debt capital using firms under their control to pursue their 
political and social objectives at the expenses of minority shareholders interest of maximising their 
wealth. 
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institutional ownership has no significant impact on capital structure. Zou and Xiao 
(2006) use a panel of 216 Chinese PLCs over the period 1993-2000 to show that the 
various type of ownership (i.e., state, domestic legal person and foreign ownership) 
do not have any important impact on capital structure choices.  
 
However, the proceeding analysis suggests the existing empirical studies in the 
context of Chinese corporations are incomplete. For example, Huang and Song 
(2006) include only managerial and institutional ownership in their capital structure 
model and do not include other corporate governance variables such as board size 
and board composition. Similarly, Zou and Xiao (2006) and Shen (2008) also only 
include some of the ownership variables but not other corporate governance 
variables such as managerial ownership and the board structure variables. In 
contrast, Wen et al. (2002) include board structure and fixed compensation of 
managers but not the shareholdings by managers or other ownership variables. Their 
analysis of the effects of independent directors was before a formal corporate 
governance code for the independent directors system has been introduced in China. 
Furthermore, Qian et al. (2009) only include state ownership in addition to other 
determinants in their dynamic capital structure model of Chinese listed companies.  
While Marhan (1992) shows that the capital structure models that ignore agency 
costs are incomplete, Moh‘d et al. (1998) argue that dynamic nature of adjustment of 
the firms‘ capital structure are influenced by the changes in the ownership structure 
through time. Moreover, other empirical studies from developed countries (for 
example Berger et al., 1997) employ a wide range of corporate governance variables 
to study the linkages between corporate governance and capital structure decisions. 
Therefore, it is clear that existing studies on the link between capital structure 
decisions and corporate governance in the context of Chinese financial market are 
incomplete, and that there has been significant changes in the ownership structure 
after 2005 split share reform especially the increase in the private and managerial 
ownership. Hence, clearly, it is increasingly interesting to see how evolving 
ownership and corporate governance structures of Chinese listed corporations affect 
their financing behaviours.  
In this study, using a sample of 1844 Chinese non-financial firms over the period 
2003 to 2010,  we examine the link between ownership and corporate governance 
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structures, on the one hand and capital structure decisions, on the other. Controlling 
for traditional determinants of leverage, endogeneity, and persistency in capital 
structure decisions using use the system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimator, 
we find that firms adjust their leverage towards target leverage at a moderate speed 
(12%)
20
. Furthermore, the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining 
leverage ratios. More importantly, we document a strong positive relationship 
between managerial shareholding and total leverage, consistent with the incentive 
alignment hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). We also find that managerial 
ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split 
share reform period. We also find that state ownership negatively influence leverage 
decisions. We explain this by the fact that state banks have become semi-commercial 
banks and started to act indiscriminately towards all the firms, regardless of the state 
involvements in them (Lin and Bo, 2011) and thus, managers in state controlled 
firms no longer enjoy easy access of finance from state owned banks. Therefore, the 
risk averse managers in the state owned firms with weak incentives (Kato and Long, 
2006a, b, c, and 2011) are more likely to pursue a lower level of leverage. This result 
may also imply that SOEs not only may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance but 
also might receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity 
financing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our empirical results also reveal that 
while foreign ownership negatively influence leverage decisions, legal person 
shareholding does not influence firms‘ leverage decisions. Finally, we also find that 
the board structure variables (board size and board composition/proportion of 
independent directors) do not influence firms‘ capital structure decisions.  
 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
theoretical background on corporate governance and capital structure decisions. 
Section 3 reviews empirical studies on the link between corporate governance and 
capital structure decisions. Section 4 develops testable hypotheses. Section 5 
presents baseline models and discusses our estimation methodology. Section 6 
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 The target leverage means the ideal value for a company's financial leverage. Managers attempt to 
calculate target leverage ratio for a company by determining the level of debt they are comfortable at, 
and attempt to reach or maintain that level. See Section 3.5.1.1for detailed discussion. 
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describes data and presents some descriptive statistics. In Section 7, we discuss our 
empirical results, before drawing some conclusions in section 8. 
 
3.2. Theoretical framework on corporate governance and capital structure 
decisions 
 
This section presents the main capital structure theories: the static trade-off theory, 
the pecking order theory and the agency theory. The aim of reviewing the capital 
structure theories is to develop a theoretical framework for predicting the effects of 
the determinants of capital structure. In addition, we also discuss theoretical concepts 
of corporate governance. 
 
For a long time, the issue of capital structure choices and the resulting effect on the 
value of the firm has been a controversial and much disputed area. The main issue of 
debate revolve primarily around the optimal capital structure that maximizes the 
value of the firm (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 and 1963; Miller, 1977). Capital 
structure means the mix of different sources of financing such as equity and debt 
(Panday, 2006). In fact, the debate on the modern theory of capital structure began 
with the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) which shows that subject to 
some conditions, the impact of debt financing on the value of the firm is irrelevant.
21
 
They contend in their first proposition that the market value of any firm is 
independent to its capital structure, and is given by capitalizing its expected return at 
the rate appropriate to the risk class (i.e. the levels of risk of the firm) (Modigliani 
and Miller 1958). This first proposition has been criticized and the main argument is 
that it is theoretically very sound but is based on the assumptions of perfect capital 
market, no taxes (personal or corporate), no distress costs and equal access to 
information which are not valid in reality.  
Following the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the literature on capital 
structure has been expanded through many theoretical and empirical contributions. 
Scholars have placed much emphasis on releasing the assumptions made by 
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 Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition I states that the total market value of the firm‘s securities 
is equal to the market value of its assets, independent on whether the firm is unlevered or levered.  
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Modigliani and Miller (1958), in particular by taking into account corporate taxes 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963),  bankruptcy costs (Stiglitz,1972; Titman,1984), 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), information  asymmetries (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984), and imperfect capital markets (Baker and Jeffrey, 2002). 
The alternative theories that currently dominate the empirical studies include the 
trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and, the agency theory. 
3.2.1 The trade-off theory 
 
This theory is a result of releasing assumptions of ‗no corporate taxes‘ and ‗no 
financial distress costs‘ (i.e. bankruptcy costs). For example, Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) relaxed their assumptions by incorporating the effect of taxes on the cost of 
capital and thus value of the firm, and contend that, in the presence of corporate tax, 
the value of the firm varies with the variation of the use of debt due to tax shield 
advantages. Tax shields occur when firms use debt financing in their capital 
structure, as firms have to pay interest on debt which is generally tax deductible. 
Thus, interest payments act as a tax shield and allow the firm to increase its value.   
However, when considering the financial distress costs that arise from maintaining 
high levels of debt (e.g., bankruptcy costs) (Stiglitz, 1972), the value of the firm is 
determined by its net benefits (i.e. tax shield benefits minus costs). Therefore, the 
total value of the levered firm (VL) is now calculated by the value of the firm 
without leverage (VU) plus interest tax shield (ITS) benefits minus present values 
(PV) of costs. 
VL = VU + (PV of ITS) – (PV of financial distress costs) – (PV of agency cost of 
debt) + PV (agency benefits of debt) 
Therefore, the trade-off theory posits that firms maximise their value when the 
benefits that stem from debt (e.g. the tax shield and reduced costs of informational 
asymmetry attached to debt compared to outside equity) outweigh or equal the 
marginal cost of debt (e.g. bankruptcy costs, and agency costs) (Modigliani   and   
Miller, 1963; Stiglitz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Titman, 
1984). Adding debt to a firm‘s capital structure lowers its (corporate) tax liability and 
increases the after-tax cash flow available to the residual owners of the firm. Thus, 
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there is a positive relationship between the (corporate) tax shield and the value of the 
firm. However, when a firm raises excessive debt to finance its operations, it may 
default on this debt.  The firm‘s continuous failure to make payments to debtholders 
can ultimately lead to insolvency of the firm (Stiglitz, 1972; Titman, 1984). 
Therefore, the trade-off theory suggests that there is an optimum level of capital 
structure that maximizes the value of the firm.  
According to the static trade-off theory, firm size, profitability, and tangibility are 
positively related to leverage whereas growth opportunities, volatility and non-debt 
tax shields are negatively related to leverage. Larger firms are more diversified than 
smaller firms and less prone to bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels, 1988). In addition, 
larger firms with better reputation in capital markets face lower agency cost of debt. 
Thus, they are expected to have a higher debt capacity compared to smaller firms.  
When a profitable firm employs debt, the greater the profitability, the greater will be 
the tax shield benefits, and the lower the financial distress cost and agency cost of the 
debt. Therefore, the theory predicts a positive relationship between profitability and 
leverage. 
When tangible assets are used as collateral for debt, the firm is restricted to use funds 
for a specified investment by collateralized debt, resulting in lenders being offered 
more favourable terms with a lower level of risk (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris 
and Raviv, 1997). Therefore, the theory predicts that a larger proportion of tangible 
assets are expected to be associated with a higher level of leverage. 
Growth opportunities are intangible in nature and cannot be collateralized. If the 
firms with high growth opportunities face bankruptcy, their value will fall, implying 
that they are likely to face higher-expected bankruptcy costs. Therefore, the trade-
off-theory predicts an opposite relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage. 
Firms with higher earnings volatility are more likely to face higher expected cost of 
financial distress and should use less leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009). The theory 
therefore predicts a negative relationship between the volatility of earnings and 
firm‘s leverage.  
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A major motivation for using debt is to get a tax shield benefit. Firms can also use 
non-debt financing (such as depreciation) to reduce the tax payments. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) show that non-debt tax shields may substitute for the tax shield 
benefits of debt. Therefore, the theory predicts a firm with higher non-debt tax shield 
are expected to have lower levels of leverage, ceteris paribus.  
3.2.2 The pecking order theory 
 
The pecking order theory, which was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Myers (1984) is linked to information asymmetries existing between insiders of the 
firm and outsiders (i.e. the capital market). The theory suggests that managers adapt 
their financing policies to minimise the cost of information asymmetries. Managers 
therefore prefer internal financing to external financing, and risky debt to equity 
since debt capital suffers less from information asymmetries than equity. That is debt 
is the first source of external finance on the pecking order and equity is issued only 
as a last resort, when the debt capacity is fully utilised. In contrast to the trade-off 
theory, there is no well-defined target leverage ratio in the pecking-order theory. Tax 
benefits of debt are a second-order effect and the debt ratio changes when there is an 
imbalance between internal funds and real investment opportunities. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) state that the more profitable firms will use retained earning first as 
investment funds and then move to debt and finally to equity as only if necessary. 
Thus, this theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage ratio and 
profitability/availability of internal funds.  
Furthermore, according to the pecking-order theory, firm size is negatively related to 
leverage but growth opportunities and tangibility are positively related to leverage. 
Rajan and Ziangales (1995) show that larger firms may use less debt in their capital 
structure since they may face lower levels of information asymmetry due to the fact 
that as they have been around longer, they are well established in the markets and 
thus are capable of issuing equity, in addition to using internal financial slack. 
Therefore, the theory predicts a negative relationship between firm size and leverage.  
In their model, Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that issuing equity is costly 
due to the asymmetric information problem between managers and outside investors. 
For this reason, firms with more tangible assets (i.e., properties with known values) 
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can use more secured debt to take advantage of this opportunity. Therefore, the 
theory predicts a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage.  
Finally, firms with high growth opportunities are likely to use more debt than equity 
because they face higher information asymmetries. Furthermore, since firms with 
more investment means their future profitability is fixed, they should be able to 
accumulate more debt over time (Fank and Goyal, 2009). Therefore, the pecking 
order theory predicts a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage.  
3.2.3 The agency theory 
 
The above two theories (i.e. the static trade-off and pecking order theories) are based 
on the assumption that the interest of the managers of a corporation with dispersed 
ownership is always aligned with that of shareholders. That is, managers take only 
value maximising financing decisions. In contrast, the agency theory assumes that 
self-interested managers always pursue their own objectives at the expenses of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally model the agency costs of equity and debt 
capital in a modern corporation. They identify two types of agency conflicts namely, 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, and conflicts between shareholders 
and bond holders, and the related agency costs in a firm. Moreover, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p.308) defined the agency costs as ―the sum of monitoring costs, 
bonding costs and residual loss‖.. The first type of cost is the monitoring cost, which 
is the cost of establishing some appropriate incentives for the managers, and to carry 
out oversight of the manager‘s activities. These expenditures are paid by the 
principal. The second type of cost is bonding costs. These costs arise when managers 
reveal additional information to the shareholders that they are acting in order to 
satisfy their shareholders‘ interests. These expenditures are paid by agent. The final 
type of cost is residual loss as the reduction in welfare experienced by the 




3.2.3.1 Agency costs of outside equity 
 
The agency cost of outside equity (i.e. equity shares held by anyone outside of the 
firm) arises from the conflicts between shareholders and managers because managers 
do not hold total residual claims in a large corporation with diffuse ownership, thus 
cannot gain entirely from their value maximizing activities. Therefore, managers 
may exert less effort in managing the firm‘s resources and may have tendency to 
transfer the firm‘s resources for their own personal benefits. The managers bear the 
entire costs of refraining from these activities, but capture only a fraction of the gain. 
As a result, they do not pursue their activities in a manner to maximize shareholders 
wealth, meaning that they consume more perquisites and invest in unrelated 
businesses to build empires (such as corporate jets, luxurious offices etc.).  
This inefficiency can be mitigated if a larger ownership share is being held by 
managers (insider ownership), and if the fraction of firm is financed with debt 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As argued in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen 
(1986), debt capital not only brings in additional monitoring from outsiders (i.e. 
creditors) but also make managers commit to pay out cash, thus it reduces the 
amount available to managers to overinvest.  
3.2.3.2 Agency cost of debt 
 
Although Jensen and Meckling (1976) recommend debt financing as an important 
governance mechanism, in their paper, they also identified a cost of debt. The use of 
debt capital in the capital structure leads to conflicts between debt-holders and equity 
holders because debt contracts give equity holders an incentive to invest sub-
optimally (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If the investment goes well, shareholders 
(existing) will capture the benefits of debt financing. Yet, debt-holders (creditors) 
will bear the entire costs because of limited liability of shareholders if the investment 
fails. Moreover, shareholders know that debt can be an effective corporate 
governance mechanism to discipline managers. That is why equity holders may 
benefit from investing in riskier projects even if they are value decreasing. Such 
investments (also known as assets substitution effect) decrease the value of debt, 
while the loss in the value of equity due to poor investment is more than offset by the 
gain in equity value transferred from debt holders. However, if this assets 
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substitution effect is anticipated by debt-holders, and the cost of debt will be 
increased accordingly.  
 
Myers (1977) identifies another agency cost of debt. He argues that when firms are 
likely to go bankrupt in the near future, equity holders have no incentive to 
contribute new capital, even to invest in value-increasing projects because they bear 
the entire cost of the investment, while the returns may be captured mainly by debt-
holders (i.e. the debt overhang problem). Therefore, the firm may undesirably forego 
positive NPV projects due to the conflicts of interest between equity holders and 
debt holders. This is well documented as ―underinvest problem‖ in the agency 
literature. 
In sum, in asset substitution problem, equity holders will have incentives to increase 
the risk of the firm so as to increase the equity value at the expense of debt holders 
whereas in under investment problem, equity holders may forgo positive net-present-
value projects because they bear the full costs of the projects while debt holders 
enjoy most of the benefits. 
3.2.3.3 The trade-off between agency costs of outside equity and agency cost of 
debt 
 
Does a high leverage ratio always reduce the agency costs of outside equity? And 
how can firms decide the desired level of capital structure? Using a high debt ratio 
may initially reduce the agency cost of outside equity but, the opposite effect may 
occur for the agency cost of debt due to the conflicts between debt holders and 
shareholders. When leverage is relatively high, further borrowings may lead to 
conflicts between shareholders and debt holders and resulting agency costs of debt 
due to higher expected financial distress or bankruptcy costs. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest a non-monotonic relationship between leverage and total agency 
costs: when firm increases debt gradually from the initial level, this motivates 
managers to act in the interest of the shareholders (decreasing the agency costs of 
outside equity), reducing the total agency costs which will happen up to a certain 
point. Thereafter, a further increase in leverage will lead to higher total agency costs 
of outside debt than the agency costs of outside equity due to the higher expected 
bankruptcy costs and financial distress costs. Therefore, an optimal capital structure 
 41 
can be reached by minimizing total agency costs at optimal fraction of outside 
financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
According to the agency theory, firm size, profitability and, tangibility are positively 
related to leverage, whereas growth opportunities are inversely related to leverage. 
Larger firms tend to provide more information to outsiders in the market, resulting in 
lower levels of agency cost of debt (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the theory 
predicts a positive relationship between firm size and leverage.  
 
There are conflicting theoretical predictions on the effects of profitability on firms‘ 
leverage. On the one hand, the agency theory suggests that the disciplinary role of 
debt financing is more valuable for profitable firms since (1) it reduces free cash 
flow available to managers‘ discretionary spending (i.e. empire building) and (2) it 
also helps avoid threat of takeover in the presence of an active market for corporate 
control (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Therefore, Jensen (1986) predicts a positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage. On the other hand, in the absence of 
an effective market for corporate control (such as is the case in China), managers of 
profitable firms use a lower level of leverage in order to avoid the disciplinary role 
of debt (Rajan and Singales, 1995), which suggests  a negative relationship between 
profitability and firms‘ leverage.   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that high-levered firms tend to invest sub-
optimally in order to expropriate wealth from firms‘ debt-holders.  If the debt is 
collateralized by tangible assets, the borrowers will be restricted to use the fund for a 
specified project. Moreover, the agency theory therefore predicts a positive 
relationship between leverage and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. 
 
The agency theory does not give a clear prediction for growth opportunities. It, on 
the one hand, predicts a negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage due to the following reasons (i.e., to avoid costs of debt): (1) managers of 
high growth firms have tendency for expropriation of debt-holders‘ wealth in favour 
of equity holders through asset substitution effects: managers (who act on behalf of 
shareholders) have incentive to shift funds from low-risk investment projects to 
high-risk ones in order to earn higher profit in the short term period. This strategy 
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allows equity holders to increase their benefit at the expenses of debtholdes (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976); (2) Myers (1977) suggests that if a firm is highly leveraged, 
excessive leverage may force shareholders to pass up profitable investment 
opportunities (under-investment problem) since returns to investment will mostly 
benefit debt-holders rather than shareholders. Furthermore, managers may forego 
positive NPV projects to avoid excess risk arising from the higher level of leverage, 
since their investment is tied up with un-diversifiable human capital vested in the 
firm (May, 1995). Thus, in order to mitigate the asset substitution and under-
investment problems, firms with higher growth opportunities would use lower level 
of leverage. On the other hand, a greater potential for free cash flow problem (i.e., 
managers can indulge and build empires) in high growth firms can be manifested in 
the form of higher leverage ratio (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, as Jensen (1986) notes, 
managers may use debt financing as a defensive tool against corporate raiders who 
are attracted by the growth prospects of the firm (market for corporate control). This 
suggests a positive effect of growth on the leverage of the firm. 
 
3.3. Review of empirical studies on capital structure decisions and corporate 
governance 
 
In this section we review in detail the empirical studies which examine the linkages 
between capital structure decisions and corporate governance. We analyze these 
studies on three main captions, namely studies based on Western countries, studies 
based on developing countries and finally studies based on the Chinese context.  
3.3.1 Empirical studies based on developed countries 
 
A large number of studies from developed capital markets provide strong empirical 
evidence that corporate governance characteristics affect corporate financing 
decision. One of the early empirical studies is by Friend and Lang (1988). Using data 
of 984 NYSE firms over the period 1979 to 1983, they examine whether capital 
structure decisions are at least in part motivated by managerial self-interest. They 
find that managerial shareholding is negatively related to leverage, and they interpret 
this finding as evidence supporting the view that the use of a higher debt ratio results 
in greater non-diversifiable risk of debt to management than to public or outside 
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investors. This is due to the fact that managers are unable to minimize their risk of 
investment since their investment is tied up with un-diversifiable human capital 
vested in the firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981). If a project fails, managers lose much 
more than shareholders. In this situation, if they use higher debt ratio, the cost of 
bankruptcy and financial distress will increases, resulting loss of managers‘ 
employment and their future employment. Therefore, when managerial ownership 
increases they prefer lower levels of leverage. Moreover, they find that large non-
managerial shareholding is positively related to firms‘ leverage, implying that they 
have higher ability to monitor the management. In the case of traditional 
determinants, their results show that leverage is negatively associated with 
profitability and volatility while leverage is positively related to size and tangibility. 
 
In a similar vein, Mehran (1992) uses a cross section of 124 manufacturing firms from 
COMPUSTAT annual industrial files over the period 1979 to 1980 to examine the 
relationship between corporate control and capital structure decisions. Mehran (1992) 
finds a positive relationship between the firms‘ leverage and equity owned by 
managers, consistent with the notion that equity ownership provides managers with the 
incentive to use more leverage so as to maximise their own wealth and outside 
shareholders‘ wealth. Yet, he does not find evidence of a non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and leverage (i.e. the squared term of managerial 
ownership is not inversely related to leverage. Thus, there is a monotonic relationship 
between managerial ownership and leverage. He also reports a positive relationship 
between independent directors, in particular investment bankers on the board, and 
leverage, implying that firm can borrow more easily from the banks without releasing 
too much information to outsiders in the market. Therefore, he concludes that the 
firm‘s capital structure is related to agency costs between managers and shareholders 
and the capital structure models that ignore agency costs are incomplete. In the case of 
traditional determinants, growth opportunities have a negative impact on leverage, 
while collateral value of assets has no significant effect.  
Different from the previous studies, Berger et al. (1997) focus on the effect of 
managerial entrenchment on firm‘s leverage choices. In their static models, they 
include CEO tenure, CEO‘s ownership of stock and options and various measures of 
board monitoring, as well as the standard financial control variables.  Focusing on a 
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panel made up of 3085 firm-year observation over the period1984 to1991, they find 
a positive relationship between managerial ownership and leverage, implying that 
managers whose financial incentives are closely tied to outside shareholders‘ wealth 
recognize the benefits of leverage (both tax and monitoring) and pursue more debt in 
order to pursue the value maximization objective of the firm. However, they find that 
levels of leverage are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either large 
shareholders and compensation incentives or active monitoring. Furthermore, they 
find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to 
managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO 
replacements, and the addition of representatives of major stockholders to the board. 
Therefore, Berger et al. (1997) conclude that their latter results provide support for 
their contention that entrenched CEOs choose lower leverage. Additionally, they find 
that board size is inversely related to leverage, meaning that large boards are 
ineffective in preventing entrenched CEOs from pursuing lower leverage. Consistent 
with their expectation that more outside directors on the board monitor management 
(CEOs) actively, outside directors on the board are positively associated with 
leverage.  
Motivated by the findings of the empirical studies from the US, Brailsford et al. 
(2002), using a sample of the 49 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange over 
the period 1989 to 1995, examine whether there exists a non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and capital structure decisions in Australia. 
Consistent with their hypothesis, they find a non-linear relationship (inverted U-
shaped) between the level of managerial ownership and leverage, and interpret their 
results as evidence for that at a low level of managerial ownership, due to 
convergence of interest between managers and shareholders, managers pursue higher 
degree of leverage. Yet at high levels of managerial shareholding, managers become 
more entrenched and use lower leverage in order to reduce their personal risk.
22
 
Furthermore, their results show that there is a positive relationship between external 
blockholders and leverage, consistent with the view that large shareholders have 
greater incentives to monitor the management, resulting in decreased managerial 
opportunistic behaviour, and leading to lower agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 
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 The entrenchment effect of managerial shareholding occurs after the threshold of 49 percent of 
managerial shareholding. 
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1986). Furthermore, they find that the relationship between external block ownership 
and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. At a low level of 
managerial share ownership, external blockholders play an effective role in 
monitoring manager‘s actions, leading to a positive correlation with leverage. In 
contrast, the relationship between external block ownership and leverage is 
weakened at high levels of managerial shareholding. As for control variables, while 
size and tangibility are positively related to leverage, volatility, growth opportunities 
and profitability are negatively correlated with it.  
Similarly, in a study based on a sample of 959 non-financial UK listed firms for the 
period 1999 to 2004, Florackis and Ozkan (2009) examine the effect of managerial 
incentives and corporate governance on firms‘ financial decisions, using a dynamic 
model of capital structure decisions. Like Brailsford et al. (2002), they also find a 
significant non-monotonic relationship between insider ownership and leverage, 
consistent with the alignment and entrenchment effects of managerial shareholding. 
Additionally, in line with the previous empirical findings for US firms, their result 
also shows that ownership concentration is positively related to firms‘ leverage, 
resulting from the greater incentive of large shareholders to supervise management 
more effectively than small shareholders. They also find that board size and board 
composition are inversely associated with leverage. Their result on the board size is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies that large boards are associated with 
coordination, communication and decision-making problems and thus are less 
effective. However, their finding for the board compositions is in contrast to the 
evidence documented for the US firms. They interpret this result as evidence that 
non-executive directors do have lack of information about the firm and hence do not 
add much to the governance of the firm. As for traditional determinants, assets 
tangibility and size are positively related to leverage, while profitability and growth 
opportunities are inversely associated with leverage. Moreover, their dynamic capital 
structure model (estimated using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond, 1991), 
indicates that UK firms adjust only partially (closer to 0.6) towards an optimal 
leverage ratio.  
 
Finally, most recently, using a sample of UK firms over the period1998 to 2012, Sun 
et al. (2015) examine the effects of agency conflicts in ownership structure on firm 
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leverage ratios and external financing decisions. First, consistent with previous 
findings (e.g. Brailsford et al. (2002) for Australian firms and Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009) for UK firms), they find a non-monotonic relation between managerial share 
ownership and the debt ratio. They also report that institutional ownership is 
positively associated with firm leverage levels. Further, Sun et al. (2015) find that 
firms with concentrated managerial shareholdings prefer issuing equity to bonds and 
thus, decrease their leverage in order to avoid the risk of bankruptcy and maintain 
their corporate control.  This effect is also strengthened during hot market periods. 
Finally, they find that consistent with the market timing theory and the risk aversion 
hypothesis, UK firms choose equity over bonds during the financial crisis.  
 
3.3.2 Empirical studies based on developing countries 
 
Compared to the studies based on developed capital market, a very limited number 
of empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the link between leverage 
and corporate governance variables in developing countries.  
 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) use a sample of 270 non-financial Thai companies listed 
in 1996 to examine the determinants of their capital structure. Results show that in 
addition to the tax effect, the signalling effect, and the agency costs, ownership 
structure also plays a significant role in financing decisions in Thailand. Although 
managerial ownership (CEOs and directors‘ ownership) has no significant effect on 
debt ratio, managerial ownership of single-family owned firms does have a positive 
influence on firms‘ leverage. She gives two potential explanations for this finding: 
(1) managers may use high level of leverage in order to protect their voting power; 
(2) managers of the single-family owned firms take on a higher level of leverage to 
signal their commitment to not divert excess cash-flows for perquisite consumption. 
Moreover, the study finds a negative relationship between large shareholding and 
leverage, implying that these shareholders may closely monitor the managers‘ self-
interested behaviour. Board size is negatively associated with leverage. In addition, 
the author finds that tangibility and firm size are positively related to leverage, while 
profitability and non-debt tax shields are inversely related to leverage. 
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In a similar vein, expanding their sample to the Asia Pacific region, particularly 
using a sample of 294 Thai, 669 Malaysian, 345 Singaporean, and 219 Australian 
firms over the period 1993 to 2001, Deesomsak et al. (2004) examine the 
determinants of the capital structure of firms in this region. They find that the capital 
structure decisions of firms are influenced by the environment in which they operate, 
as well as firm-specific factors identified in the extent literature. Moreover, they 
point out that the financial crisis of 1997 is found to have had a significant but 
different impact on firm‘s capital structure decisions across the Asia Pacific region. 
Ownership concentration is positively related to firms‘ leverage for both the whole 
sample period and the post-crisis period. Yet, it is negatively related to leverage 
before the crisis, suggesting that higher ownership concentration encourages higher 
levels of monitoring, which in turn reduces management‘s discretion. The pre-crisis 
result is also consistent to the finding of Wiwattanakantang (1999).  
 
Using a sample of 22 firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) over the 
period 1998 to 2003, Abor (2007) examines the link between corporate governance 
characteristics and corporate financing decisions. The results show that in contrast to 
the findings of prior research, leverage is positively related to board size, suggesting 
that larger boards follow a stringent monitoring, pursuing high debt ratios in order to 
raise the firm value. Yet, Abor (2007) finds that when board size increases beyond a 
certain level, further increase in board size could lead to lack of consensus resulting 
in weaker corporate governance and lower leverage. He finds a positive relationship 
between board composition and leverage, implying that firm with more non-
executive directors on the board pursues high leverage. This result supports the 
finding of Berger et al. (1997) for US firms, but diverges from those of Wen et al. 
(2002) for Chinese firms. As for the traditional determinants of capital structure, 
consistent with the empirical results for the Western countries, size is positively 
related to leverage while growth opportunities and profitability are negatively 
associated with leverage.  
 
Focusing on a panel of 41 Jordanian industrial firms listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) over the period 2001 to 2005, Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009) 
examine the effect of ownership structure on corporate financing decisions using a 




, consistent with the view that when managerial ownership increases, 
managers prefer lower leverage in order to reduce the non-diversifiable risk 
associated with their personal wealth. In addition, there is no significant relationship 
between leverage and institutional ownership.
24
 They suggest that this is due to the 
fact that developed mutual funds or investment companies do not exist in Jordan, 
resulting in institutional investors having a weak ability (passive monitoring) to 
influence managerial behaviour. Moreover, the dynamic adjustment in the leverage 
shifts (about 41%) in the ownership structure through time. As for control variables, 
profitability is negatively related to leverage while size and tangibility are positively 
associated with the debt ratio. 
 
Focusing on a comprehensive panel data of 806 Latin American firms covering 
seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) 
over the period 1996 to 2005, Cespedes et al. (2010) examine the relationship 
between ownership concentration and capital structure decisions. Their study reveals 
Latin American firms have high ownership concentration, and leverage is positively 
related to ownership concentration (measured by Herfindahl index). This is 
consistent with the argument that firms with high ownership concentration avoid 
using equity finance in their capital structure, since owners do not want to share or 
lose control rights. In the case of traditional determinants of capital structure, 
leverage is positively related to size and tangibility, while profitability is inversely 
associated with leverage. 
 
Finally, Haque et al. (2011) use a questionnaire-based survey to create a Corporate 
Governance Index (CGI) for Bangladesh‘ listed firms. Based on their governance 
index and  financial data on debt finance and other firms characteristics collected 
from the annual reports of the sample firms (98 nonfinancial listed firms) over the 
period 2004 to 2005, they study the effect of firm-level corporate governance on the 
financing decisions of these firms. They find that there is an inverse relationship 
between corporate governance quality and leverage. Leverage is positively related to 
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. They interpret this as suggestive that large shareholders 
prefer a capital structure with more debt in order to maintain their control rights (i.e. 
raising more debt will not dilute their controlling position among equity holders in 
the corporation.). As for the control variables, leverage is positively associated with 
size while profitability and non-debt tax shields are inversely related to leverage. 
3.3.3 Empirical studies based in the Chinese context 
 
In this section we focus on the empirical studies that have investigated the link 
between corporate governance variables and corporate financing decisions and its 
dynamic nature in China. Since it is important to understand the findings of previous 
studies on the effects of traditional determinants of the capital structure that have 
been suggested by the main stream capital structure theories, we briefly discuss them 
as well. Additionally, we summarize the findings of most of the prior studies based 
on Chinese listed companies in Tables 3.1A and 3.1B in the Appendix.  
In early studies, Chen (2004) uses a sample of 77 Chinese pubic-listed companies 
over the period 1995-2000 to examine the determinants of capital structure in 
Chinese firms. He indicates that certain firm-specific factors that are relevant for 
explaining capital structure in the Western countries are also relevant in the context 
of China. However, neither the trade-off theory nor pecking order theory originated 
from the developed economies provides convincing explanations for the capital 
structure choices of the Chinese firms. Instead, capital structure decisions of Chinese 
firms are based on a different theory: firms follow a ‗new pecking order‘ using 
retained profits first, equity, next and debt as a last resort. He suggests that this is 
because the fundamental institutional assumptions (such as the legal system, banking 
and securities market, corporate governance structure, and financial constraints) 
underpinning the developed economic models are not valid in the context of Chinese 
firms. Moreover, Chen (2004) finds that tangibility is positively related to the 
leverage ratio, and profitability is inversely related to it.  
 
Yan (2008) uses a panel of 722 Chinese listed Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in the manufacturing industry over the period 2004 to 2007 and show that 
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profitability and liquidity are negatively related to the leverage ratio, while size and 
asset structure are positively associated with it. 
Moosa et al. (2011) use data on 344 publicly listed shareholding companies and 
differentiate between fragile (i.e. the sign and/or significance of the coefficients on 
these variables change depending on model specification) and robust firm-specific 
determinants of the capital structure of Chinese firms. They find that size, liquidity, 
profitability and growth opportunities are robust variables, while tangibility and 
stock price performance are fragile. Other variables (pay-out ratio and age of the 
firm) are insignificant. 
Turning to the studies, which consider effects of governance variables, the first and 
only empirical study examining the relationship between board structure and 
leverage is Wen et al. (2002). Using a very small sample of 180 observations for 60 
Chinese listed firms over the period 1996 to 1998, they find that there are lower 
leverage levels when the percentage of outside directors on the boards is higher. 
They interpret their results as outside directors monitoring the management more 
actively in order to make better financing decisions. Thus, outside directors may act 
as substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt in the capital structure. This result is 
inconsistent with the finding of Berger et al. (1997) for US firms, who find that the 
board size does not have any significant impact on leverage. Yet, Wen et al. (2002) 
do not examine the effect of ownership structure on corporate financing decisions, 
and they do not control for firm fixed effects and potential endogeneity in their 
study. 
Contrary to Wen et al.‘s study (2002), Huang and Song (2006) use data for 1200 
Chinese PLCs over the period 1994-2003 and examine the effects of ownership 
structure in addition to traditional factors on capital structure decisions. They find 
that leverage in Chinese firms   decreases with managerial shareholding. According 
to them, the reason for this is that Chinese managers are generally risk- averse and 
thus, they prefer to pursue a capital structure with lower leverage. They also show 
that state ownership or Institutional ownership has no significant impact on capital 
structure decisions. As for traditional determinants, they report that leverage 
increases with firm size and fixed assets but decreases with profitability, non-debt 
tax shields, and growth opportunities. However, they do not examine the impact of 
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other corporate governance factors such as board size and composition on the capital 
structure choices. 
Similarly, Zou and Xiao (2006) use a panel made up of 1424 firm-year observation 
over the period 1993-2000 and examine the effect of ownership structure (including 
state, domestic legal person and foreign ownership) in addition to the traditional 
factors on the debt financing behaviour. They show that firm size, tangible assets, 
growth opportunities, and profitability are important determinants of firm leverage in 
China. In particular, leverage is positively related to firm size and tangibility but it is 
negatively related to growth opportunities and profitability. Their results are 
consistent with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995) for G7 countries while 
they are very different from the findings of Booth et al. (2001) for ten developing 
countries. In the case of ownership structure variables, none of them does have any 
impact on the capital structure choices of Chinese listed companies.  
In a similar vein, using a sample of firms over the period from 2000 to 2006, Su 
(2010) investigates effects of corporate diversification, ownership and board 
characteristics on capital structure decisions. He finds that corporate diversification 
(in to related or unrelated industries) and state ownership are negatively associated 
with leverage. Furthermore, while the study finds some evidence for larger boards 
being associated with less debt financing, other board characteristics such as the 
number of independent directors and CEO duality do not affect capital structure. 
Additionally Su (2010) finds that larger and older firms use more leverage in the 
capital structure,  
Different from the all the previous studies in the context of Chinese listed 
companies, Qian et al. (2009) employ a dynamic capital structure model to study the 
determinants of capital structure for 650 Chinese publicly listed companies over the 
period 1999 to 2004. Their results show that Chinese firms adjust towards an 
equilibrium level of debt ratio in a given year at a very slow rate: for a firm 
experiencing a large reduction in its leverage ratio, only about 11% of the 
discrepancy between its desired and actual leverage levels is eliminated within a 
year. They also find that leverage is positively related to state shareholding. This 
finding is consistent with their explanation that state controlled firms have better 
access to bank loans from the state-controlled banking sector since government 
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provides a guaranty for bank loans. As for the traditional factors, firm size and 
tangibility are positively related to the leverage whereas profitability, non-debt tax 
shields, and volatility are negatively associated with it. However, the authors do not 
include other ownership structure variables (in addition to state ownership) and 
board structure variables in their dynamic capital structure model. 
Most recently, using a panel of 13,107 firm-year observations for Chinese publicly 
listed companies over the period 1998 to 2009, Cheng et al. (2009) identify seven 
determinants of leverage that are statistically significant and have coefficients of 
consistent signs across various models. They find that leverage is negatively related 
to state shareholding and the largest shareholding of state-controlled listed firms. 
They interpret this finding as being evidence for that SOEs not only may face 
fewer restrictions in equity issuance but also might receive favourable treatments 
when applying for seasoned equity financing.  As for the traditional factors, firm 
size, tangibility, industry average, asset growth are positively related to the leverage 
whereas profitability is negatively associated with it. However, the authors do not 
include board structure variables in their study. 
In summary, these studies show that in addition to the traditional factors, ownership 
and other corporate governance factors have a significant impact on the capital 
structure decisions of Chinese firms. Yet, most studies use a small sub-set of 
corporate governance variables and are based on data before 2005. Given the 
tremendous changes in the corporate governance system, it becomes therefore 
imperative to investigate the impact of recent changes in ownership structure and the 
corporate governance system on Chinese firms‘ financing decisions. This is the 
objective of our study. 
3.3.4 Contributions of the study 
This study contributes to the literature on the linkage between corporate governance 
and capital structure decisions in many ways. First, so far, only a very limited 
number of studies have investigated the impact of corporate governance on the use 
of leverage in the capital structure in the context of emerging markets and 
particularly in China, the largest emerging economy in the world. Furthermore, the 
existing studies have examined subset of governance mechanisms, usually using 
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only one or two governance variables. For example, Huang and Song (2006) include 
only two governance variables (managerial and institutional ownership) in their 
capital structure model. Similarly, Qian et al. (2009) use only one ownership variable 
(state ownership) in their dynamic capital structure model. Furthermore, Zou and 
Xiao (2006) do not include managerial ownership and board structure variables. In 
this study, for the first time we include all the ownership structure, and board 
structure variables as well as other control variables (size, profitability, tangibility, 
growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields, volatility and firm age) in a unified 
framework in an attempt to develop a better capital structure model that could 
explain leverage ratio in the context of Chinese listed firms. 
Second, corporate governance practices have evolved considerably over the last 
decade, focusing much of the attention on the ownership structure and composition 
of board of directors. CSRC published codes of best corporate governance practice 
for Chinese listed corporations in 2002 and 1/3 of independent director system was 
introduced in 2003 along the lines of best corporate governance practices around the 
world. Through their monitoring of managers‘ actions and bringing their expertise 
and network with other institutions, boards of directors could pave the ways for 
optimal capital structure decisions in the firms they represent. Yet, so far, to the best 
of our knowledge no single study has examined the impact of board structure on 
leverage choices in China after 2003.
26
  
Third, almost all the existing empirical studies on the capital structure decisions of 
Chinese listed companies (e.g., Huang and Song, 2006; Wen et al., 2002) use data 
before 2005. Therefore, these studies do not have opportunities to examine whether 
the 2005-split-share reform has any impact on leverage choices of Chinese listed 
companies. We use data from 2003 to 2010
27
 to examine whether ownership 
structure variables, in particular managerial ownership
28
 have significant impact on 
firm‘s leverage decisions after the split-share reform. This study, therefore, provides 
first empirical evidence using a longer period of latest Chinese listed company data 
on the effects of ownership reform as well as corporate governance variables on the 
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data before 2000 (including the period 1996 to 1998).  
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 Our sample ending period is in year 2010 that the latest year for which data was available when the 
study was carried out.  
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 Managerial ownership has considerably increased after split-share structure reform.  
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corporate financing decisions. More importantly, our study suggests that share 
ownership by managers provide them with necessary incentives to pursue risky 
policy choices such as using more debt in firms that operate in unique institutional 
environment where state still retain considerable control over firms; firms rely 
heavily on bank for debt financing; and minority shareholder protection and other 
legal system are not well developed. 
Fourth, all the previous studies on the capital structure decisions of Chinese listed 
companies, except Qian et al. (2009), have failed to shed light on the dynamic nature 
of firm‘s capital structure decisions. Therefore, we provide empirical evidence on the 
dynamic nature of firm‘s capital structure, especially adjustment speed towards 
target leverage ratio using the system GMM in the context of Chinese listed firms. 
Finally, previous studies on the link between corporate governance and capital 
structure in the Chinese context do not control for potential bias arising from the 
endogeneity of governance variables (for example Wen et al., 2002; Huang and 
Song, 2006; Shen, 2008). However, research has shown that most of the governance 
variables are likely to be endogenously determined (Aggarwal and Mandelker, 1987; 
Himmelberg, 1999; Wintoki, et al., 2012). For instance, an external shock like the 
2007-2009 credit crunch may affect both leverage and firm characteristics as well as 
governance characteristics. Moreover, debt financing is itself a governance 
mechanism that can reduce agency conflicts (Jensen, 1986; Aggarwal and 
Mandelker, 1987; Stulz, 2000) and thus it can potentially act as a substitute for other 
governance mechanisms such as ownership concentration, insider ownership, and 
board composition. We use the system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) to control for, the presence of unobservable fixed effects, 
endogeneity of all regressors and for leverage being highly persistent. 
 
3.4. Hypothesis development 
 
In this section, in order to answer the research questions, we develop the following 
hypotheses based on relevant theories and previous empirical studies that have been 
so far carried out in Western countries as well as in the Chinese context. 
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3.4.1 Ownership structure 
 
Ownership structure of Chinese listed companies is very unique and arguably the 
government dominates in their governance structure (Chen, 2005; Bhabra et al., 
2008). There are three main types of ownership in Chinese PLCs, namely, state 
ownership, legal-person ownership (i.e. institutional investors), and domestic individual 
ownership (tradable A-shares). In addition foreign and managerial ownership also play 
important role in the decisions of firms (Bhabra et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011). Since 
these different ownership groups have different objectives, capabilities and incentives, 
they are likely to have an important influence in the capital structure choices of firms in 
China. Before the split-share structure reform in April 2005, non-tradable shares (which 
include both state and legal-person shareholding) represented about two-third of total 
outstanding shares (Bhabra et al., 2008). Only one-third of total outstanding shares 
were tradable in the stock exchanges for outside individual investors. However, after 
the 2005 split-share reform, the picture has changed for the reverse, state, legal person 
and A-shareholders held about 9%, 10% and 66% respectively by the end of 2010. In 
case of managerial ownership (i.e. shares owned by CEOs, directors, supervisors and 
top management), the share was less than 1% before 2005 but it has increased to about 
8% by the end of 2010. This shows that Chinese listed firms‘ ownership structure is 
becoming more similar to what is observed in Western countries. 
 
3.4.1.1 Managerial ownership 
 
As we discussed earlier, managerial direct incentives are an important determinant of 
corporate financial decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managerial ownership 
(dstmshare) is defined as the percentage of total shares held by top management 
including CEOs and chairman, directors and supervisors.
29
 Previous empirical 
studies based on US firms (Ikeo and Hirota, 1992; Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 
1997) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and leverage. 
Their findings suggest that managers whose financial incentives are more closely 
related to outsiders‘ wealth will pursue more leverage in order to inflate the value of 
the firm. From another perspective (i.e. entrenchment motives), it is also shown that 
managers might increase leverage beyond the optimal point in order to raise their 
                                                 
29
 The position of the CEO is equivalent to that of general manager in China. 
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own voting power and reduce the possibility of takeover (Stulz, 1988; Harris and 
Raviv, 1988). 
 
A counter-argument is provided by Friend and Lang (1988), who show that 
managerial shareholding is negatively related to debt ratios, implying that managers 
prefer less leverage since their wealth is largely tied up in non-diversifiable human 
capital and personal investment vested in the firm. Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed 
(2009) find a similar relationship between managerial ownership and leverage in 
Jordanian industrial firms. Furthermore, other studies such as Brailsford et al. (2002) 
and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) report a significant non-monotonic relationship 
(inverted U shaped) between managerial ownership and leverage for the sample of 
Australian and UK firms, respectively, consistent with the alignment and 
entrenchment effects. Yet, Mehran (1992) does not find evidence to support the non-
linear relationship between managerial ownership and leverage for US firms. He 
concludes that the precise relationship between leverage and managerial ownership 
is complex.  
 
In the context of China, only a paper by Huang and Song (2006) examines the effects 
of managerial ownership (with a definition similar to ours) on capital structure 
decisions and find a negative relationship with leverage. Therefore, they conclude 
that Chinese managers are generally risk averse, thus leading to pursue less 
leverage.
30
 However, their results should be cautiously interpreted since they do not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity or endogeneity which may create a spurious 




We expect to observe a significant positive relationship between managerial 
shareholding and the level of leverage, consistent with the incentive effect, as 
Chinese managers‘ shareholdings have increased considerably after the 2005 split-
share reform. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
                                                 
30
 Most of the previous studies that examine capital structure decisions of Chinese listed firms, do not 
include managerial ownership as a main variable in their studies (Wen et al, 2002; Zou and Xiao, 
2006; Qian et al., 2009), since managerial share ownership was significantly lower in the listed firms‘ 
ownership structure. However, we include managerial ownership as it is about 8% by the end of 2010.  
31
 They use simple OLS to run the regression. 
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H1: There is a significant positive relationship between managerial shareholding and 
the level of leverage  
 
3.4.1.2 Legal-person ownership (institutional shareholding) 
 
Arguments based on agency theory predict that institutional shareholders (in Chinese 
terminology these are known as legal-person shareholders) can reduce agency costs 
by closely monitoring managerial opportunistic behaviour. This is because both the 
benefits of monitoring cash flow and the ability to access various sources of 
information and resources provide institutional investors necessary incentives and 
capabilities to bear the costs of monitoring management of the firms where they have 
large ownership stake (Coffee, 1991;  Sun et al., 2015). Therefore, leverage should 
increase in the presence of institutional shareholders. A counter argument suggests 
that institutional shareholders may substitute for the disciplinary role of leverage in 
the capital structure (Grier and Zychowicz, 1994). That is, increasing ownership by 
institutional shareholders makes their interests more aligned with those of 
shareholders. Consequently, they are more likely to monitor the managers in order to 
maximize shareholders‘ wealth. 
 
Using a sample of 41 Jordanian industrial firms over the period of 2001 to 2005, Al-
Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009) document an insignificant relationship between 
leverage and institutional ownership, which they explain by the fact that there are no 
developed mutual funds or investment companies in Jordan and  institutional 
investors do not exercise active monitoring to influence managerial behaviour. In 
Chinese context, some studies find no significant role for legal person shareholders 
in capital structure decisions (Huang and Song, 2006; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Chen and 
Strange, 2005). Yet, using a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 1992 to 
2001, Bhabra et al. (2008) find that legal person shareholding in entrepreneurial 
private firms has a positive impact on leverage. In line with previous empirical 
studies in the context of Chinese firms, we measure legal-person shareholding (lpos) 
as shares owned by legal person divided by total number of outstanding shares. We 
test the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: There is a positive significant relationship between legal-person ownership and 
leverage. 
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3.4.1.2 State ownership 
 
When the state is a shareholder in a firm, the firm may obtain necessary resources 
without much problem.  In general, research suggests that due to the following reasons, 
state owned firms are more likely to have a higher leverage ratio than other firms. 
Firstly, as the government provides a guaranty for loans and most of the banks in China 
are state-owned, the direct and indirect presence of the state in firms reduces the 
financial distress costs of the firms (Bhabra et al., 2008). Secondly, leverage can be 
used by state agents (as a controlling shareholder) to fund resources in order to 
pursue their own economic and/or social objectives at the expense of minority 
shareholders without diluting state control over the corporations (Stulz, 1988; Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Tian, 2001; Ellul, 2008; Faccio et al., 2010). Finally, as state 
controlled firms face severe agency problems due to the lack of direct residual 
claims (Berkman et al., 2002), they should benefit more than other firms from the 
disciplining role of debt capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986).  
However, the Chinese evidence remains controversial. For example, Qian et al. 
(2009) and Shen (2008) find a positive relationship between state shareholding and 
leverage. By contrast, others, for example Zou and Xiao (2006), Bhabra et al. (2008), 
find that state ownership has no impact on leverage. Bhabra et al. (2008) interpret 
this result as evidence for that the State‘s protectionist role does not affect the 
financial distress costs of their sample firms. More recently, using a sample of 1325 
Chinese listed firms over the period 1999 to 2008, Lin and Bo (2011) find a negative 
relationship between state shareholding and leverage, but the relationship is not 
significant. This finding is consistent with their explanation that state banks have 
become semi-commercial banks and they have started to act indiscriminately 
towards all the firms and thus, state ownership in firms no longer facilitates easy 
access of finance from state owned banks. Therefore, the risk averse managers in the 
state owned firms with weak managerial incentives (Kato and Long, 2006a, b, c, and 
2011) are more likely to prefer a low level of leverage. Similarly, using a sample of 
firms over the period from 2000 to 2006, Su (2010) provides evidence for negative 
relationship between state ownership and leverage. Finally, Chang, Chen and Liao 
(2014) also find a negative association between state ownership and leverage, 
suggesting that SOEs not only may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance but also 
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might receive favorable treatments when applying for seasoned equity financing. In 
line with these reasoning, we would expect that state ownership should be negatively 
associated with leverage. We measure the state shareholding (sos) as state owned 
shares normalized by total number of outstanding shares, and hypothesize that:  
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between state ownership and 
leverage. 
 
3.4.1.3 Foreign investors 
 
In Chinese listed firms, foreign investors are either founder shareholders (e.g., Hong 
Kong incorporated industrial firms) or shareholders of B-shares (e.g., foreign banks 
or mutual funds). Following Bhabra et al. (2008), we measure foreign ownership 
(focap) as the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors to total outstanding 
shares. In the case of Chinese listed firms, foreign investors (who are often large 
institutional investors with diversified portfolios) normally have low ownership 
stakes in them and thus they may find debt as a preferable monitoring mechanism to 
constrain managerial self-interested behaviour of managers in their portfolio firms 
(Zou and Xiao, 2006). Furthermore, foreign investors in nascent markets like China 
may face severe asymmetric information problems compared to domestic investors 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999), implying that they are likely to rely on debt as a 
mechanism for monitoring managers‘ opportunistic behaviour.  
 
In the context of China, while Zou and Xiao (2006) find that foreign ownership does 
not have any significant impact on leverage, Bhabra et al. (2008) find that there is a 
positive relationship between foreign ownership and leverage. In line with these 
reasoning, we expect that:  
 







3.4.2 Board structure 
 
3.4.2.1 Board size 
 
The major functions of the board are to hire, fire, and evaluate the top management‘s 
(including CEO) performance as well as to compensate the CEO, and to act as a 
counselor (Jensen, 1993). A well-functioning board of directors is an important 
internal governance mechanism which may affect agency costs and firms‘ decisions 
such as capital structure decisions. In their theoretical articles, Jensen (1986) 
suggests that a larger board should be associated with higher leverage since debt is 
an effective mechanism to constraint agency costs of free cash flow. By contrast, 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that boards become less effective 
as they increase in size and more susceptible to the influence of CEOs because: (1) 
coordination problems become more significant with size (2) the free rider problem 
becomes more severe as the board size increases. Therefore, the decision-making 
problems become more sever with large boards. Debt financing, which constrains 
managers‘ ability to use free cash flow for the consumption of perquisites and 
empire building, may not be easily accepted. Therefore, larger boards are more likely 
to be negatively related to leverage. 
 
Using a sample of US and UK firms respectively, Berger et al. (2007) and Florackis 
and Ozkan (2009)  find that board size is inversely related to leverage, meaning that 
large boards are associated with coordination, communication and decision-making 
problems and thus,  ineffective in preventing entrenched CEOs from pursuing lower 
leverage. In addition, Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Abor (2007) also provide 
evidence suggesting that larger boards are ineffective in encouraging CEO to pursue 
high level of leverage for firms in emerging markets. By contrast, Ghosh et al. 
(2010) report a significant positive relationship between large boards and leverage. 
They attribute this finding to the fact that most of their sample firms (in the Real 
Estate Investment Trusts-REITs) are operating within an effective range of board 
size (i.e. an average of 8.5 members compared with an average of more than twelve 
members for a sample of industrial firms used by Berger et al. (1997)). Using a small 
sample of Chinese listed firms, Wen et al. (2002) find an insignificant relationship 
between board size and leverage.  Consistent with most of the empirical findings, if 
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small boards are indeed more effective at monitoring and directing managers to high 
level of leverage, then we would expect a negative relationship between board size 
and leverage. Following Berger et al. (1997), we measure the board size (lnbodsize) 
as log of total number of directors on the board. Our hypothesis is that: 
H5: There is a significant negative relationship between board size and leverage. 
 
3.4.2.2 Board composition/ proportion of independent directors 
  
The agency theory suggests that since independent directors who are generally 
concerned about their reputations and social status, have incentives to monitor 
management, the top managers generally face more careful monitoring (Fama and 
Jenson, 1983a; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Weisbach, 1998). Therefore, Jensen 
(1986) argues that firms whose boards are dominated by outside directors have 
higher levels of leverage which is an effective mechanism for restricting managerial 
control of free cash flow. The resource dependence perspective developed by Pfeffer 
and Salancick (1978) highlights, on the other hand, that external directors boost a 
firm‘s ability to protect itself against the external environment, reduce uncertainty, or 
co-opt resources that increase the firm‘s ability to raise funds or increase its status 
and recognition. A high proportion of outside directors are therefore believed to be 
associated with higher levels of leverage.  
 
Consistent with the above arguments, Berger et al. (1997) find a positive association 
between the proportion of outside directors and leverage. In contrast, Wen et al. 
(2002) find a significant negative relationship between number of outside directors 
on the board and leverage using the Chinese listed firms‘ data over the period 1996-
1998. They suggest that outside directors monitor the management more actively and 
hence outside directors may act as substitute for the disciplinary role of debt in the 
capital structure. However, after decades of improvement in the corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies, if independent members are more effective 
at monitoring and directing management‘s choices, we would expect a positive 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and level of leverage. 
Following Berger et al. (1997), we measure the board composition (indes) as a 
proportion of independent directors on the board. Hence, we hypothesise that: 
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H6: There is a significant positive relationship between the percentage of outside 
directors on the board and leverage. 
 
3.5. Model specification and estimation methodology 
 
In this section, we first present our model specifications: static baseline model and 
dynamic model. Following the model specification, the control variables that are 
used in the study are described lengthily with reference to relevant theories and prior 
empirical studies. Finally, estimation methodologies are discussed.  
 3.5.1 Model specification 
levit = β0 + β1sizeit + β2profitit + β3tangit + β4growthit + β5nontaxshdit +β6volit +                                                                   
β7firmageit + vi + vt + vj + vk + eit.                                                             (3.1) 
 
In order to test our hypotheses and motivated by the recent literature on the link 
between corporate governance and capital structure decisions (Merhan, 1992; Berger 
et al., 1997; Bhabra et al., 2008), we first estimate the following equation (static 
baseline model): 
levit = β0 + β1lposit (sosit) + β2dstmshareit +  β3fcapit  + β4lnbodsizeit +β5indesit + β6sizeit + 
β7profitit +   β8tangit + β9growthit + β10nontaxshdit +β11volit +  
β12firmageit + vi + vt + vj + vk + eit.                                                                                                                     (3.2) 
 
where i indexes firm, t years. The term vi, vt,, vj, and vk represent time-invariant firm 
specific fixed effects, time-specific effects, industry effects, and effects of regional 
differences, respectively; eit is a random/ idiosyncratic error term.  Lemmon et al. 
(2008) provide strong evidence that firm-specific effect (vi) unobservable 
characteristics of the firm have a significant impact on firms‘ capital structure 
decisions.  They vary across firms but are assumed to remain constant for each firm 
through time. They include variables such as the quality of management, managers‘ 
attitudes towards risk, and market reputation, etc. On the other hand, time-specific 
effects (vt), which we control for by including time dummies, vary through time but 
are the same for all the firms at a given point in time. Furthermore, vt captures 
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macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, inflation and business cycle effects, 
which are outside the control of firms.  
On the left hand side of the Equation (3.2), our dependent variable is the leverage 
ratio (the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of the firm‘s total 
assets) of firm i in year t. On the right hand side a set of ownership and corporate 
governance variables are included as explanatory variables in addition to a set of 
control variables (the traditional variables). The list of variables used in the paper, 
their definition and expected sign are summarized in Appendix A3.1.  
Recent studies (for example, Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lommon et al., 2008; 
Florakis and Ozkan, 2009) emphasize that capital structure is more likely to be 
highly persistent due to the adjustment costs and other market imperfections. Thus, 
we next estimate the following dynamic equation:   
levit = β0 + β1levit-1 + β2lposit (sosit) + β3dstmshareit  +  β4fcapit  + β5nbodsizeit +                  
β6indesit + β7sizeit + β8profitit + β9tangit + β10growthit + β11nontaxshdit +                                         
β12volit + β13firmageit +  vi + vt + vj + vk + eit.                                                 (3.3) 
where all abbreviations are the same as in Equation (3.2). In Equation (3.3) we 
include the lagged dependent variable amongst the explanatory variables to capture 
the dynamic effects in the capital structure decisions (Florakis and Ozkan, 2009). A 
dynamic specification recognizes that firms cannot reach the target level of leverage 
immediately due to adjustment and other costs.   
3.5.1.1 Target leverage structure and speed of adjustment 
 
The use of a dynamic modelling strategy considers the fact that firms have a target 
level of leverage in their capital structure and that it may take time to reach this 
target leverage following changes in firm-specific characteristics or random 
economic shocks due to adjustment and other costs (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). 
Therefore, firms make a partial adjustment towards the desired leverage ratio 
(Ozkan, 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Firms‘ speed of adjustment towards its 
target leverage ratio is calculated by one minus the value of the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable. As in our equation 3.3, (1-β1) takes values between 0 and 
1: value 0 indicates that there is no adjustment at all towards the target leverage ratio 
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and value 1 indicates that there is an instantaneous adjustment towards the target 
leverage ratio. Our dynamic specification assumes that the speed of adjustment 
depends on the parameter β1 in Equation (3.3) which gives the fraction of the desired 
change [i.e. levit - levi(t-1)= β1(lev it* - levi(t-1))] that managers can achieve.
32
 The 
coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable, β1, is expected to be 
positive, and (1- β1) represents the speed by which firms adjust toward their target 
leverage ratio. 
 
A dynamic panel data framework is useful for the following two main reasons: (1) it 
allows us to control for the endogeneity problem and the persistency in capital 
structure decisions (2) It enables us to analyse the dynamic nature (dynamic 
relationship) of the capital structure decisions of firms (for example, Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2009). 
3.5.1.2 Control variables 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Frank and 
Goyal (2009), the study uses seven important firm characteristics as control 
variables. Additionally, we include year, industry and regional dummies to control 
for year-specific, industry-specific and geographic effects. The expected relationship 
between control variables and leverage are primarily guided by relevant theories as 
well as previous empirical studies.  
3.5.1.2.1 Firm size 
As discussed in Rajan and Zingales (1995), the theoretical prediction for the effect of 
size on leverage is ambiguous. It is argued that larger firms tend to be more 
diversified and have more tangible assets, stable cash flows and better reputations.  
The trade-off theory therefore postulates that compared to smaller ones, ceteris 
paribus, larger firms are expected to have a higher debt capacity due to a lower risk 
of bankruptcy (bankruptcy cost).   
                                                 
32
 levit is the actual leverage ratio of firm i at time t, levit* is the target value of leverage, and  (lev*it - 
levi(t-1)) is the desired change in leverage. 
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In contrast, the pecking-order theory suggests that, bigger firms are more likely to 
use less debt due to lower asymmetric information problems between insiders and 
outside investors (i.e. larger firms provide more information to lenders than smaller 
firms, so the cost of issuing new equity is lower than the debt issuing cost).  
Previous empirical studies from developed countries (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Berger et al., 1997; Brailsfore et al., 2002; Florackis and Ozken, 2009), from 
developing economics (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Pandey, 2001; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004), as well as in the context of Chinese firms (Chen and 
Strange, 2005; Zou and Xiao 2006; Haung and Song, 2006; Qian et al., 2009) all 
uniformly find that leverage is positively related to firm size. We therefore expect a 
positive relationship between firm size and leverage. In this study, firm size (size) is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total real assets.  
3.5.1.2.2 Profitability 
According to the static trade-off theory, the more profitable the firms, the greater the 
use of leverage, ceteris paribus, due to an increase in the tax shield benefits and, to a 
lower financial distress and agency costs of debt. Thus, this theory predicts that 
profitability is positively related to leverage. In contrast, there is an opposite 
prediction based on the pecking-order theory that the most profitable firms tend to 
borrow less. In other, the pecking-order theory suggests that firms first finance their 
investment using internal resources (i.e. retained profit), and then move to debt and 
new equity financing as a last resort.  
Previous empirical findings on financing behaviour of firms in developed economies 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chiarella et al., 1992; Allem, 1993; Wald, 1999; Rajan 
and Singales, 1995; Berger et al., 1997; Brailsfore et al., 2002; Fama and French, 
2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Florackis and Ozken, 2009), and in emerging 
economies (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Pandey, 2001; Deesomsak 
et al., 2004) find a negative relationship between leverage ratios and profitability. In 
the context of Chinese enterprises, several authors (Chen, 2004; Chen and Strange, 
2005; Zou and Xiao 2006; Haung and Song, 2006; Qian et al., 2009) also report a 
similar relationship. 
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In this study, the measure of earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets 





According to the pecking-order theory, firms with more fixed assets can easily 
access secured debt since tangible assets are used as collateral for debt. The static 
trade-off theory postulates that the larger the fixed assets of the firm (fixed assets are 
collateralised for debt and thus they reduce the risk of lenders), the lower the 
bankruptcy  and financial distress costs. In line with the explanation of both theories, 
a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage is expected. 
The findings of prior empirical research on leverage based on developed countries 
(Rajan and Singales, 1995; Berger et al., 1997; Wald, 1999; Brailsfore et al., 2002; 
Florackis and Ozken, 2009), and developing countries (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004) as well as China (Chen, 2004; Chen and Strange, 2005; Zou 
and Xiao 2006; Haung and Song, 2006; Qian et al., 2009), confirm this theoretical 
prediction. We thus expect a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
In this study, tangibility (tang) is measured by  net fixed assets normalized by total 
assets of the firm. 
3.5.1.2.4 Growth opportunities: 
According to the static trade-off theory, firms with high growth opportunities (which 
are a form of intangible assets) in the future are likely to be high risk, and this leads 
to a greater financial distress costs (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Therefore, an inverse 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is postulated. The pecking-
order theory, in contrast, predicts a positive relationship between these variables 
since high-growth opportunity firms are likely to face more information asymmetry 
problems between insiders and outsiders (i.e. company managers know more about 
their future investment opportunities than outside investors). So these firms use more 
debt than equity in the financing hierarchy, since debt capital suffers less from 
information asymmetries.  
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  Note that tangibility means collateral value of assets throughout the Chapter.   
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Most empirical work on capital structure decisions show an opposite relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage. Empirical studies from developed 
countries (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Singales, 1995; Fama and French, 
2002; Brailsfore et al., 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Florackis and Ozken, 2009), 
from developing countries (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Deesomsak et al., 2004), and 
from China (Zou and Xiao 2006; Haung and Song, 2006) obtain an inverse 
relationship between leverage and growth opportunities. Therefore, we also expect to 
find a negative relationship between the two variables  in Chinese listed companies. 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001), we use the ratio of the 
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of 
total assets to measure growth opportunities (growth) in our study. 
3.5.1.2.5 Non-debt tax shields 
 
Non-debt tax shields (nontaxshd) represent tax credits for investments and 
depreciation. Non-debt tax shields reduce a firm‘s tax payments and thus reduces the 
need for debt financing as a means to obtain tax advantages (Dammon and Senbet, 
1988). That is, non-debt tax shields are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt 
financing. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between 
non-debt tax shields and leverage.  
 
Previous empirical studies from developed countries (Wald, 1999; Chaplinsky and 
Niehaus, 1993), from developing countries (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Deesomsak et 
al., 2004), as well as in the context of Chinese firms (Huang and Song, 2006; Qian et 
al., 2009), find an inverse relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage. 
Therefore, we expect a similar relationship between non-debt tax shields and 
leverage. In this study, we use non-debt tax shields (notaxshd) measured by 
depreciation scaled by the total assets as an inverse proxy for tax shield advantage.  
  
3.5.1.2.6 Volatility 
According to the trade-off theory, a firm with higher earnings volatility has a higher 
probability of financial distress, since the volatility of earnings is the chief factor in 
determining firms‘ ability to meet  debt obligations, such as interest charges. 
Therefore, an inverse relationship between volatility and leverage is postulated.  
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The findings of prior empirical studies on leverage based on developed countries 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Friend and Lang, 1988; Brailsford et al., 2002), and 
developing countries (Booth et al., 2001) as well as Chinese firms (Huang and Song, 
2006) converse  an inverse relationship between the volatility of earnings and 
leverage. We thus also expect to find a negative relationship between volatility and 
leverage. Following Johnson (2003), in this study, we define volatility (vol) as the 
standard deviation of the first differences of earnings before taxes and depreciation 
over the four years preceeding the sample year, divided by average total assets for 
that period.   
  
3.5.1.2.7 Firm age 
 
Both the static-trade off and pecking-order theories are silent as regards the 
relationship between the firm age and leverage. However, based on the agency 
framework, some authors (e.g. Du et al., 2010) suggest that the older firms are less 
likely to face asymmetric information problems and should have much easier access 
debt financing compared to younger ones, ceteris paribus. Also, older firms are less 
likely to invest in risky projects, since they are established over many years and well 
reputed in the market (Diamond, 1991). Moreover, Tian and Estrin (2007) also 
mention that firm with long history can easily establish their reputation in the debt 
market, resulting older firms are more likely to have a higher leverage ratio than 
younger ones.   
Previous empirical studies on Chinese firms (for example, Chen and Strange, 2005) 
find that firm age is positively related to leverage. In line with the above explanation 
and previous findings, we expect a positive relationship between firm age and 
leverage. In this study, firm age (firmage) is measured by the natural logarithm of 
years since the establishment of the firm. 
 
3.5.2 Estimation methodology 
3.5.2.1 OLS and fixed effects 
 
In this study panel data estimation methodologies are used. Panel data analysis 
presents several advantages:  it increases the degree of freedom owing to large 
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number observation, reduces the possibility of collinearity among the explanatory 
variables, and results in more efficient estimates.   
However, several important estimation problems often arise in dynamic panel data 
specifications. When unobservable firm-specific effects are correlated with the 
regressors, OLS coefficients will be biased (Hsiao, 1985). Furthermore, in a dynamic 
model (Equation 3.3) OLS will always give inconsistent (upward biased) estimates of 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable since the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with firm fixed effects.
34
 In addition, OLS assumes that all independent 
variables are exogenous which may not be the case in capital structure decisions, i.e. it 
does not control for possible endogeneity of the regressors. Although it is possible to 
eliminate the firm-specific fixed effects by taking first-differences, the OLS estimators 
are still not efficient since the first-difference transformation introduces correlation 
between the lagged dependent variables (∆levi,(t-1)) and the differenced errors (∆eit ) due 
to the correlation between levi(t-1)and ei(t-1).  
Alternatively, the fixed effects estimator controls for firm-specific fixed effects by 
transforming the equation in differences of each variable from its mean value. 
However, in the presence of dynamic effects as in our Equation 3.3, this estimator 
will give inconsistent (downward biased) estimates of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable, since the difference of the lagged dependent variable from its 
mean is correlated with in difference of an random/ idiosyncratic error term from its 
mean. Moreover, the fixed effects estimator has a problem with slow moving 
variables (Zhou, 2001) since it wipes out all cross sectional variations and thus it 
considers only within variations over the years.
35
 However, corporate governance 
variables are more likely to be cross-sectional phenomena. Furthermore, the fixed 
effects model only control for endogeneity arising from omitted variables (i.e. firm- 
specific unobserved time-invariant effects), and it assumes that all the explanatory 
variables are exogenous. It does not control for endogeneity arising from reverse 
                                                 
34
 That is, levi(t-1) is correlated with the vi component of the error term in Equation (3.3). 
35
 In order to check which model (fixed-effects versus random-effects) better suits to our panel data, 
we formally perform the Hausman-test, which is used to check, whether random effects exist. This 
test employs a Chi square test to compare the coefficients of the random effects model and fixed 
effects model with a null hypothesis that random affects estimator provide consistent estimates (i.e 
random effects exist). If there is no systematic difference, we accept null of hypothesis that random 
effects exist. In our study we find χ
2
 = 44.20, p<0.001, suggesting that null hypothesis is rejected and 
thus unobserved heterogeneity cannot be assumed to be unrelated to the predictors of leverage 
outcomes. Therefore, Hausman test supports the use of a fixed effects model.  
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causality. 
3.5.2.2 The system GMM estimator 
To overcome the above mentioned problems, this study uses the system GMM 
estimator, which is a powerful tool to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity 




Endogeneity is an important concern in our study. First, our estimates may be 
affected by reverse causality/ simultaneity bias i.e. not only the ownership structures 
can affect the firms‘ leverage, but the ownership structure can also be affected by 
leverage. For instance, when firms already have a high level of leverage that can 
constrain managers‘ opportunistic behaviour, there may not be the need for 
increasing managers‘ equity ownership or vice-vasa for the purpose of aligning the 
interest of managers and shareholders. That is leverage may act as a substitute to 
managerial shareholding. Similarly, larger shareholders (legal person shareholding 
and state ownership) and board composition can also be a substitute for leverage. For 
example, Deesomsak et al. (2004), Wiwattanakantang (1999) find that leverage is 
inversely related to ownership concentration, implying that large shareholders have 
greater incentive to monitor the managers. This, in turn, can reduce equity agency 
conflicts and limit managers‘ discretionary spending such as empire building. As a 
result, there is less demand for debt to control the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers in the firms. Wen et al. (2002) also suggest that outside directors‘ 
monitoring can reduce the value placed on the debt as a monitoring device. This 
suggests that different governance mechanisms indeed can be substitutes to each 
other (see also Agrawal and Knoeber, 1986).  
A second source of endogeneity that is likely to arise in the capital structure choices 
is when observable and unobservable characteristics of the firm affecting leverage 
choices are also likely to affect corporate governance. Therefore, the simultaneous 
determination of corporate governance and an unobserved or uncontrolled factor 
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 The simultaneous equations approach (2SLS) which can also be used to control for potential 
endogeneity is subject to several criticisms. Firstly, finding appropriate instrumental variables for 
each equation is very difficult and poor instruments may disguise an underlying relationship. 
Secondly, this approach is quite sensitive to model specification and consequently, a misspecification 
of any equation affects the entire system and inflates the standard errors (i.e., reduces t-statistics) of 
the coefficient estimates. 
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could potentially bias our estimates. Finally, external shocks such as the financial 
crisis may jointly affect leverage, corporate governance, and firm characteristics. 
Following recent studies (e.g., Lemmon et al., 2008; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009), we 
use the system GMM estimator in our study.  There are two GMM estimators: the 
first differenced GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the system GMM 
estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The GMM 
estimator takes first-difference of all the variables in order to eliminate the firm fixed 
effects (unobserved firm heterogeneity). An instrumental variable (IV) approach is 
then applied to deal with endogeneity. Therefore, the GMM estimator  not only 
controls for omitted variable bias and the endogeneity associated with our corporate 
governance and control variables, but also purges the endogeneity inherent in first 
difference of the lagged leverage ratio. As discussed in Bond (2002) and Bond et al. 
(2007), the system GMM estimator is preferred to the first-difference GMM 
estimator when instruments are likely to be weak and the value of the lagged 
dependent variable approaches unity as in the case of leverage ratios. They also show 
that the first difference GMM estimator could be subject to finite sample biases. The 
system GMM estimator is more efficient than the first-differenced estimator since it 
considers all possible instruments set by estimating the relevant equation (our 
Equation 3.3) simultaneously both in levels and in first-differences: it combines the 
equation in the first differences instrumented by lagged levels, with an additional set 
of equation in levels instrumented by lagged first differences. We treat firm age, 
volatility and the dummy variables (year, industry, and regional dummies) as 
exogenous and all other variables as endogenous variables.  In Equation (3.3), we 
use all right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility and the dummy variables 
lagged twice or more (t-2 or earlier) as instruments in the first-differenced equation, 
and first-differences of these same variables lagged once as instruments in the level 
equation. In addition, we include year dummies, industry dummies, and regional 
dummies as additional instruments set in all regressions.  
To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly 
specified, we first use the test for first and second-order (i.e. AR (1) and AR (2)) 
serial correlation of the residuals in the differenced equation. The AR (1) and AR (2) 
tests are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal distribution under the null 
hypothesis of no first/ second-order serial correlation on the first-difference 
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residuals, and provide a check on the legitimacy of instruments in the differenced 
equitation. We next use the Sargan test (also known as J test) which tests the over-
identifying restrictions, concerning the validity of instruments. Under the null of 
instrument validity, this test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of 
parameters. Furthermore,  we use two step robust standard errors in GMM. This two-
step GMM methodology can control for the correlation of errors over time, 
heteroskedasticity across firms, simultaneity, and measurement errors due to the 
utilization of orthogonal conditions on the variance-covariance matrix 
Although System GMM estimator is superior to many other methods, some caveats 
are worth mentioning. The main disadvantage of the system GMM estimator is that 
it is complicated and so can easily generate invalid estimates (Roodman, 2009). 
Another problem is that although the dynamic panel data estimators (the system 
GMM estimator) are linear estimators, they are highly sensitive to the particular 
specification of the model and its instruments. 
 
3.6. Data and descriptive statistics  
 
In this section, we describe the dataset and sample that is used in our study, and 
explain how the data is processed. This section also provides a discussion on 
summary statistics and correlation analysis of our variables.  
3.6.1 Data and sample selection 
 
Our sample includes all the publicly held firms that have been listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges  over the period of 2003 to 2010. Data are collected 
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and 
Sino-fin. We first delete firms in the financial industry, since their capital structure is 
subject to many regulations. We then remove the potential outliers (i.e., extreme 
observations) by deleting observations below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 percentile of 
all our regression variables, expect dummy variables. Our final sample has 1844 
Chinese firms and covers an unbalanced panel of 9624 firm-year observations. When 
using the  system GMM estimator, since we lag all the right hand side variables 
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twice or more to obtain suitable instruments, the final sample comes down to 6414 
firm year observations.  
3.6.2. Summary statistics 
 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, explanatory and 
control variables used in our regression analysis. Included are mean, median, 
standard deviations, minimum and maximum for the variables used in our study.  
The minimum and maximum book values of leverage (lev) ratios for the sample 
firms range from 5.8 % to 306.1 % with an average of about 50% (median 50 %).  
This suggests that on average, half of total assets are financed by debt capital. 
Furthermore, this figure implies that our sample firms in China have similar mean 
leverage compared with the findings of the previous studies in developed economies. 
For example, in their sample of firms from G-7 countries Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
report that  mean  leverage ratios (in book value) of 52 % and 54 %, respectively for 
the United States and the UK.  Moreover, the mean leverage ratio of Chinese listed 
firms is also similar to the ratios observed in developing countries (which average  
51 % according to Booth et al., 2001).   
As for the ownership structure, average (median) managerial share ownership 
(dstmshare) for the sample firms is 2.5% (0.00) of the total outstanding shares. The 
mean of managerial ownership is in line with Berger et al. (1997) who report a mean 
of managerial ownership of 2.7 % for 434 US firms for the period 1984 to 1992. 
Brailsford et al. (1992) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) find a mean of 10.65% and 
11.6% for Australian and UK firms, respectively. Our sample firms on average (at 
the median) have 25.3 % (22.9 %) and 16.1 % (4.2%) of shares owned by state (sos) 
and legal person (lpos), respectively. Using 1424 firm-year observation over the 
period 1993-2000, Zou and Xiao (2006), report that state, legal person and foreign 
shareholding have a mean of 33%, 28% and 8% respectively. The average level of 
foreign shareholding (fcap) is 3.6 % (0.00).  
The mean (the median) of the board size (lnbodsize) is 9.4 (9) with the proportion of 
independent directors (indes) of 35 % (33.3 %).  
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With regard to firm characteristics, i.e. traditional determinants, the mean (median) 
of firm size (size) proxied by total assets of the firm is 1.463 billion RMB (732 
billion RMB).
37
 Moreover, according to the sample, Chinese firms have an average 
profitability (profit) of 7.4 %, an average tangibility (tang) of 46 %, and average 
growth opportunity (growth) of 20.82 %.  
Average (median) non- debt tax shield (notaxshd) for the sample firms is 2.5% 
(2.2%) while average (median) volatility (vol) for the sample firms is 3.7 % (2%) . 
The average level of firm age (firmage) is 10.5 (10.00). Using data 972 Chinese 
PLCs in 2003, Chen and Strange (2005) find a mean of 6.60 for firm age. The mean 
values of these variables are comparable to those reported in studies on capital 
structure decision in the context of China, such as Huang and Song (2006) among 
others. 
 
3.6.3 Correlation analysis 
 
Table 3.2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables used in our 
regression analysis. Legal person shares exhibit a positive significant correlation 
with total leverage, as we hypothesised (H2). State shares exhibit a negative but 
insignificant correlation with leverage. Managerial ownership shows a negative and 
statistically significant correlation with the leverage ratio. This unexpected sign of 
managerial ownership may be due to the confounding factors behind such 
association. Our multivariate regressions analysis using econometric techniques 
should account for this issue.  
Table 3.2 shows a high negative correlation between state and legal person 
shareholders (-0.51), implying that multicollinearity is likely to be a problem.
38
 
                                                 
37
 It should be noted that although firm size is measured as the logarithm of total real assets in the 
regression analysis, the figure reported in the descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 is not in logarithms as 
actual value is easier to interpret. 
38
 When we calculate the correlation on a yearly basis, we find that correlation coefficient between 
lpos and sos is above -0.8 during the period before 2005. This is similar to the one reported by Yuan 
et al. (2008) who find a correlation coefficient of -0.88  between lops and sos. We also calculate the 
variance inflation factor (VIF), and note that the VIF is 9.2 (which is closer to the threshold of 10), 
which suggests that the observed high correlation coefficient between state shareholdings and legal 
person shareholdings may cause problems in our regressions. 
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Therefore, in order to mitigate the problem, we include one and drop the other at one 
time. Previous studies that involve the ownership structure of Chinese listed 
corporations also do so (for example, Zou and Xiao, 2006 and Yuan et al., 2008). 
Moreover, except for these variables, the correlation coefficients between other 
explanatory variables are generally moderate. 
As for the control variables, while firm size and tangibility exhibit a positive 
association with total leverage, profitability and growth opportunities show a 
negative correlation with total leverage. These results are consistent with the theories 
and our expectations. Table 3.3 reports a matrix of Spearman correlation coefficients 
for all of these variables which shows a similar pattern to the one in Table 3.2.  
 
3.7. Empirical results 
 
This section discusses the empirical results. As we discussed in methodology 
section, we mainly rely on the estimation results of the dynamic system GMM 
estimator for inferences, which enable us to control for potential unobserved 
heterogeneity, endogeneity and persistency in capital structure decisions. In addition, 
we report estimates from static models obtained using the pooled OLS and firm fixed 
effects regressions which enable us to directly compare our results with previous 
studies based on developed countries as well as in the context of Chinese firms. 
Additionally, we carry out many robustness tests using alternative model 
specifications and sub-sample of firms. 
3.7.1 The traditional determinants of capital structure 
 
We begin by estimating a naïve model with a set of firm characteristics suggested by 
the typical capital structure theories and by numerous empirical studies (e.g., Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Frank and Goyal, 2009). In addition, 
we include year, industry and regional dummies in our regressions as control 
variables. Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.4 refer to the regression results obtained 
using the OLS, Fixed effects and the system GMM estimators, respectively. 
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We can see that in all regressions in Table 3.4, firm size (size) attracts a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. This is consistent with the previous empirical 
findings (e.g., Berger et al., 1997; Booth et al., 2001) and with the trade-off and 
agency theories, meaning that larger firms are more diversified compared to small 
ones and consequently, they are associated with a lower risk of bankruptcy cost and 
better borrowing capacity relative to smaller firms. 
 
In line with the pecking-order theory, the relationship between profitability (profit) 
and leverage is negative and precisely determined in all columns. This provides 
additional support to findings of previous empirical studies in the context of Chinese 
listed companies. For example Chen (2004) proposes ‗a new pecking-order‘, 
whereby  firms use first retained profits, then equity financing, and debt capital  as a 
last resort since bond markets in China are not very much developed. He finds that 
firms with more profitable projects tend to use less external financing since these 
firms have better access to internal financing than firms with lower profits.  
 
Tangibility (tang) is positively related to leverage in columns 1 and 2, suggesting 
that the larger the proportion of fixed to total assets the firm has, the lower the 
bankruptcy costs. This finding is in line with the trade-off theory and the findings of 
previous empirical studies (e.g., Rajan and Zinghales, 1995; Zou and Xiao, 2006). 
Yet, results from the GMM regression in Column 3 show that tangibility has no 
significant impact on leverage ratios. This finding is consistent with Titman and 
Wessels (1988).  
 
Furthermore, as can be seen in the OLS and the GMM regression in columns 1 and 3 
respectively, growth opportunities (growth) exhibit a negative significant coefficient 
in line with the static trade-off theory. This can be also explained following Myers 
(1977) who argues that high growth firms tend to use less leverage in order to reduce 
underinvestment problem. This result is also consistent with the findings of the 
previous studies in the context of China (Zou and Xiao 2006; Haung and Song, 
2006; Moosa et al., 2011), from developed countries (Brailsfore et al., 2002; Frank 
and Goyal, 2003; Florackis and Ozken, 2009), and from developing countries (see 
e.g., Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Deesomsak et al., 2004). However, results from the 
fixed effects model in column 2 indicate that growth opportunities have no 
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significant impact on leverage ratios. This finding could be due to the fact that the 
fixed effect estimates do not take endogeneity into account. 
 
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.4 show that the non-debt tax shield (nontaxshd) is 
negatively and significantly related to leverage, confirming non-debt tax shields are 
substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). This 
result is consistent with the findings of the previous empirical studies (Deesomsak et 
al., 2004; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Qian et al., 2009). However, as shown in column 
(2), sign, the estimated coefficient on non-debt tax shield is insignificant in fixed 
effects regressions. 
 
The results from OLS and fixed effects regressions in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively indicate that firm age (firmage) is positively and significantly related to 
leverage, suggesting that older firms have much easier to access debt financing since 
they face less asymmetric information problems. This is consistent with the previous 
empirical finding in the context of Chinese listed firms (Chen and Strang, 2005). 
However, in the GMM regression (column 3), firm age has no significant impact on 
leverage ratios, which is consistent with Wiwattanakantang (1999). This finding is 
also consistent with Du et al. (2010) who find an insignificant coefficient on firm‘s 
age in their  leverage equations estimated on a panel of  Chinese SMEs.  
 
As can be seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4, the estimated coefficient on 
volatility (vol) is significantly positive. These results are consistent with the findings 
of the previous studies for Chinese listed firms (Qian et al., 2009). However, the 
results from the system GMM in column 3 reveal that there is no significant 
relationship between volatility and leverage. This finding is consistent with Titman 
and Wessels (1988). 
 
It is worth noting that the lagged dependent variable has a positive and strongly 
significant coefficient, which is about 0.88 in column 3, indicating that there is a 
high level of persistency in the leverage ratio. This warrants the use of dynamic 
modelling strategy and the system GMM estimator in our study. On the other hand, 
this suggests that only 12 per cent of the gap between last period‘s leverage and this 
period‘s target is eliminated within a year. The Chinese listed firms‘ adjustment 
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speed of leverage is much lower than that observed for the Chinese SMEs which is 
about 30% (as reported in DU et al., 2010), and for the US firms, which ranges 
between 30% (as reported in Flannery and Rangan, 2006) and 22-25% (as reported 
in Lemmon et al., 2008). This mean that the Chinese listed firms adjust towards a 
target leverage ratio slowly and partially, and can be due to higher adjustment and 
other costs (such as costs of negotiating with lenders in an under developed capital 
market 
 
So far, our analysis indicates that the average leverage ratio of Chinese listed firms is 
similar to those observed in other developing countries; the leverage is highly 
persistent over time; and the level of leverage is well explained by traditional 
determinants. In the next section, we introduce corporate governance variables as 
additional determinants of firms‘ leverage ratio and analyse how they affect firms‘ 
capital structure decisions. 
3.7.2 The effects of ownership structure and board structure on capital 
structure decisions 
 
The estimation results of our static baseline model Eq. (3.2) and dynamic baseline 
model Eq. (3.3) are reported in columns 1-4 and columns 5-6 of Table 3.5, 
respectively. As sos and lpos are highly correlated, regressions estimates are reported 
separately for regressions containing one or the other. Generally our results are 
consistent with our hypotheses  and the results of previous empirical studies.  
It is interesting to see that different from our conjecture, managerial ownership is 
negatively related to leverage in the OLS regression in column (1). This can be 
explained considering that when managers‘ stock ownership increases, managers 
become risk averse and adopt a capital structure with lower leverage. This result is 
consistent with Huang and Song (2006) who reports OLS estimates of regressions of 
the level of total leverage against managerial ownership. However, one needs to be 
cautious in interpreting this finding as evidence for a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and leverage. This result may be in fact contaminated by 
spurious correlation between the two variables, since, as we discussed to estimation 
methodology section, OLS does not effectively control for potential unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity.  
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As can be seen in columns 5-6 of Table 3.5, when endogeneity is controlled for 
using the system GMM estimator, the estimated impact of managerial ownership 
(dstmshare) on total leverage becomes positive and statistically significant, in line 
with our hypothesis (H1).
39
 Furthermore, its magnitude is also economically more 
significant (Huang and Ritter, 2009): calculating the economic significance from 
column 5, we find that incrementing managerial ownership by one-standard 
deviation increases leverage by 3.1 % of its mean.
40
 This finding is consistent with 
the incentive alignment hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggesting that 
greater managerial shareholding leads to a better alignment of the interest of insiders 
and outsiders, which in turn motivates managers to adopt more risky financial 
choices by using relatively more leverage. Moreover, the positive relationship may 
also imply that when managerial shareholding increases they choose higher leverage 
ratios as a signal for committing to low agency costs to outsiders. That is, a higher 
leverage ratio serves as a signal to outside investors that the managers are 
committed, and not going to pursue any non-profit maximization activities like 
excess consumption of perquisites and empire building. This finding is consistent 
with previous findings by Kim and Sorensen (1986), Mehran (1992), Berger et al. 
(1997) for US firms. Most recent studies (Li et al., 2007; Hu and Zhou, 2008; Liu et 
al., 2012) provide strong evidence that managerial ownership is positively associated 
with performance and value of the firms. In this study we identify one channel (i.e 
debt financing), which managers use to achieve this. Additionally, the flip in the sign 
(from negative to positive) of the estimated coefficient on managerial ownership 
provides an actual fact that relationship between managerial ownership and leverage 
is endogenous, and thus this is a focal new finding from our study in the context of 
Chinese firms.  
 
The estimated coefficient on legal person shareholding (lpos) is significantly 
positive, consistent with our expectation (H2), in the OLS regressions (column 1), 
implying that legal person investors do conduct active monitoring. Legal person 
shareholders can closely monitor the managerial opportunistic behaviour since they 
have large stake in the firm. A one standard deviation increase in legal person 
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 We also tested whether managerial ownership is non-linearly related to leverage, but we do not find 
such relationship in our data.  
40
 The estimated coefficient on managerial ownership (0.173) times standard deviation (0.089), 
divided by the mean value of leverage (0.503). 
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shareholding increases leverage by approximately 2.5%.
41
 Yet, as can be seen in 
column 5 of Table 3.5, after controlling for potential unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity, legal person shareholding is found not to have significant impact on 
leverage though it bears a positive sign. Column 3 also shows that the estimated 
coefficient on legal person shareholding is insignificant. This is consistent with the 
previous empirical findings (for example, Zou and Xiao, 2006; Chen and Strange, 
2005).  
Consistent with our hypothesis (H3), state ownership (sos) has a negative significant 
impact on leverage in all columns (columns 2, 4 and 6). A one standard deviation 
increase in state shareholding decreases leverage by approximately 2.08% in             
column 6.
42
 This finding is inconsistent with Qian et al. (2009) who find that a 
positive relationship between state shareholding and leverage by using data over the 
period 1999 to 2004. Our results lend support to the argument that state banks have  
become semi-commercial banks and started to act indiscriminately towards all the 
firms, regardless of the state involvements in them (Lin and Bo, 2011) and thus, 
managers in state controlled firms no longer enjoy easy access to finance from state 
owned banks. Therefore, the risk averse managers in the state owned firms with 
weak managerial incentives (Kato and Long, 2006a, b, c, and 2011) are more likely 
to prefer a low level of leverage. This result is in line with Lin and Bo (2011) who 
find a negative but insignificant relationship between state shareholding and 
leverage. Furthermore, this result may also imply that SOEs not only may face fewer 
restrictions in equity issuance but also might receive favorable treatments when 
applying for seasoned equity financing, thus use less debt. 
Different from what we hypothesised (H4), foreign shareholding (fcap) is negatively 
related to leverage to OLS and the GMM regressions. Focusing on the column (5), a 
one standard deviation increase in foreign shareholding, decreases leverage by 
approximately 4.1%.
43
 This result may be explained by the fact that most of Chinese 
listed firms have controlling shareholders who may use debt to acquire more 
resources for their expropriation at the expenses of minority shareholders without 
                                                 
41
 The estimated coefficient on legal person shareholding (0.06) times standard deviation (0.207), 
divided by the mean value of leverage (0.503).  
42
 The estimated coefficient on state shareholding (0.043) times standard deviation (0.244), divided by 
the mean value of leverage (0.503).  
43
 The estimated coefficient on foreign shareholding (0.205) times standard deviation (0.101) divided 
by the mean value of leverage (0.503). 
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diluting their control of the firms (Stulz, 1988; Xu and Wang, 1999; Faccio et al., 
2010). As for the foreign ownership, it is relatively low in these firms, the foreign 
investors may therefore prefer to use less debt in their portfolio firms to avoid 
expropriation by controlling shareholders.   
Turning to the effects of board structure, our results suggest the absence of 
significant relationship between board structure variables [board size (lnbodsize) and 
independent directors (indes)] and leverage ratios of Chinese listed firms. Our 
empirical result for board size is consistent with previous findings of 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) for Thai firms and Wen et al. (2002) for Chinese firms. 
While our finding that independent directors do not affect capital structure decisions 
is inconsistent with Wen et al. (2002), it is consistent with criticism of Clarke (2003 
and 2006) among others that independent directors of Chinese PLCs have no 
necessary knowledge and experience on financial and strategic aspects of the firms 
they represent and they are added to the board just to meet the legal and regulatory 
requirements. This finding is consistent with empirical findings of Su (2010) and 
Dixon et al. (2015) in that they show that Chinese independent directors are not 
effective in influencing listed firms‘ capital structure decisions and 
internationalisation decisions, respectively. 
 
As for the control variables, most of the traditional determinants of leverage retain 
their sign and significance levels as reported in the previous sub section. 
Furthermore, when we calculate the economic significance of these variables from 
column 6, we find that incrementing size and firm age of one-standard deviation 
increase leverage by 0.11 times and 0.17 times (from column 5) of its mean, 
respectively whereas incrementing profitability, growth opportunities and volatility 
by one-standard deviation decreases leverage by 7.25%, 6.61% and 2% of its mean, 
respectively. 
 
The estimated coefficients on volatility (vol) are significantly negative in the system 
GMM (columns 5 and 6). This result is consistent with previous studies from 
developing countries (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Deesomsak et al., 2004), in the 
context of Chinese listed companies (Zou and Xiao, 2006) and with the trade-off and 
theory, suggesting that high volatility of earnings  increases the probability of 
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financial distress which in turn decreases firm‘s debt capacity. Firm age (firmage) 
attracts a positive and statistically significant coefficient with leverage ratios, except 
in column 6. This is consistent with the previous empirical findings (e.g. Chen and 
Strang, 2005). 
  
3.7.3 Robustness checks  
 
In this sub-section we verify whether our results are robust to using alternative 
model specifications and different sub-sample of firms.  
3.7.3.1 Estimating separate regressions for state and non-state firms 
In this section, we investigate how the impact of managerial ownership on the 
leverage differs between the sub-sample of state and non-state firms. This exercise is 
motivated considering that top executives who come from the state sector are 
generally appointed by the Communist Party of China and government agencies 
(typically party secretaries, government officials or veteran socialist managers) 
(Walder, 2011). Therefore, Walder (2011) argues that managerial autonomy is 
limited in state controlled firms.  
In contrast, top executives in the private sector may have begun their careers in the 
state sector. But, they have not been appointed by the state. The managers of the 
private sector have greater independency from the state agencies compared to their 
counterparts. Moreover, Walder (2011) notes that top executives who come from 
private sector get much higher levels of compensation and they are more likely to 
have a significant level of ownership stake. These developments indicate that 
managers of these companies play a major role, as they have to take ultimate 
decision of the company.  
In the light of these considerations, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.6, we provide 
separate system GMM estimates of Equation (3.3) for state and non-state (private) 
firms. The results show that managerial ownership (dstmshare) only affects the 
leverage decisions of private firms, whilst the coefficient on managerial ownership is 
insignificant for state firms.  
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As can been seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.6, legal person shareholding 
(lpos) have a negative impact on leverage ratios of state firms, whilst the coefficient 
on legal person shareholding is insignificant for private firms.
44
  
In addition, we verify how the impact of state shareholding on the leverage differs 
between the sub-samples of state and non-state firms. This exercise is motivated by 
Tian and Estrin‘s study (2007), who use a sample of 2660 firm-year observation over 
the period 1994-1998 to examine the governance role of debt capital in the context of 
Chinese listed firms. When they differentiate the role of the debt on constraining 
managers between state controlled firms and private controlled firms, they find 
evidence that bank loans facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth in 
government controlled firms while bank loans helps to constrains agency cost in 
firms controlled by private owners. Therefore, they argue that a firm which is 
controlled by government is associated with soft budget constraints since loans from 
state owned banks facilitate managers in government controlled firms to expand the 
resources under their control for expropriation (the government is both debtors and 
creditors). Thus, soft budget constraints make debt as an ineffective governance 
mechanism in reducing agency cost in state-controlled firms. In the light of these 
considerations, column 3 shows that state ownership (sos) negatively influences the 
leverage decisions of state firms. Moreover, the coefficient on foreign ownership 
(fcap) is insignificant for both firms.   
The absence of a significant relationship between board structure variables (board 
size and independent directors) and leverage ratios applies to both of the subsamples 
of state and non-state listed firms.  
3.7.3.2 Taking into account differences in the pre- and post-reform periods 
Managerial ownership has become more important in recent years and Chinese 
corporations have been allowed to provide incentives to their top management in the 
form of stocks and stock options only from January 2006 onwards. Furthermore, 
firms‘ ownership structures have changed tremendously following the 2005 split 
share structure reform in which large part of the non- tradable shares have been 
converted to tradable shares which have been bought by private shareholders. 
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 When we use state ownership (sos) instead of legal person shareholding (lops), it is also not 
significant in private controlled firms. 
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Consequently, managerial shareholding has increased considerably after 2005. In 
particular, it was  less than 1% before 2005, but  has increased to about 8% by the end 
of 2010. It is therefore interesting to examine whether managerial ownership has played 
a more significant effect on firms‘ leverage decision during the post reform period 
(2005-2010). To this end, we generate a dummy variable = 1 if year > 2005, and 0 
otherwise and interact it with our proxy for managerial ownership. We include this 
interaction term in our dynamic specification (Equation 3.3).  
The results are reported in column 4 of Table 3.6. We can see that, the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction term (dstmshare*post_reform) is positively and 
significantly related to leverage ratios, whilst managerial ownership 
(dstmshare*pre_reform) is found not to have a significant impact on leverage in the 
pre-reform period. This suggests that the effects of managerial ownership on 
leverage only became apparent in the post-reform period. The coefficients on the 





In this chapter, we study the relationship between leverage, and both ownership 
structure and board structure. We use a sample of 1844 Chinese non-financial firms 
over the period 2003 to 2010 for our empirical analysis. This is the first empirical 
study after the 2005 spilt -share reform, which takes into account ownership 
structure and board structure variables. Moreover, we use the system GMM 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimator to study the relationship, explicitly controlling 
for potential unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. A dynamic model is 
adopted to control for persistency in capital structure decisions and to trace capital 
structure adjustments over time.  
 
Controlling for traditional determinants of leverage, endogeneity, and persistency in 
capital structure decisions, we find that firms adjust their leverage towards target 
leverage at a speed of 12%. Furthermore, the ownership structure plays a significant 
role in determining leverage ratios. More importantly, we document a strong positive 
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relationship between managerial shareholding and total leverage, consistent with the 
incentive alignment hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
More specifically, managerial ownership is positively related to leverage ratios after 
the split-share reform, but it does not have significant influence on the leverage 
ratios before the split-share reform. Furthermore, when differentiate state and non-
state firms, we find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of 
private firms. 
 
Our empirical results also reveal that state ownership is negatively related to 
leverage. However, legal person shareholding does not influence firms‘ leverage 
decisions. Contrary to our expectation, foreign ownership negatively influences 
leverage decisions. Furthermore, the board structure (board size and board 
composition/proportion of independent directors) does not influence firms‘ capital 
structure decisions.  
 
Our research has policy implications. Our findings suggest that recent ownership 
reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through 
managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices. Further, our study also 
suggests that managerial ownership can work as an incentive mechanism in countries 
like China with unique institutional settings.  Therefore, our study recommends that 
managerial ownership should be further encouraged in state controlled firms so as to 
provide managers of these firms to take more risk. However, even after the 
introduction of corporate governance code and the independent director system for 
Chinese listed corporations like in the Western countries, board of directors, 
especially independent directors do not seem to influence firms‘ important decisions 
like capital structure choices. Thus, our study recommends that a strong and truly 
independent board structure should be encouraged in the Chinese listed corporations 










Table A3.1 Definition of variables 
Variables Name  Measures Expected 
sign 
Dependent Variable 
Leverage lev : Total debt / total assets  
Governance variables    
Managerial 
ownership 
dstmshare : Shares owned directly by directors, 
supervisors & top management / total number 
of outstanding shares 
+(H1) 
Legal person shares lpos : Shares owned by legal persons/ total number 




sos : State owned shares/ total number of 
outstanding shares 
-(H3) 
Foreign investors  focap : Foreign investor owned shares/ total  number 
of shares 
+(H4) 
Board size lnbodsize : Log of total number of directors on the board -(H5) 
Board composition ( 
independent 
directors) 
indes : Percentage of independent directors on the 
board 
+(H6) 
Control variables    
Size size : Natural logarithm of total real assets + 
Profitability profit : ROA =Return on assets = Earnings before 
interest, taxes and depreciation / total assets 
- 
Tangibility tang : Net fixed assets/ Total assets + 
Growth  
opportunities   
growth : Ratio of the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt to the book 
value of total assets  
Non-tradable share price is used to calculate 
as the market value of the tradable equity.  
- 
Non-debt tax shield notaxshd : Depreciation / total assets - 
Volatility vol : Standard deviation of the first differences of 
earnings before taxes and depreciation over 
the four years preceding the sample period, 
divided by average total assets for that 
period. 
- 
Firm age firmage : Log of the number of years since the 
establishment of the firm  
+ 
Year dummies vt : Year dummies for the years 2003 to 2010  
Industry dummies vj : CSMAR B classification: 5 industries :  
Utilities, Properties, Conglomerates,  Industry, 
Commerce (except financial industries) 
 
Regional dummies vk : Dummies indicating whether the firm is 
located in the Coastal, Western, or Central 
region of China 
 
Notes: We exclude CEO duality from the analysis since its variation is not sufficient for it to be 
included in our model as an independent variable. It is typically 15% over the period of 2003 to 














Firm size (size) TOT  + Larger firms are more diversified, and 
have a greater debt capacity and a 
relatively lower bankruptcy cost than 
smaller firms. 
 AT + Larger firms provide more information 
to debt holders and hence a lower level 
of agency cost of debt. 
 POT  - Larger firms face lower level of 
information asymmetry since they are 
well established in the market and 
hence a lower cost of equity. 
Profitability (profit) TOT  
 
+ Profitable firms have greater tax shield, 
and a lower financial distress and 
bankruptcy costs.  
 AT + Profitable firms have more free cash 
flow. Hence, debt financing reduces the 
free cash flow problem in the presence 
of an active market for corporate 
control (Jensen, 1986).  
  - Managers of profitable firms prefer 
lower level of debt in order to avoid the 
disciplinary role of debt financing in 
the absence of an active market for 
corporate control (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995) 
 
 POT - Profitable firms prefer internal 
financing over external financing. 
Tangibility (tang) TOT  
 
+ Firm with more tangible assets are 
more capable of providing collaterals 
for debt.   
 AT + Debt financing creates the sub-optimal 
investment problem (Jensen and 
Mackling, 1976) and higher level of 
debt diminishes managers‘ 
discretionary spending (Grossman and 
Hart, 1982)  
 POT 
 
+ Firms with more fixed assets can easily 
access secured debt since tangible 





- Firms with high growth opportunities 
are likely to be risky and hence have a 
greater likelihood of financial distress 
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and bankruptcy costs. 
 AT - 
 
 
Debt financing creates assets 
substitution problem (Jensen & 
Mackling, 1976). In order to mitigate 
the underinvestment problem associated 
with use of excessive leverage, firms 
with more growth opportunities tend to 
have a lower level of leverage (Myers, 
1977). 
  + Debt financing reduces the free cash 
flow problem in low growth firms 
(Jensen, 1986) 
 POT + Firms with high growth opportunities 
face severe asymmetric information 
problems.  
Non-debt tax shield 
(notaxshd) 
TOT - Firms can use non-debt financing (such 
as depreciation) in order to reduce the 
tax payments. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest 
that non-debt tax shields may substitute 
for the tax shield benefits of debt. 
Volatility (vol) TOT - Firms with higher earnings volatility 
use less debt in order to avoid financial 
distress costs (bankruptcy costs) (Fama 
and French, 2002). 
Notes: Trade-Off Theory (TOT), Pecking Order Theory (POT) and Agency Theory (AT). ‗+‘ means 






Table A3.3 Summary of studies on the effects of corporate governance in capital 




 Sampling Analytical 
method 
Reported results and findings 
 
    
Wen et al. 
(2002) 
Sample of 180 
observations for 60 
Chinese listed firms over 
the period 1996 to 1998.  





Outside directors - 
The tenure of the CEO – 
Board size 0 




Sample of more than 1200 
listed companies over the 
period 1994-2003. 
Cross-sectional 
analysis and OLS 
Managerial shareholding – 




Fixed assets + 
Non-debt tax shields –  
 
Zou and Xiao 
(2006) 
Panel of 1424 firm-year 
observation over the period 
1993-2000. 
Fixed and random 
effects regression. 
State ownership 0 
Domestic legal person 
shareholding 0 







Earning volatility (risk) – 
Marginal tax rate + 
Non-debt tax shield + 
Dividend pay-out ratio – 
 
Shen (2008) Sample of 1098 listed 
companies over the period 
1991–2000. 
OLS Government ownership + 
Ownership concentration of the 
10 largest shareholding + 
Legal person - 
 
Size  and profitability  - 
Tangibility 0 
Tax rate  and Growth + 
Capital intensity + 
Product diversification + Asset 
specificity - 
Risk  and Duration 0  
Su (2010) Panel of of 789 firms  
with a total of 5523 firm-




State ownership – 
Board size – 
Independent directors  0 
CEO duality  0 
Largest shareholder + 
 
Size  and age + 
Profitability  - 
Growth and nontax shields 0 




Panel of of 13,107 firm-




State ownership - 






Asset growth + 
Industry leverage  + 
 
Note: + significantly positive; - significantly negative; + - significantly positive or negative; 0 
insignificant. 
 
Table A3.4 Summary of studies on the effects of the traditional determinants of 
the capital structure based on Chinese firms 
Chen 
(2004) 
Sample of 77 Chinese pubic-
listed companies for the period 
1995-2000. (Dataset- the Dow-
China 88 index) using firm-level 





Profitability –  
Tangibility + 






Sample of 972 listed companies 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 
China in 2003 
OLS Profitability - 
Size + 








Panel of 722 listed Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 
the manufacturing industry (202 
firms) over the period 2004 -
2007. 
OLS Size + 
Liquidity -   
Profitability - 
Growth opportunities + 





Sample of 650 publicly listed 
firms over the period 1999–
2004. 
DPD-GMM  Size +  
Profitability -, Tangibility + 
Volatility + 
State shareholding +  





Data on 344 publicly listed 







Profitability -          
Growth  - 
Tangibility + 
Pay-out ratio 0 
Age 0          
 
    








Table 3.1 Summary statistics of leverage, corporate governance, and control 
variables of Chinese listed firms over the period of 2003 to 2010. 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable       
lev 9624 0.503 0.505 0.214 0.058 3.061 
Governance variables       
dstmshare 9624 0.025 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.546 
lpos 9624 0.161 0.042 0.207 0.000 0.730 
sos 9624 0.253 0.229 0.244 0.000 0.750 
fcap 9624 0.036 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.513 
lnbodsize 9624 9.390 9.000 1.856 5.000 15.000 
indes 9624 0.351 0.333 0.042 0.222 0.500 
Control variables 9624      
size (billion RMB) 9624 1.463 0.732 2.471 0.067 26.136 
profit 9624 0.074 0.074 0.063 -0.254 0.268 
tang 9624 0.460 0.457 0.165 0.061 0.845 
growth 9624 2.082 1.659 1.237 0.807 8.504 
notaxshd 9624 0.025 0.022 0.015 0.000 0.081 
vol 9624 0.037 0.020 0.049 0.000 0.368 
firmage  9624 10.543 10.000 4.132 1.000 26.000 




















Table 3.2 Pearson correlation matrices 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
lev 1 1.00              
dstmshare 2 -0.17* 1.00             
lpos 3 0.03* 0.00 1.00            
sos 4 -0.02 -0.26* -0.51* 1.00           
fcap 5 -0.01 -0.05* -0.05* -0.03* 1.00          
lnbodsize 6 0.04* -0.07* -0.07* 0.14* 0.06* 1.00         
indes 7 -0.00 0.08* -0.02 -0.10* 0.01 -0.27* 1.00        
size 8 0.20* -0.15* -0.21* 0.14* 0.17* 0.21* 0.03* 1.00       
profit 9 -0.33* 0.08* -0.06* 0.02 0.03* 0.06* -0.00 0.19* 1.00      
tang 10 0.20* -0.15* -0.10* 0.11* 0.03* 0.09* -0.03* 0.16* 0.09* 1.00     
growth 11 -0.22* 0.22* 0.01 -0.19* -0.04* -0.09* 0.06* -0.30* 0.21* -0.21* 1.00    
nontaxshd 12 0.29* -0.16* 0.05* -0.06* 0.05* -0.09* 0.03* -0.12* -0.21* -0.01 0.07* 1.00   
vol  13 -0.02 -0.12* -0.12* 0.12* 0.10* 0.08* -0.04* 0.06* 0.23* 0.50* -0.08* 0.06* 1.00  
firmage 14 0.25* -0.27* -0.08* -0.22* 0.06* -0.05* 0.03* 0.15* -0.10* 0.08* -0.03* 0.29* 0.02* 1.00 











Table 3.3 Spearman correlation matrices 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
lev 1 1.00              
dstmshare 2 -0.09* 1.00             
lpos 3 0.01* 0.08* 1.00            
sos 4 0.01 -0.23* -0.41* 1.00           
fcap 5 -0.04 -0.08* -0.01 -0.02* 1.00          
lnbodsize 6 0.05* -0.04* -0.05* 0.15* 0.06* 1.00         
indes 7 0.02 -0.03* -0.05* -0.08* 0.02 -0.17* 1.00        
size 8 0.29* 0.00 -0.22* 0.13* 0.13* 0.20* 0.03* 1.00       
profit 9 -0.30* 0.08* -0.05* -0.01 0.04* 0.05* -0.01* 0.16* 1.00      
tang 10 0.22* -0.09* -0.08* 0.11* 0.03* 0.10* -0.01* 0.16* 0.11* 1.00     
growth 11 -0.28* 0.06* -0.02* -0.21* -0.02* -0.10* 0.05* -0.34* 0.26* -0.21* 1.00    
nontaxshd 12 0.23* -0.14* -0.06* -0.03* 0.03* -0.06* 0.00 0.04* -0.16* 0.07* 0.01 1.00   
vol  13 -0.05 -0.07* -0.12* 0.12* 0.07* 0.08* -0.04* 0.04* 0.31* 0.51* -0.08* 0.09* 1.00  
firmage 14 0.23* 0.06* -0.06* -0.24* 0.05* -0.07* 0.03* 0.14* -0.09* 0.04* 0.02* 0.43* -0.01 1.00 






















levit-1    0.886
***
 




























  (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) 











  (0.140) (0.110) (0.879) 











  (0.097) (0.172) (0.286) 
Industry dummies  yes Yes yes 
Regional dummies  yes yes yes 
Year dummies  yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects   yes yes 
Observations  9624 9624 8055 
R
2
  0.298 0.192  
adj. R
2
  0.296 0.191  
F  82.761 46.929 145.316 
P  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test ( p values)    0.242 
m1  (p values)    0.000 
m2 ( p values)    .311 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are reported in columns 1 and 2 (clustered on firms). Asymptotic 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses in column 3. For the system 
GMM regression, AR2 is a test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test (also known 
as J test) of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument 
validity. We treat all right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility and dummy variables as 
potentially endogenous variables. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%and 10%, 






Table 3.5 The effects of ownership structure and board structure on capital 
structure decisions 
  OLS Fixed effects System GMM 
 Predicted 
sign 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Governance 
variables 
       
dstmshare + -0.031 -0.070* 0.042 0.022 0.173*** 0.116** 
  (0.038) (0.040) (0.071) (0.070) (0.051) (0.053) 
lpos + 0.060***  0.002  0.010  
  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.026)  
sos -  -0.056***  -0.034**  -0.043** 
   (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.018) 
fcap + -0.129*** -0.142*** 0.034 0.019 -0.205** -0.225** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.059) (0.059) (0.102) (0.099) 
lnbodsize - 0.014 0.013 -0.002 -0.002 0.029 0.044 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.044) (0.043) 
indes + -0.036 -0.043 0.013 0.013 0.068 0.163 
  (0.072) (0.073) (0.051) (0.051) (0.184) (0.168) 
Control variables        
levit-1      0.856
*** 0.862*** 
      (0.041) (0.035) 
size + 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.018** 0.023*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
profit - -0.993*** -0.994*** -0.628*** -0.629*** -0.593*** -0.579*** 
  (0.073) (0.073) (0.046) (0.045) (0.108) (0.108) 
tang + 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.169*** 0.170*** -0.020 -0.076 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.079) (0.050) 
growth - -0.012** -0.011** -0.001 -0.002 -0.026** -0.027** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013) 
nontaxshd  - -0.946*** -0.951*** 0.000 0.021 0.604 0.600 
  (0.322) (0.320) (0.374) (0.375) (0.724) (0.478) 
vol - 1.080*** 1.096*** 0.602*** 0.603*** -0.362*** -0.171** 
  (0.140) (0.140) (0.114) (0.112) (0.116) (0.079) 
firmage  + 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.021*** 0.011 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant  -0.926*** -0.897*** -0.934*** -0.950*** -0.463 -0.681** 
  (0.109) (0.107) (0.188) (0.188) (0.335) (0.301) 
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Regional dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects    yes yes yes yes 
Observations  8426 8426 8426 8426 6414 6414 
R2  0.312 0.312 0.207 0.208   
adj. R2  0.310 0.310 0.204 0.206   
F test  65.883 66.020 39.526 39.895 107.067 97.600 
P value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test ( p 
values) 
     0.339 0.800 
m1  (p values)      0.000 0.000 
m2 ( p values)      0.819 0.685 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are reported in columns 1- 4 (clustered on firms). Asymptotic standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses in column 5-6. For the system GMM regression, AR2 is a 
test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test (also known as J test) of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as 
Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility 
and dummy variables as potentially endogenous variables. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%and 







Table 3.6 Robustness checks 
 Private State Reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Governance variables     
dstmshare 0.189
**
 0.073 0.132  
 (0.086) (0.626) (0.661)  
dstmshare*post_reform    0.114
**
 
    (0.058) 
dstmshare*pre_reform    0.100 
    (0.097) 
lpos -0.042 0.070
**
  0.027 
 (0.031) (0.032)  (0.020) 
sos   -0.063
**
  
   (0.027)  
fcap -0.150 -0.054 -0.101 -0.201
*
 
 (0.119) (0.164) (0.172) (0.105) 
lnbodsize 0.072 0.067 0.084 0.056 
 (0.085) (0.049) (0.051) (0.044) 
indes 0.260 0.192 0.152 0.189 
 (0.393) (0.157) (0.201) (0.164) 






























 (0.159) (0.135) (0.144) (0.105) 
tang -0.194 -0.063 -0.027 -0.073 










 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
nontaxshd 3.787
**
 0.420 -0.033 0.589 










 (0.175) (0.154) (0.164) (0.078) 
firmage  0.017 0.006 0.005 0.015
*
 










 (0.561) (0.366) (0.401) (0.284) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2132 4256 4256 6414 
F test 55.176 66.556 68.591 93.993 
P values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test ( p values) 0.405 0.566 0.531 0.462 
m1  (p values) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 ( p values) 0.590 0.752 0.676 0.759 
Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.  For the system GMM 
regression, AR2 is a test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test (also known as J test) of over-identifying 
restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables 
except firm age, volatility and dummy variables as potentially endogenous variables. ***, **, and * denote 






Debt maturity and the effects of growth opportunities and liquidity 
risk on leverage: Evidence from Chinese listed companies 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Research on capital structure decisions has broadened its scope since the seminal 
work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). A large number of studies, such as Smith and 
Watts (1992) and Rajan and Zigales (1995), have focused on a single capital 
structure decision (the debt/equity choice). Yet, recently, other strands of theoretical 
and empirical literature on capital structure decisions have focused on various 
attributes of the debt in firms‘ capital structure rather than the simple debt-equity 
choice. One particular attribute that has been widely studied is debt maturity. For 
example, in his seminal paper, Myers (1977) argues short-term maturity debt can 
mitigate the suboptimal incentive effects of debt financing, for example the under-
investment problem. The ‗under-investment‘ problem arises from the use of high 
leverage and long term debt. Firms‘ managers (who act on behalf of shareholders) 
forego positive net present value projects because a portion or all of the benefits 
from the project may accrue to debt holders. This conflict of interest between 
shareholders and debt holders over the exercise of growth options creates 
considerable agency costs to the firms. Yet, as Myers (1977) argues, when 
shortening the debt maturity, refinancing occurs or the debt matures before 
investment options expire, which prevents gains from new projects accruing to debt 
holders by allowing debt to be re-priced. Firms with greater growth opportunities 
face greater underinvestment problems. It is, therefore, argued that firms whose 
investment sets contain more growth opportunities have the incentive to employ a 
higher proportion of short-term debt. That is, short-term debt is an important 
mechanism to attenuate the agency problems arising from conflicts of interest 
between stockholders and bondholders (i.e., underinvestment). 
Conversely, according to the liquidity risk hypothesis of Diamond (1991, 1993) and 




liquidity risk problems when they choose too much short-term debt in order to 
reduce the underinvestment problems.  
Taken together, firms with a greater liquidity risk problem have an incentive to 
choose long-term debt, but may still choose lower leverage because the longer 
maturity increases the cost of underinvestment problems, as suggested by Myers, 
(1977). On the other hand, the use of too much short-term debt by firms with high 
growth opportunities is likely to result in the firm facing higher expected bankruptcy 
costs due to the high risk of liquidity associated with the short-term debt, thus 
reducing optimal leverage. On balance, considering the two opposing effects of short 
term debt, firms will trade-off the cost of under-investment problems (i.e., agency 
cost) against the cost of liquidity risk problems (i.e., bankruptcy cost) in order to 
reach an optimal maturity structure. 
A vast number of early studies have empirically examined the relationship among 
growth opportunities, leverage and debt maturity separately. For example, studies 
that examine capital structure decisions (i.e., the debt/equity choice) (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Stulz, 1990; Smith and Watts, 1992; Rajan and Zigales, 1995; Frank 
and Goyal, 2003, Sun et al.,2015) find a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage, while studies based on debt maturity choices find a 
positive relationship between short-term debt and growth opportunities (or 
equivalently, a negative relationship between growth opportunities and longer 
maturity) (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996, Arslan and Karan, 
2006; Stephan et al., 2011). The findings of these two sets of papers are consistent 
with Myers‘s (1977) prediction that firms with greater growth opportunities face a 
greater degree of underinvestment problems and thereby tend to lower their leverage 
and/ or shorten the maturity of their debt.  
Following Barclay et al. (2003) and Johnson (2003), the importance of modelling the 
two major components of a firm‘s capital structure namely leverage and debt 
maturity as jointly determined has been well-established in the capital structure 
literature.
45
  Barclay et al. (2003) mainly focus on the joint determination of leverage 
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and maturity, as well as on the effect of growth opportunities on leverage and debt 
maturity. Johnson (2003) extends this work by empirically testing both predictions 
that short-maturity debt can mitigate the negative effect of high growth opportunities 
on leverage (Myers, 1997 and Hart & Moore, 1995), on the one hand, and it 
increases liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991, 1993 and Sharpe, 1991), on the other.
46
 
Using a large sample of 20,565 Compustat firm-year observations over the period 1986 
to 1995, Johnson (2003) finds that although leverage is negatively associated with 
growth opportunities, shortening debt maturity helps attenuate the negative effect of 
growth opportunities on leverage. Yet, his other finding that there is a significant 
negative relationship between short-term debt and leverage provides support to the 
liquidity risk hypothesis. His study thus provides evidence for both attenuation 
effects and liquidity risk effects of short-term debt for US firms. Based on these 
findings, the author concludes that the use of short-term debt does not completely 
eliminate the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage due to the liquidity 
risk inherent in it, leading to a less than optimal level of total leverage. In other 
words, when combining both effects together, his results show that the negative 
direct effect is greater (i.e., increased liquidity risk) than the positive effects (i.e., 
reduced under investment problem). As a result, the net effect on leverage is 
negative.       
China has a unique institutional environment where state still retains considerable 
ownership and control not only in business firms but also in banks; bond market is 
still very small compared to its huge banking scoter; legal system has not well been 
developed. As discussed in Cai et al., (2008) and Firth et al. (2008), the opening up 
of China‘s economy and the adoption of capital market principles have presented 
many investment opportunities for its listed firms and thus Chinese investors have 
higher expectations regarding their future prospects. Furthermore, there is a high 
level of information asymmetry; Chinese firms are more likely to face asymmetric 
information problems over their investment opportunities. Furthermore, even after 
considerable development in the commercial bank lending environment in China 
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controlling stockholder–bondholder conflicts over the exercise of growth options and thus, 




(Firth et al., 2009; Tsai et al., 2014), short-term debt still accounts for more than 
80% of the total debt of listed firms.   
 
China, therefore, provides an interesting context to examine the interaction between 
growth opportunities, and leverage and maturity choices of firms in an institutional 
environment that is different from Western countries where these interactions have 
already been tested. 
 
In the Chinese context, some empirical studies that have examined the determinants 
of leverage, debt maturity and linkages between leverage and investment provide 
empirical evidence suggesting that Chinese listed firms face underinvestment 
problem, by showing a negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage (Zou and Xiao, 2006; Haung and Song, 2006; Moosa et al., 2011) and a 
negative relationship between leverage and investment (Firth et al., 2008). However, 
they do not focus on the attenuation effect of short-term debt. In this study, using a 
framework similar to Johnson (2003), we extend this literature to China, a largest 
emerging market with a unique institutional background, by examining how the 
attenuation and liquidity risk effects of short-debt maturity simultaneously affect 
leverage. Thus, our study fills an important gap in the literature. 
 
Using a large panel of 7860 non-financial Chinese listed firms over the period 2003 
to 2010, we will estimate the full capital structure decisions of firms by estimating 
leverage and maturity equations simultaneously, using the system GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Unlike Barclay et al. (2003) 
and Johnson (2003),
47
 the use of the system GMM estimator enable us to control for 
the high level of persistency observed in the capital structure decisions (Graham et 
al., 2008; Denis, 2012) in addition to accounting for the presence of unobservable 
fixed effects and endogeneity of all regressors.  
We find a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. Also 
consistent with our expectation and prior empirical work, we find a positive 
relationship between the proportion of short-term debt and growth opportunities. We 
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also find that the coefficient on growth opportunities interacted with short-term debt 
is significantly positive in the leverage equation, suggesting that the proportion of 
short-term debt attenuates the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage. 
Additionally, we also report that short-term debt is negatively related to leverage, 
suggesting that firms with a higher leverage ratio prefer a longer maturity of debt in 
order to avoid the liquidity risk problems associated with short-term debt. However, 
our analysis indicates that the economic implication of liquidity risk effect is much 
lower for Chinese firms than that observed in the literature for US firms. Our study 
suggests that these differences can be explained by differences in the institutional 
environment in which firms operate. This new finding related to Diamond‘s (1991) 
liquidity risk hypothesis extends our understanding of the relationship between 
liquidity risk and the debt maturity choice. 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
theories, and reviews the related empirical studies on debt maturity structure. In 
section 3, we develop testable hypotheses. In Section 4 we discuss the research 
methodology used to analyse the data. Section 5 describes our data and presents 
some descriptive statistics. Section 6 discusses our main empirical results.  Section 7 
provides conclusions. 
 
4.2. Review of the literature 
 
In this section, we provide a review of relevant theories and previous empirical 
studies on the debt maturity choices, estimating a single debt maturity equation as 
well as adopting a simultaneous equation approach.  
4.2.1 Review of relevant theories 
 
We focus on two major relevant theories which are used to explain the rationale behind 
the use of debt maturity in the capital structure, namely, the agency theory and liquidity 
risk hypothesis   





As Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) argue, when firm‘s investment 
opportunities are financed by risky debt, the benefits from undertaking positive NPV 
projects accrue, at least partially, to the creditors rather than accruing fully to the 
shareholders. For example, if firms are, in some circumstances, likely to go bankrupt 
in the near future, equity holders do not have the incentive to contribute new capital 
because bondholders may capture a large portion of the returns if firms undertake 
profitable investment projects (the debt overhang problem). In this situation, firms‘ 
mangers have the incentive to forego positive net present value project. This is 
known as the underinvestment problem. Myers (1977) suggests that these sub-
optimal incentive effects of debt financing associated with high growth options can 
be control in two ways.
48
 The first is using a lower level of leverage in the capital 
structure. Therefore, firms with greater growth opportunities are likely to use a lower 
than optimal level of leverage. The second is by shortening the maturity of debt. 
Specifically, he notes that if the debt matures before the investment options expire, 
gains from profitable investment projects do not accrue to debt holders, eliminating 
therefore the underinvestment problem. This theory predicts a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunities, on the one hand, and a positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and short-term debt, on the other.  
4.2.1.2 The liquidity risk hypothesis  
 
Diamond (1991) point out that the optimal debt maturity is reached by trading off 
between the benefit of short-term debt and liquidity risk. Given the information 
asymmetry between insiders and lenders, short-term debt helps to reduce borrowing 
costs when a firm receives good news and the debt is refinanced. Further short-term 
debt reduces underinvestment problem of growth opportunities.  However, short-
term debt exposes the firm to liquidity risk: if a firm defaults in its obligation, 
control rents are very high (control of the firm is transferred to creditors) (Diamond, 
1991) and refinancing costs (denial of refinancing), (Flannery, 1986). The 
implications of the liquidity risk argument are twofold.
49
 First, the use of too much  
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short-term debt by firms creates liquidity risk problems, thereby increasing 
bankruptcy costs (Diamond, 1991and 1993). Therefore, the relationship between 
growth opportunities and short-term debt is determined by the trade-off between the 
cost of underinvestment problems (i.e. agency cost) and the cost of liquidity risk 
problems (i.e. bankruptcy cost). Second, firms with higher leverage attempt to avoid 
liquidity risk by lengthening their maturity (Diamond, 1991and 1993; Sharpe, 1991). 
Leland and Toft (1996) theoretically show that the leverage level relies on the debt 
maturity: firms with a higher leverage ratio tend to choose longer maturity of their 
debt and vice versa. Thus, the theory predicts a negative relationship between 
leverage and short-term debt. Stohs and Mauer (1996) recommend controlling for 
leverage when testing the effect of liquidity risk on debt maturity 
 
In sum, while the agency theory (Myers, 1977) supports the use of short-term debt in 
order to control under-investment problems, the liquidity hypothesis (Diamond, 1991 
and 1993; Sharpe, 1991) supports the use of long-term debt so as to avoid the 
liquidity risk associated with short-term debt when firms have higher leverage level.  
 
4.2.2 Review of related empirical studies 
 
4.2.2.1 Prior evidence on the relationship between debt maturity and growth 
opportunities. 
 
Most early empirical studies have focused on debt maturity choices of US firms 
(Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer,1996). For 
example, utilizing a large panel of 37979 firm-year observations over the period 
1974 to 1992, Barclay and Smith (1995) examine the determinants of debt maturity 
structure. They find evidence that firms with fewer growth opportunities use larger 
proportions of long-term debt in their capital structures, while firms with high 
growth opportunities prefer short-term debt.  
Using a panel of 328 industrial firms from Compustat industrial annual files over the 




growth opportunities and long term leverage when they include leverage as an 
independent variable in the regression. However, when they drop leverage from their 
regression, they find a negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage
50
. They also find that asset maturity has a positive impact on long-term 
debt. This result is consistent with the matching principle, according to which firms 
match their debt maturity to their assets maturity, in order to control for the risk and 
cost of financial distress.  The authors also find that earnings volatility and firm 
quality are negatively related to long-term debt, and that firms with greater leverage 
use more long-term debt, suggesting that the optimal leverage and debt maturity 
structure are determined simultaneously.  
Using a sample of 7,369 debt issues by US-based corporations over the period 1982 
to 1993, Guedes and Opler (1996) find that firms with high growth opportunities 
tend to issue more short-term debt. Furthermore, they find that firm size and asset 
maturity are positively related to long-term debt.  
Researchers have also focused on the determinations of debt maturity structure in 
Western Europe. They have also shed light on the dynamic nature of adjustment of 
corporate maturity structure using GMM estimation procedures. For example, Ozkan 
(2000) uses an unbalanced panel of 4624 firm year observations over the period 
1982 to 1996 to investigate the determinants of debt maturity structure among UK 
firms, in addition to the speed of adjustment towards the target debt maturity. He 
finds a negative relationship between growth opportunities and long-term debt, 
which he explains considering that the firms face severe asymmetric information 
problems. He also finds that firm size is positively related to debt maturity, 
suggesting that large firms are less likely to face severe agency problems and can 
easily access to the capital market. His results also show that asset maturity of firms 
has a positive effect on their maturity structure, implying that firms match the 
maturity of their assets and liabilities, consistent with the prediction of the matching 
theory.  
 
                                                 
50
 As Baclay et al. (1997) notes, Stohs and Mauer‘s (1996) estimates are potentially biased and 
inconsistent since they include both a leverage measure (an endogenous variable) and a growth 





Using cross sectional data for 3153  UK firms, 1253 French firms,  and 1590 
German firms over the periods 1969 to 2000, 1983-2000 and 1987-2000, 
respectively, Antoniou et al. (2006) report that each country‘s firms‘ maturity 
structure is determined by firm-specific factors, as well as by the country‘s financial 
systems and macroeconomic factors (institutional traditions) in which they operate. 
Their results show that most of the factors identified in the literature as determinants 
of debt maturity structure are found to be also significant in the case of UK firms. 
Moreover, their dynamic results show that the adjustment speed of French firms 
(56%) is faster than that of the UK and German firms.
51
 Overall, their results provide 
evidence in support of the fact that firms in three major European countries adjust 
their maturity structure towards their optimal level. 
 
In the context of developing countries, Booth et al. (2001) analyse data from ten 
emerging economies between 1980 and 1991 and find that, unlike Western countries, 
most of the emerging countries choose short-term debt since capital markets are not 
well developed in most of these economies. In a similar vein, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) use a larger data set (9,649 non-financial firms from 30 
developed and developing countries) over the period 1980 to 1991 to study the 
choices of debt maturity structure. They find that there are many similarities in the 
determinants of firms‘ debt maturity choices across developed and developing 
markets. Moreover, they show that firms (especially small ones) are prone to rely on 
short-term debt. They argue, following Diamond (1991, 1993) and Rajan (1992), that 
in the developing countries where financial and legal systems are inefficient or costly 
to use, short-term debt is more likely to be employed than long-term debt.  
 
Using a cross sectional sample of 1726 Thai firms, 2493 Malaysian firms, 1164 
Singaporean firms, and 809 Australian firms over the period 1993 to 2001, 
Deesomsak et al. (2009) find that firms operating in these regions have a target 
optimal debt maturity structure, and their maturity structure decisions are driven by 
both their own characteristics and the economic environment.  Moreover, they point 
out that the financial crisis of 1997 has had a significant effect on firms‘ debt 
maturity structure and their determinants. Furthermore, leverage, firm size, liquidity 
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and asset maturity are positively related to long-term debt while earnings volatility is 
negatively related to long-term debt.  
Cai et al. (2008) use a panel made up of 1554 firm year observations over the period 
1999 to 2004 to examine the determinants of debt maturity structure of Chinese 
listed firms. Using the system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to 
control for the endogeneity of the regressors, they find that firm size and assets 
maturity are positively related to long-term debt, which is consistent with the 
predictions of agency and matching theories, respectively. Growth opportunities 
have a positive but insignificant impact on debt maturity choices (long term debt). 
Furthermore, they find that ownership concentration does not affect debt maturity 
choices. However, they neither account for the persistency in the capital structure 
choices nor for the dynamics of firms‘ debt maturity decisions. 
To the best of our knowledge, so far, Cai et al. (2008) is the only study that focuses 
on the determinants of the debt maturity choices of Chinese listed companies in a 
static framework. 
4.2.2.2 Prior evidence on the relationship between leverage, debt maturity and 
growth opportunities based on studies that focus on the joint determination of 
leverage and debt maturity 
 
While early empirical studies have focused on explaining a single facet of financial 
policy choices, recent studies have focused on the joint determination of debt and 
maturity. Using a sample of 5765 industrial firms in the US over the period 1980 to 
1999, Barclay et al. (2003) focus on the effect of growth opportunities on capital 
structure decisions and on the joint determination of leverage and debt maturity in a 
system of simultaneous equations. In both the leverage and maturity regressions, 
they find a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage, and 
growth opportunities and long-term debt. These results are consistent with Myer‘s 
(1977) prediction that firms with greater growth opportunities face a greater degree 
of underinvestment, and thereby tend to lower their leverage and/ or shorten the 
maturity of their debt. In the leverage regression, they find that profitability is 
negatively related to leverage, while tangibility is positively related to leverage. 




respectively. In their maturity regression, firm size and asset maturity are positively 
related to long-term leverage.  
Focusing on a large sample of 20,565 Compustat firm-year observations over the 
period 1986 to 1995, Johnson (2003) finds a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage in his leverage regression, in his pooled OLS and fixed 
effects regressions. More importantly, he finds evidence that shortening debt maturity 
attenuates the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage.
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 Moreover, he finds 
a negative relationship between stand-alone short-term debt and leverage, consistent 
with the liquidity risk hypothesis (Diamond, 1991, 1993 and Sharpe, 1991). 
Furthermore, in his maturity equation, he finds a negative relationship between asset 
maturity and short-term debt, which is consistent with Myers‘s (1977) prediction that 
firms match the maturity of their assets with their liabilities in order to reduce 
underinvestment problems. Johnson (2003) also finds that firm size and its squared 
term are negatively and positively related to short-term debt, respectively. These 
results are consistent with Diamond‘s (1991) prediction that there is a positive and 
negative relationship between firm size and long-term debt and its squared term and 
long-term debt, respectively.  
Extending the work of Johnson (2003), Billett et al. (2007) examine the effect of 
growth opportunities on firms‘ joint choice of leverage, debt maturity and debt 
covenants in a system of simultaneous equations using the system GMM estimator. 
Using a panel data set of 7016 Compustat firm-year observations over the period 
1989 to 2002, they find a negative relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities. They also report that while short-term debt attenuates the negative 
effect of growth opportunities on leverage for their sub-sample of non-investment 
grade firms (which are more likely to face asymmetric information problems over 
their investment opportunities). Additionally, they also report that while debt 
covenants attenuates the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage, short-
term debt and restrictive covenants are substitute mechanisms in mitigating the 
agency conflict between stockholders and debtholders over the exercise of  growth 
options.  Moreover, Billett et al. (2007) do not find support for the liquidity risk 
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hypothesis since all of the firms used in their sample are rated firms. These results 
are also consistent with Johnson‘s (2003) findings for the rated firms in his sample. 
Rated firms are likely to have higher credit quality and also likely to face fewer 
constraints on extending maturity than unrated firms. As such the liquidity risk effect 
on leverage is only relevant for lower credit quality firms (i.e. unrated firms) and 
firms that cannot easily lengthen their maturity.
53
  
In a similar vein, using a sample  of 4170 firm-year observations over the period 
1996 to 2003, Dang (2011) examines the effects of growth opportunities on leverage 
and debt maturity among UK firms, as well as the speed of adjustment towards the 
target debt maturity. Using the GMM estimator, he finds a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunities in the leverage regression. Moreover, he 
finds a positive relationship between long-term debt and leverage. This finding is 
consistent with the liquidity risk hypothesis, suggesting that firms with long-term 
debt face a lower liquidity risk problem and, thus,  are able to use more leverage. 
Furthermore, they fins that profitability is negatively related to leverage, whereas 
tangibility is positively related to leverage. In his maturity regression, firm size and 
the tax rate are positively related to long-term debt, whilst growth opportunities do 
not have a negative impact on long-term debt. Therefore, his results suggest that 
high-growth firms in his sample deal with the underinvestment problem by reducing 
leverage but not by shortening their debt maturity.   
4.2.3 Our contribution  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically examine whether the short 
maturity of debt can attenuate the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage 
in the context of emerging markets, particularly in China, which is the largest 
emerging economy in the world.  
Second, our study provides a useful extension to Diamond‘s (1991) liquidity risk 
theory of debt maturity. While Diamond‘s (1991) proposition show that debt 
maturity increases with the liquidity risk of the firm, we show how institutional 
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differences (such as state ownership of firms) influence the liquidity risk faced by 
the firms. To this end, we split our sample into state and privately controlled firms 
and test liquidity risk effect of short-term debt for these firms separately exploiting 
China‘s unique institutional environment where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
non-SOEs co-exist. 
Our third contribution is methodological. Following Barclay et al. (2003) and 
Johnson (2003), we treat leverage and debt maturity as jointly endogenous variables. 
However, unlike these studies, we use the system GMM estimator (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998) to control for the presence of potential endogeneity of all regressors. 
This is important considering that, for example, a vast number of studies show 
profitability as an important determinant of leverage, whilst others show that 
leverage itself affect profitability (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Abor, 2005; 
Berger et al., 2009; Margaritis, Maria Psillaki, 2010).  Furthermore, for the first time, 
we provide empirical evidence on the attenuation effect of short-term debt in a 
dynamic framework. Previous empirical studies by Johnson (2003) and Billett et al. 
(2007) are in fact based on a static framework and, thus fail to shed light on the 
dynamic nature of firms‘ capital structure and to control for persistency in the capital 
structure decisions (Lemmon et al., 2008; Denis et al., 2012).  
4.3. Hypotheses 
  
In this section, we develop hypotheses based on relevant theories and previous 
empirical studies.  
4.3.1 Leverage and growth opportunities  
 
Agency arguments suggest that although debt financing can mitigate conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders, i.e., agency costs of equity, it may 
create conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders, i.e., agency costs 
of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986). Myers (1977) 
argues that when managers in a firm with risky debt outstanding act in the interest of 
equity holders to maximize the value of equity rather than total firm value, they have 
incentives to sub-optimally invest in future growth opportunities. More specially, 




positive net present value projects because a portion of the benefits of the project 
would accrue to debt holders. The loss in firm value from these suboptimal 
investment decisions and the cost of contracting mechanisms (e.g. short-term debt or 
debt covenants) that the firm uses to mitigate stockholder–bondholder conflicts  
account for considerable agency cost of debt. In the absence of mechanisms to 
control these conflicts between stockholders and bondholders, rational bond holders 
anticipate conflicts and thus require a higher premium for debt financing. Therefore, 
in order to mitigate or avoid potential conflicts over the exercise of future growth 
options altogether, the firm may resort to using less debt financing. Thus, agency 
arguments predict that there should be a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. A large number of empirical studies provide empirical 
support for this theoretical prediction (Smith and Watts, 1992; Rajan and Zigales, 
1995; Brailsfore et al., 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Florackis and Ozken, 2009, 
Sun et al, 2015). Previous research on Chinese financial markets suggests that, the 
opening up of China‘s economy and the adoption of capital market principles has 
presented many investment opportunities for its listed firms and thus Chinese 
investors have higher expectations regarding their future prospects (Cai et al., 2008; 
Firth et al., 2008). Therefore, Chinese listed firms with high growth options are 
likely to face conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders. In line with 
this, using data from Chinese listed firms, Zou and Xiao (2006), Haung and Song 
(2006), and Moosa et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunities. In line with these findings, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities (in the leverage equation) 
 
4.3.2 Debt maturity (the proportion of short-term debt in total debt) and 
growth opportunities 
 
Myers (1977) shows that conflicts between stockholder and bondholders over the 
exercise of growth opportunities can be controlled for by the use of a shorter 
maturity of debt in the capital structure. Thus, his theory suggests a positive 




total debt.   Childs et al. (2005) also show that short-term debt can mitigate the sub-
optimal investment effects of debt financing, by making the debt less sensitive to 
changes in firm value and by allowing for more frequent re-pricing of debt. 
 
A positive relationship between growth opportunities and the use of short-term debt 
(or equivalently, a negative relationship between growth opportunities and longer 
maturity) has been observed in several empirical studies from developed countries 
(for example, Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Ozkan, 2000; 
Barclay et al. 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Guney and Ozkan, 2005) as well as from 
emerging economies (for example, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2010; 
Stephan et al. 2011).  
 
Only a handful of papers have examined attenuation effect of short-term debt. Based 
on a large panel of 20,565 US firm-year observations over the period 1986 to 1995, 
Johnson (2003) argues and provides empirical evidence suggesting that while growth 
opportunities have a negative direct effect on leverage, the use of short-term debt 
attenuates this negative effect. Billett et al. (2007) confirm Johnson‘s (2003) findings 
by using a sub-sample of non-investment grade firms.  In this line, we hypothesise 
that: 
 
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities interacted with short-term debt (in the leverage equation).  
 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between growth opportunities and the 
proportion of short-term debt (in the maturity equation) 
 
4.3.3 Debt maturity (the proportion of short-term debt in total debt) and 
liquidity risk  
According to the liquidity risk hypothesis, firms with higher leverage ratio tend to 
choose longer maturity of their debt in order to avoid liquidity risk problems 
(Diamond, 1991 and 1993; Sharpe, 1991). Therefore, the theory predicts a negative 




Most of the previous empirical studies from developed and developing countries 
(e.g. Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; Antoniou 
et al., 2006; García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2010; Stephan et al. 2011) report a 
positive relationship between leverage and long-term debt (equivalently, a negative 
relationship between the proportion of short-term debt and leverage).   
In the context of China, prior research reports evidence that Chinese firms largely 
rely on short-term debt for their external financing needs (Cai et al., 2008; Du et al., 
2013) suggesting that these firms face greater rollover risk/liquidity risk than their 
Western counterparts.
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 Cai et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that leverage is 
positively associated with maturity (long term debt). We thus hypothesize that   
 
H4: There is a significant negative relationship between leverage and the proportion 
of short-term debt (in both leverage and maturity equations) 
 
4.4. Baseline specifications and estimation methodology 
 
In this section, we first present our model specifications and then discuss our 
estimation methodologies  
 
4.4.1 Baseline specifications 
 
Following Barclay et al. (2003) and Johnson (2003), we estimate two models namely a 
leverage equation and a maturity equation.  
4.4.1.1 Leverage equation 
 
In order to test our hypotheses,  we estimate the following equation:  
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tlevit= β0 + (β1tlevit-1) + β2prop_stlevit + β3growthit + (β4growthit * prop_stlevit) + 
β5tangit +β6profitit + β7sizeit + β8volit + β9nontaxshdit +   
β10 firmageit + vi + vt + vj + vk + eit                                                        (4.1)                                                               
 
 where i indexes firms, and t years. The terms vi, vt,, vj, and vk represent respectively a 
time-invariant firm specific fixed effect, a time-specific effect, an industry-specific 
effect, and a region-specific effect . eit is a random/ idiosyncratic error term.  
On the left hand side of equation (4.1), our dependent variable is the leverage ratio of 
firm i in year t (defined as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value 
of the firm‘s total assets). On the right hand side, we include a stand-alone measure of 
debt maturity– the proportion of short term debt in total debt (prop_stlev). According to 
Hypothesis (H4), we expect a negative relationship between leverage and short term 
debt (prop_stlev).  
 
We measure growth opportunities (Q) as the ratio of the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. According to 
Hypothesis 1, we expect to observe a negative relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunities (Q).  Following Johnson (2003), we include an interaction term 
between growth opportunities and the proportion of short-term debt (growth * 
prop_stlev) in the leverage equation. The interaction term makes the effect of growth 
opportunities on leverage conditional on the maturity structure of a firm‘s leverage, 
and thus allows testing whether a short debt maturity attenuates the negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage (attenuation effects). In line 
with Hypothesis 2, we expect yo observe a positive relationship between leverage and 
this interaction term (growth * prop_stlev).    
 
Turning to the control variable, as in the previous literature, we include in the  
leverage equation  firm size, profitability, tangibility, volatility and non-debt tax 
shield and firm age as control variables. These control variables are the same as in the 
previous Chapter (Chapter-3) and defined in Table A3. We have already discussed 
theories and the prior evidence related to these control variables and the expected 




variables are motivated mainly by the empirical findings of Berger et al. (1997), 
Barclay et al. (2003), Johnson (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2009), among others. 
Following Johnson (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2011), we exclude firm size squared and 
asset maturity from the leverage equations because capital structure theories suggest 
that these variables only influence the debt maturity structure. 
 
Lemmon et al. (2008) provide strong evidence that firm-specific unobservable fixed 
characteristics (vi) have a significant impact on firms‘ capital structure decisions. 
They vary across firms but are assumed to remain constant for each firm through 
time. They include factors such as quality of management and managers‘ attitudes 
towards risk. On the other hand, time-specific effects (vt) which are controlled for by 
including year dummies vary through time but are the same for all the firms at a 
given point in time. They capture macroeconomic factors such as changes in interest 
rates, inflation and business cycle effects that are outside the control of firms. 
Additionally, we include industry and regional dummies to control for industry-
specific and geographic fixed effects. 
Since recent studies emphasize that capital structure decisions are more likely to be 
highly persistent due to adjustment costs and other market imperfections (e.g. 
Antoniou et al., 2008; Lemmon et al., 2008; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009), we also 
estimate the dynamic equation with a lagged dependent variable (β1tlevit-1). In 
Equation (4.1) we include the lagged dependent variable amongst other variables to 
capture the dynamic feedback effects in the capital structure decisions (Antioniou et 
al., 2008).  
 4.4.1.2 Debt maturity equation 
Following Johnson (2003), to test the effects of leverage and other independent 
variables on the maturity structure of the Chinese listed firms, we estimate the 
following maturity equation (a static and dynamic models):  
prop_stlevit= β0 + (β1prop_stlevit-1) + β2tlevit + β3growthit + β4assetmatit + β5sizeit + 
β6(size)
2




where i indexes firms, and t years. The term vi, vt,, vj, and vk represent respectively 
time-invariant firm specific fixed effects, time-specific effects, industry effects, and 
regional effects . eit is a random/ idiosyncratic error term.  
On the left hand side of the maturity equation (Eq.4.2), our dependent variable is the 
debt maturity. Following Baum et al. (2007), Marchica (2008) and Stephan et al. 
(2011), we define debt maturity as the proportion of total debt that matures within 
one year. On the right hand side, we include leverage, asset maturity, firm size and its 
squared term, volatility, non-tax shield and firm age. These variables are motivated by 
the predictions of theoretical models of debt maturity and the empirical findings of 
Johnson (2003) and Barclay and Smith (1995), among others. In addition, in the 
maturity equation, unobservable firm-specific fixed effects, firm-invariant time-
specific effects, the regional and industry effects are controlled for by including 
dummy variables.  
 
Recent studies, for example, Ozkan, (2002), Antioniou et al. (2006); Marchica 
(2008); Denis (2012) emphasize that debt maturity decisions are more likely to be 
highly persistent due to the adjustment costs and other market imperfections. We 
thus extend previous empirical models on determination of maturity structure 
choices (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Johnson, 2003; Billett et al., 2007) in the context 
of China by estimating the dynamic equation. In the maturity equation (4.2), we 
include the lagged short-term debt to control for the dynamic effects of debt 
maturity.  
The use of a dynamic modelling strategy considers the fact that firms do have target 
maturity ratios in their maturity structure decisions and that it may take time to reach 
target maturity following changes in standard financial characteristics or random 
economic shocks, due to adjustment and other costs (Ozkan, 2000; Antioniou et al., 
2006). Therefore, firms make a partial adjustment towards the desired maturity ratio 
(Ozkan, 2000; Antioniou et al., 2006; Marchica 2008). Firm‘s speed of adjustment 
towards its target maturity ratio is calculated by one minus the value of the 
coefficient of lagged dependent variable (1-β1). A value of 0 indicates that there is no 
adjustment at all towards the target maturity structure, and a value of 1 indicates that 




speed of adjustment depends on the parameter β1 which gives the fraction of the 
desired change [i.e. prop_stlevit – prop_stlevi(t-1)= β1(prop_stlev it* - prop_stlevi(t-1))] 
that managers can achieve.
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4.4.1.2.1 Independent variables 
Following previous studies (Johnson, 2003; Barclay and Smith, 1995; among 
others), we use several important variables as independent variables in the maturity 
equation. 
4.4.2.1 Firm size 
 
Following Johnson (2003), Barclay et al. (2003) and Datta et al. (2005), we use firm 
size (measured by the natural logarithm of total assets) and its square as proxies for 
credit quality or liquidity risk. Diamond (1991) argues and finds an increasing, then 
decreasing relationship between credit quality and debt maturity (measured by 
proportion of long term debt in total debt). This suggests that a short maturity of debt 
should be positively and negatively related to firm size and its squared term, 
respectively. The main reason behind this non-linear relationship is that larger firms 
are more diversified and have lower bankruptcy risk and thus are able to use more 
rolling debt. More recently, Johnson (2003) provides empirical evidence supporting 
Diamond‘s (1991) increasing, and decreasing relationship between credit quality 
(measured by firm size) and debt maturity. In line with his findings, we also expect 
to observe a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between firm size and the proportion 
of short-term debt for Chinese listed firms.  
 
4.4.2.3 Asset maturity 
 According to the matching principle, firms match the maturity of their liabilities to 
that of their assets in order to control for potential risk and cost of financial distress. 
Thus, firms with longer lived assets are expected to have longer debt maturity, 
whereas firms with shorter lived assets expected to have shorter debt maturity. As 
discussed in Stohs and Mauer (1996), on the one hand, when debt has a shorter 
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maturity than assets, the firms may not have sufficient cash to pay their debt 
obligations when they fall due. On the other hand, if the maturity of debt is longer 
than that of assets, firms would have remaining debt obligations to meet. Therefore, 
firms should match their debt maturity to their assets maturity. Furthermore, Myers 
(1977) argues that the underinvestment problem can be eliminated by matching the 
maturity of firm‘s debt to that of its assets. These arguments suggest that there 
should be a negative relationship between asset maturity and short-term debt. 
 
Previous empirical finding on corporate debt maturity structure for the US (Guedes 
and Opler, 1996), Western Europe (Antoniou et al. 2006; Ozkan, 2000), the Asia 
Pacific region (Deesomsak et al., 2009) and China (Cai et al., 2008) find a positive 
relationship between asset maturity and long-term debt. Therefore, equivalently, we 
expect a negative relationship between asset maturity and the proportion of short-
term debt. Following Ozkan (2000) and Marchica (2008), we define the ratio of net 
fixed assets (include land and buildings, plant and machinery, and other fixed assets) 
to annual depreciation expenses as a proxy for the asset maturity (assetmat).      
 
4.4.2.4 Volatility in earnings  
Firms with more volatility in earnings may have difficulty to repay debt. Thus, firms 
with high earning volatility prefer a longer debt maturity in order to avoid frequent 
re-balancing of their capital structure (Johnson, 2003). This suggests the presence of  
a negative relationship between earnings volatility and short-term debt.  
Previous empirical studies (Johnson, 2003; Marchica, 2008) find a negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and short-term debt. Therefore, we also 
expect to observe a negative relationship between volatility and the proportion of 
short-term debt in total debt. Following Johnson, (2003) and Marchica (2008), we 
measure earnings volatility (vol) as the standard deviation of the first differences of 
earnings before taxes and depreciation over the four years preceding the sample year, 
divided by average total assets for that period.  
 





 The tax hypothesis analyses the tax implications of the debt maturity choices. In 
their model, Brick and Ravid (1985) demonstrate that if the term structure of interest 
rates increases, the firm will issue long-term debt, since the interest tax shield on 
debt is accelerated with interest rates which increase the value of the firm. Following 
Johnson (2003) and Saretta and Tookes (2013), we use non-tax shield (notaxshd) as 
a proxy for an alternative tax shield
56
, which is defined as depreciation scaled by the 
total assets. Availability of alternative tax shields can reduce the value of long-term 
debt, if a firm expects to raise its value by issuing long-term debt. Therefore, we 
expect to observe a positive relationship between short-term debt and our proxy for 
alternative tax shield (i.e. the non-debt tax shield).  
 
4.4.2.6 Firm age 
 
Firm age is often used as a proxy for credit rating and reputation. On the ground of 
agency theory, Du et al. (2013) suggest that the older firms are likely to use more 
long-term debt since these firms face less asymmetric information compared to 
younger ones, ceteris paribus. Using a large panel of data of Chinese SMEs, they 
find that firm age is positively related to long-term debt. In this line, we expect to 
observe a negative relationship between firm age and the proportion of short-term 
debt in total debt. In this study, firm age (firmage) is measured by the natural 
logarithm of firm age. 
4.4.3 Estimation methodology 
 
Using the OLS estimator can lead to biased coefficient estimate for our right hand 
variables because firms‘ financial policy choices (e.g. the level of debt and the 
maturity) are likely to be jointly determined as a function of firm characteristics and 
the contracting environment (Billett et al., 2007). For example, Barclay et al (1997 
and 2003) show that leverage and debt maturity are endogenously chosen 
complements. Given the endogeneity issue, the coefficient on the maturity variable 
and any related interaction terms in the leverage equation obtained using OLS could 
be biased and inconsistent. Therefore, to account for the endogenous choice of 
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leverage and maturity, we use the system GMM estimator to estimate the models of 
leverage and maturity. We treat only firm age, volatility and the dummy variables 
(i.e., year, industry and regional dummies) as exogenous. Please see section 3.5.2 
(Chapter 3) for a detailed discussion on the GMM estimator. 
  
 
4.5. Data and descriptive statistics  
 
In this section, we describe the dataset and sample that is used in our study and 
provide a discussion on summary statistics and correlation analysis of our variables.  
4.5.1 Data and sample selection 
 
Our sample includes all the publicly held firms that have been listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period of 2003 to 2010. Data are collected 
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR) and 
Sino-fin. Following the literature, we first delete firms in financial industries since 
their capital structure is subject to many regulations. We then remove outliers (i.e. 
extreme observations below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 percentile) for all regression 
variables. In the system GMM, since we lag all the right hand side variables twice or 
more to obtain suitable instruments,7860 firm year observations are used in 
estimation. This sample is an unbalanced panel  
4.5.2. Summary statistics 
 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in this study for 
the full sample of firms, as well as for state- and privately-controlled firms. The 
average (median) leverage to total assets ratio (tlev) is 53.4 (53.9) per cent. We 
observe that the average (median) proportion of short-term debt to total debt 
(prop_stlve) is 86 % (92.2%).  The minimum and maximum values of the short-term 
debt (prop_stlev) ratios  range from 34.0 % to 100 % with a standard deviation of 
15.6%. For the average firm, 86% of total debt is due within one year, which implies 
that short-term debt is popular among Chinese firms. This figure is  higher than that 




Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who show that firms in developing 
countries tend to depend more on short-term debt. 
 
The average (median) long-term debt to total debt ratio is only 14% (8%) in China 
compared with a mean of 41% in the G-7 countries and 22% in developing countries 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001) . The substantially low amount of 
long-term debt reflects the fact that the Chinese-listed companies are mainly 
financed by short-term debt rather than long-term debt. The minimum and maximum 
values of long-term debt to total debt (ltlev) ratios for the sample firms range from 0 
% to 65 % with a standard deviation of  15.6%.  
Similar to the data reported in Cai et al. (2008),  the mean (median) value of growth 
opportunities (growth) of our sample firms (measured by Tobin‘s ratio) is  2.026 
(1.62). This may indicate that the average firm (median) has valuable investment 
opportunities and thus is likely to face potential underinvestment problems, as stated 
by Myers (1977). This figure is considerably greater than that reported by Johnson 
(2003) and Datta et al. (2005) for US firms, and by Marchica (2008) for UK firms. 
The main reason for this difference is that, as discussed in Cai et al., (2008) and Firth 
et al. (2008), the opening up of China‘s economy and the adoption of capital market 
principles has presented many investment opportunities for its listed firms and thus 
Chinese investors have higher expectations regarding their future prospects. The 
average (median) asset maturity (assetmat) is 12.1 years (11.4 years).  
Furthermore, compared to firms controlled by the state, privately-controlled firms 
exhibit higher growth opportunities (growth) measured by Tobin‘s Q and use more 
short-term debt suggesting that these firms may face more underinvestment 
problems, and thus use more short-term debt. On average, non-sate controlled firms 
use slightly more total leverage than state-controlled firms. The conclusions drawn 
from these summary statistics are similar to those reported in Huyghebaert and Wang 
(2013). This finding is also consistent with Firth et al. (2012) who show that 
privately controlled firms are able to get more external financing than state 
controlled firms with the liberalisation and improvement in the governance of 




4.5.3 Correlation analysis 
 
Table 4.2 reports a matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables 
used in our regression analysis. These correlations show some simple relationship 
between the variables.  
We observe a significantly negative correlation between growth opportunities and 
leverage (-0.12), consistent with Myer‘s (1977) prediction that leverage is negatively 
associated with firms‘ growth opportunities due to the potential underinvestment 
problems. This finding is also consistent with the findings of previous empirical 
studies on capital structure (e.g., Johnson, 2003). Furthermore, growth opportunities 
exhibit a statistically significant and positive correlation with the proportion of short-
term leverage: firms with more growth opportunities have an incentive to choose 
short-term debt in order to control underinvestment problems (Myers, 1977). This is 
consistent with most previous studies on debt maturity choices. Turning to control 
variables, as expected, asset maturity shows a significant negative correlation with 
the proportion of short-term leverage in total leverage, suggesting that in order to 
reduce Myers‘ underinvestment problem firms‘ match their debt maturity to their 
assets.  
Taken together, in general, the above findings from the correlation analysis are 
consistent with Johnson‘s (2003) findings for US firms. We next test our hypotheses 
in a multiple regression framework using the system GMM estimator, and test whether 
and to what extent the empirical relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities and liquidity risk of the firms are affected by firms‘ choices of debt 
maturity.     
 
4.6. Empirical results 
 
We use the system GMM estimator to estimate leverage and maturity equations. The 
estimation results are presented in three subsections: the first subsection focuses on 
results for the leverage equation, the second contains the results for the maturity 




summary of the main empirical predictions for this paper are as follows. In the 
leverage equation, we predict that leverage should be negatively related to the 
market-to-book ratio and the proportion of short-term debt in total debt, and 
positively related to the interaction term between market-to-book ratio and the 
proportion of short-term debt in total debt. In the maturity equation, we predict that 
the proportion of short-term debt in total debt (debt maturity) is negatively related to 
leverage (H4) and positively related to the market-to-book ratio (H3).  
4.6.1 Leverage equation results 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.3 report the estimation results of static and dynamic 
specifications for leverage equations respectively, estimated using the system GMM 
estimator.  The system GMM estimator estimates the relevant equation both in levels 
and in first-differences. First-differencing is used to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. We use all right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility and the 
dummy variables lagged twice or more as instruments in the first-differenced 
equation, and first-differences of these same variables lagged once as instruments in 
the level equation  As for the validity of the instruments, the AR(2) and Sargan tests 
generally indicate that our models are correctly specified and that the instruments are 
generally valid. 
 In both the static and dynamic specifications of the leverage regressions, the 
estimated coefficients on growth opportunities (growth) (-0.119 and -0.106, 
respectively, in columns 1 and 2) are significantly negative, supporting our 
hypothesis H1, according to which growth opportunities negatively affect leverage. 
This finding is consistent with Myers‘ (1977) prediction that high growth firms use 
less leverage. This finding is also consistent with previous empirical findings for US 
firms (e.g. Smith and Watts, 1992; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Johnson, 2003) as well 
as Chinese listed firms (e.g. Zou and Xiao, 2006; Haung and Song, 2006; Moosa et 
al., 2011). In general, this result is also consistent with the notion that Chinese listed 
firms face underinvestment problem (e.g. Firth et al. (2008) who report a negative 
relationship between leverage and investment of Chinese listed firms).  
Focusing on the dynamic specification in Column 2, we can observe that these 




leverage is 0.534, and the standard deviation of growth opportunities is 1.194 for the 
firms in our sample (as shown in Table 4.1), a one-standard deviation increase in 
the growth opportunities reduces leverage by 23.7% of its mean for the average 
firm in our sample
57
. Although economically significant, this effect represents only 
1/3 of the marginal effect (69%) reported by Johnson (2003) for the average US 
firm. This difference can be explained by the fact that as shown in table 4.1, Chinese 
listed firms‘ proportion of long term debt to total debt is only about 14%. As  it is 
long term debt which leads to potential underinvestment (debt overhang) problems  
over the exercise of growth options, it is likely that  Chinese listed firms face lower 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders than their Western 
counterparts. Furthermore, Chinese listed firms are made of state controlled (SOEs) 
and privately controlled firms. Government‘s socioeconomic objectives might 
induce soft budget constraints for government controlled firms (Bai et al., 2006, 
Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011), suggesting that state controlled firms may 
be able to obtain debt financing irrespective of growth potential. In a similar vein, 
while Chen et al. (2011) provide evidence that the sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs, and Firth 
et al. (2008) report that the negative relationship between leverage and investment is 
weaker in state controlled firms.  
Furthermore, we observe from the results of both the leverage regressions in Table 
4.3 that the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between growth 
opportunities and the proportion of short-term debt (growth* prop_stlev) are 
significantly positive (at the 5% level or more) and precisely determined. This result 
is consistent with our H2, and suggests that short-term debt can significantly 
attenuate the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage. This result is also 
consistent with Myers‘s (1977) second theoretical prediction, and with the empirical 
finding in Johnson (2003) for US firms. As for  growth opportunities,  a one standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of short-term debt increases leverage only by 
approximately 7 % of its mean through the positive interaction
58
. The smaller 
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attenuation effect of short-term debt compared with 30% increase in leverage 
reported by Johnson (2003) for the US firms can be attributed to the fact that 
Chinese listed firms use larger proportion of short-term debt in their capital structure 
than their Western counterparts.  
 
Consistent with our hypothesis (H3), the estimated coefficients on the stand-alone 
short-term debt are found to be significantly negative in both specifications. This 
finding is consistent with the finding of Johnson (2003), and lends support to the 
liquidity risk hypothesis (Diamond, 1991, 1993 and Sharpe, 1991) that predicts a 
negative relationship between short-term debt and leverage. That is, firms with short-
term debt face a potential liquidity risk problem and thus lower their optimal level of 
leverage.  
 
Interestingly, computing economic significant, we find that Chinese listed firms face  
a lower liquidity risk than US firms: a one standard deviation increase in their 
proportion of short-term debt to total debt reduces in fact their leverage ratio only by 
approximately 7% of its mean through the negative direct effect
59
. Furthermore, 
combining the negative effect between the proportion of short-term debt and 
leverage (due to the liquidity risk) with the positive interaction effect of short-term 
debt, the results show that the net effect (7%-7%=0) on leverage is zero. These 
finding of a smaller liquidity risk effects (negative effect of the proportion of short-
term debt/ maturity on leverage) and a zero net negative effect of short-term 
maturity debt for average Chinese firms is in marked contrast to the strong effects 
(71 %, (71%-30% =) 41%, respectively) reported by Johnson (2003) for the average 
US firm.  
 
Surprisingly, even though Chinese listed firms use a large amount of short-term debt 
in the capital structure, the rollover /liquidity risk appears to be less important for 
them. The possible explanation for why liquidity risk may be less of a concern 
for Chinese listed firms are as follows. First, out of large number of Chinese 
firms seeking for listing on both Chinese stock exchanges, only a very small 
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number of firms are granted approval to do so after a stringent screening process. 
Therefore, the listed firms may be considered more profitable and thus less risky 
by lenders (especially banks). This reasoning is consistent with Johnson (2003) 
and Billett et al. (2007) who report evidence that the liquidity risk of short-term 
debt is not important for rated US firms (firms with bond ratings) in Compustat 
and is only relevant for lower quality firms (unrated firms).  
 
Second, perhaps more plausible but complementary to the above explanation is 
that in China a considerable number of listed firms are still owned and controlled 
by the government. Since these firms operate with multiple objectives such as 
socio-economic objectives, it is costly for the government to allow them to fail. 
Furthermore, the big four Chinese commercial banks in China are still mainly 
owned and controlled by the government. This suggests thus that soft budget 
constraints might arise in government controlled listed firms (Bai et al., 2006; 
Guariglia et al., 2011). Avivazian et al. (2005) suggest that compared with non-
corporatized SOEs, corporatized SOEs have a greater preference for credit from 
the four major state banks (which are the main sources of government subsidized 
loans) than from other market oriented financial institutions and thus, the high 
dependence on these banks indicates that the soft budget constraint may not be 
alleviated. Consequently, state controlled firms are able to obtain external 
funding or extend the maturity of loans more easily than privately controlled 
firms (Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999), which makes liquidity risk less 
important for them. In fact, Firth et al. (2012) show that state controlled firms 
increase investment irrespective of growth opportunities even when they have 
negative cash flows. Further, unlike their Western counterparts, while Chinese 
private firms rely on personal (or family) connections and personal reputation of 
entrepreneurs to obtain finance from alternative financing channels (Allen et al., 
2005), they use social capital building strategies (Du et al., 2013) for accessing 
or rolling over debt finance
60
. These reasoning may also explain the lower 
liquidity risk faced by the Chinese listed firms. 
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Turning to the control variables, the estimated coefficients on these variables in the 
leverage equation show that results are generally consistent with previous capital 
structure studies. Specifically, the coefficient on the profitability (profit) is significantly 
negative in both the static and the dynamic regressions, supporting  Myers‘ (1984) 
pecking order prediction that highly profitable firms will use less leverage since 
these firms have better access to internal financing than their low profit counterparts. 
Also, in both regressions, firm size (size) has a significantly positive coefficient. This 
is consistent with the trade-off and agency theories, meaning that larger firms are 
more diversified compared to small ones and, consequently, face a lower risk of 
bankruptcy cost and better borrowing capacity relative to smaller firms. Except for 
the dynamic specification, the estimated coefficient on tangibility (tang) is 
significantly positive suggesting that the larger the fixed assets of the firm, the lower 
its bankruptcy costs. The coefficient on volatility (vol) is negative in the dynamic 
specification but insignificant. Wiwattanakantang (1999), Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
and Zou and Xiao (2006) also find an insignificant relationship between volatility 
and leverage. The non-debt tax shield (nontaxshd) attracts a poorly determined 
coefficient in both specifications. This can be seen as evidence against the trade-off 
theory. Du et al. (2013) also find insignificant non-debt tax shield coefficients in the 
context of Chinese firms. 
Finally, as can be seen in column 2 of Table 4.3, the estimated coefficient on lagged 
leverage is significantly positive, and equal to 0.83, indicating that there is a high 
level of persistency in the capital structure decisions of Chinese listed firms.  
 
4.6.2 Debt maturity equation results 
 
Tale 4.4 presents the system GMM estimation results for maturity equations. In the 
static specification, consistent with the negative coefficient on maturity in the 
leverage equation, the coefficient on leverage (tlev)  is significantly negative.  Yet, 
this same coefficient is negative but not different from zero in the dynamic 
specification. The negative relationship between leverage and the proportion of 
short-term debt is consistent with our hypothesis (H4) that firms with high leverage 




Sharpe, 1991). This is also consistent with the previous empirical findings of studies 
estimating a single debt maturity equation (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and 
Mauer, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; Antoniou et al., 2006; Marchica, 2008) as well as 
studies adopting a simultaneous equation approach (Johnson, 2003) 
 
In support of our hypothesis (H3), we observe that the estimated coefficient on 
growth opportunities is positive though not statistically significant in both 
specifications. This result supports the notion that firms with greater growth 
opportunities (growth) prefer shorter maturities of debt so as to reduce the 
underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977). Previous empirical studies (Stohs and 
Mauer, 1996; Billett et al., 2007) also report an insignificant relationship between a 
debt maturity measure and growth opportunities in the debt maturity equation.  
 
Consistent with our expectation, the estimated coefficient on asset maturity 
(assetmat) which is negative and statistically significant at 5% level in both 
specifications. This indicates that firms in our sample match the maturities of their 
assets with those of their liabilities in order to reduce the underinvestment problem 
(Myers, 1977). Thus, maturity matching is an important strategy for firms in China. 
This result is also consistent with the findings of the previous empirical studies (e.g., 
Johnson, 2003; Cai et al., 2008; Ozkan, 2000; Guedes and Opler, 1996;  Deesomsak 
et al., 2009).  
 
Following Barclay et al. (2003) and Johnson (2003), we use firm size and its square 
to control for the effect of credit quality in the debt maturity equation. As shown in 
Table 4.4, the estimated coefficients of log firm size (size) is significantly negative 
and its squared term (size
2
)  is significantly positive in both regressions, which is 
consistent with Diamond‘s (1991) prediction that larger firms have higher credit 
quality/lower liquidity risk and thus use more short-term debt. This result is also 
consistent with the findings of the previous studies (e.g. Johnson, 2003; Datta et al., 
2005). 
  
The estimated coefficient on volatility (vol) is negative, but insignificant in both 




associated with greater credit risk. Yet, previous empirical studies also report 
insignificant volatility coefficient (e.g. Johnson, 2003; Cai et al., 2008). The 
coefficients on non-debt tax-shield (nontaxshd) are not significant at conventional 
levels in both specifications, suggesting that non-debt tax-shield does not influence 
debt maturity choices. This result is consistent with Johnson (2003). Furthermore, 
we can see that, as expected, firm age (firmage) is negatively related to the 
proportion of short-term debt in total debt  in both specifications, but is insignificant. 
This finding is consistent with, Du et al. (2013) who find that the coefficient on 
firm‘s age in a regression for short-term debt is insignificant in the Chinese context.  
 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the lagged short-term debt has a significantly 
positive coefficient, which is about 0.52 in the dynamic specification. This suggests 
that 48 per cent (1- 0.52) of the gap between the last period‘s short-term debt and 
this period‘s target short-term debt is eliminated within a year. Considering that only 
about 17% of the gap between last period‘s leverage and this period‘s target leverage 
is eliminated within a year in the leverage equation, firms adjust their target short 
term leverage at very high speed (48%), suggesting that adjustment costs are rather 
low for short term debt compared to total leverage. Chinese firms seem to adjust 
their short-term debt approximately three times faster compared to total leverage, in 
an attempt to reach their target debt maturity. So, firms with potential investment 
opportunities finance them largely by shorter maturity debt rather than long-term 
debt.  
4.6.3 Additional tests 
 
In this sub-section, following Johnson (2003), we verify whether our results are 
robust to using firms with Tobin‘s Q>1.  We then provide regression results for 
results for state and privately controlled firms separately. 
4.6.3.1 Differentiating firms according to whether their Tobin’s Q is greater or 
smaller than one  
 
In this section, we investigate Myer‘s (1977) prediction that potential 




opportunities. To take this into account, we divide firms into two categories based on 
Tobin‘s Q (growth) in order to identify potential underinvestment problems: (1) 
firms who have Tobin‘s q greater than one (growth >1), (2) firms who have Tobin‘s 
q equal or less than one (growth <=1). Table 4.5 presents the system GMM 
estimation results of leverage equation for both groups of firms 
As can be seen in column 1 of Table 4.5, the estimated coefficient for the attenuation 
effect is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level only for firms with 
valuable growth opportunities, suggesting that the attenuation effect reflects a 
reduction in the underinvestment problems.  Moreover, the coefficients associated 
with the other variables in columns 1 of Table 4.5 are generally consistent with the 
main results reported in Table 4.3
61
.  
Looking at the results for the firms with less growth opportunities (growth <=1) in 
column 2 of Table 4.5, our hypothesised variables are statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that the potential underinvestment problem or 
attenuation and liquidity risk effects of short-term debt are not  important for firms 
with low growth opportunities. These results are consistent with Johnson (2003). 
Turning to the estimation results for maturity equations for these groups of firms in 
Table 4.6, we note that the estimated coefficients for the independent variables in the 
maturity equation for firms with Tobin‘s q greater than one show that results are 
generally consistent with those of full sample firms reported in Table 4.4.  By 
contrast, none of the independent variables except the legged maturity variable 
(growth <=1) are statistically significant for the firms with Tobin‘s q equal or less 
than one. 
4.6.3.2 Estimating separate regressions for state and non-state firms 
Chinese listed firms can be classified into state controlled (SOEs) and privately/non-
state controlled firms. As we discussed subsection 6.1, state controlled firms may 
have different behaviour than privately controlled firms. For example, Chen et al. 
(2011) provide evidence that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment 
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 We observe that calculated economic significance for the hypothesized variables using mean and 
standard deviation for firms with Tobin‘s q greater than one are similar in magnitude to those for full 




opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs than private firms, and Firth et al. 
(2008) report that the negative relationship between leverage and investment is 
weaker in state controlled firms. Therefore, leverage may be less sensitive to growth 
opportunities in state controlled firms. By contrast, as shown in the summary 
statistics, private firms are more likely to have higher growth opportunities and thus 
may face a greater underinvestment problem. 
Furthermore, because of the government‘s socioeconomic objectives, state controlled 
firms may enjoy soft budget constraints (Bai et al., 2006, Poncet et al., 2010; 
Guariglia et al., 2011). Therefore, they may obtain necessary external finance for 
investment through political connections. Furthermore, with the government 
intervention and guarantee, state controlled firms may be able to extend the maturity 
of the loans more easily than private firms. Therefore, state controlled firms may 
face a lower liquidity risk than privately controlled firms. 
Focusing on the results of leverage equations in column 3 & 4  of Table 4.5, we 
observe that the coefficient for  growth opportunities and that of the stand-alone 
short-term debt are negatively significant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient for  
growth opportunities interacted with the proportion of short-term debt in total debt 
(attenuation effect) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for 
privately controlled firms. As for the state controlled firms, although the coefficient 
on  growth opportunities is negatively significant at the 10% level, the coefficients 
on  the stand-alone short-term debt and  growth opportunities interacted with 
proportion of short-term debt  in total debt are not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels . These results are consistent with the notion that the attenuation 
effect and liquidity risk effects are relevant only for non-state controlled firms in the 
context of Chinese listed firms. Moreover, the coefficients on  the other variables in 
columns 3 of Table 4.5 are generally consistent with those reported for the full 
sample in Table 4.3.  
Looking at the estimation results for maturity equations reported in columns 3& 4 of 
Table 4.6, we can see that the estimated coefficients for the independent variables in 
the maturity equation for non-state controlled firms are consistent with those for the 




independent variables except the legged maturity variable for state controlled firms 
are statistically insignificant at the conventional significant levels. 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we empirically investigate the attenuation effect (i.e., reducing the 
negative effects of growth opportunities on leverage) and liquidity risk effect of the 
short term debt on leverage. We estimate the equations of financial policy choices of 
leverage and debt maturity (i.e. proportion of short-term debt) using the system 
GMM estimation methodology which to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity 
and the potential endogeneity of the regressors (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell 
and Bond 1998). In the context of China, for the first time, we study this link using a 
large sample of Chinese non-financial firm-year observations over the period 2003 to 
2010.  
 
First, we find that the direct effect of growth opportunities (i.e. stand-alone growth 
opportunities) on leverage is negative, suggesting that Chinese listed firms face 
underinvestment problem (debt overhang) due to the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders/lenders (Firth et al., 2008).  Second, we find a positive 
relationship between leverage and growth opportunities interacted with measure of 
short-term debt. This supports the prediction that short-term debt attenuates the 
negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage (Myers, 1977; Johnson, 2003). 
Third, we find that the short debt maturity negatively affects leverage, as predicted 
by the liquidity risk hypothesis (Diamond, 1991 & 1993). The latter two results 
therefore suggest that firms with valuable growth opportunities control the 
underinvestment problem by shortening the maturity of their debt, whilst using less 
total leverage in order to avoid liquidity risk. In other words, firms trade off the cost 
of underinvestment problems against the cost of increased liquidity risk when 
choosing short debt maturity. We report these results after controlling for all 
previously identified determinants of leverage and debt maturity and endogeneity of  
debt maturity, leverage, and other regressors in a dynamic framework using the 
system GMM methodology. 
 




effect of growth opportunities (underinvestment problem) and short maturity 
(liquidity risk)  as well as the positive attenuation effect of short-term debt on 
leverage are much lower for Chinese listed firms compared to their US 
counterparts. We explain the observed differences on the grounds of the different 
institutional environment in which Chinese and US firms operate. More specially, a 
considerable number of Chinese listed firms are still owned and controlled by 
government, so these firms may be less responsive to growth opportunities and less 
likely to face liquidity risk (government ownership may provide an implicit 
guarantee). By contrast, although private firms face an underinvestment problem 
and use a higher proportion of short-term debt, they are able to mitigate the rollover 
risk through family contacts, relationship and personal reputation of the 
entrepreneurs. For example, Huyghebaert and Wang (2013) note that Chinese listed 
firms do rely on trade credit consistent with Fisman and Love (2007) who point out 
that supplier finance is characteristic of countries with immature capital markets. 
 
Additional analysis conducted by differentiating the firms according to whether 
their  Tobin‘s q is greater or lower than one, as well as according to whether they 
are state controlled (SOEs) or privately controlled  provides further evidence to 
support our main findings and our explanation for the observed differences between 
Chinese listed  firms and their US counterparts. 
 
Our study extends the debt maturity structure literature in two ways. First, it refines 
our understanding of the attenuation and liquidity risk effect from the perspective of 
firms in the largest emerging economy. Second, we extend previous studies by 
examining the dynamic nature of Chinese firm‘s maturity choices. We find that 
Chinese firms adjust their short-term debt to reach their target short-term debt level 
relatively faster (approximately three times faster) than their leverage.  
 
Our study has important policy implication in that it suggest that the importance of 
attenuation and liquidity risk effects of short-term debt for a firm is dependent on 
the institutional environment in which it operate. 




not been well developed (Allen et al., 2012), we are unable to see how the 
importance of attenuation and liquidity risk effects differs between rated and 






Table A4  Definition of variables 











Short-term debt / total debt 
- (H4)  
Growth  
opportunities   
growth The ratio of the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt to the 
book value of total assets. (the tradable 
share price is used to calculate the market 
value of the non-tradable equity shares.) 







 + (H2)  
Long-term 
debt  
ltlev Long-term debt/ total debt (1- prop_stlev)   
Size size Log of total real assets + - 
Size squired size
2 
  + 
Asset 
maturity 
assetmat The ratio of total net fixed assets to annual 
depreciation expense. The total net fixed 
assets include land and buildings, plant 
and machinery, and other fixed assets.  
 - 
Volatility vol 
The standard deviation of the first 
differences of firm‘s earnings before taxes 
and depreciation over the four years 
preceding the sample year, divided by 




taxratio The ratio of tax expense to pre-tax profit. - - 
Firm age firmage Log of the number of years since the 




vj CSMAR B classification: 5 industries   
Utilities, Properties, Conglomerates, 





vk Dummies indicating whether the firm is 
located in the Coastal, Western, or Central 
region of China.  
  
Year dummies vt Year dummies for the years 2004 to 2010.   
 Notes: ‗+‘ means that leverage/short-term debt increases with the variables, ‗-‘ means that leverage/short-term 






Table 4.1 Summary statistics of Chinese listed firms over the period of 2003 to 
2010. 




Panel A full sample firms 
tlev 7860 0.534 0.539 0.199 0.060 2.911 
stlev 7860 0.860 0.922 0.156 0.344 1.000 
ltlev 7860 0.140 0.078 0.156 0.000 0.656 
growth 7860 2.026 1.630 1.194 0.807 8.373 
assetmat 7860 12.144 11.427 4.869 2.438 35.344 
 
Panel B Privately controlled firms 
tlev 2229 0.542 0.535 0.230 0.060 3.016 
stlev 2229 0.875 0.937 0.150 0.346 1.000 
ltlev 2227 0.125 0.063 0.151 0.000 0.654 
growth 2229 2.230 1.802 1.345 0.809 8.373 
assetmat 2229 12.585 11.578 5.338 2.464 35.264 
 
Panel B State controlled firms 
tlev 5143 0.527 0.531 0.205 0.061 3.061 
stlev 5143 0.850 0.911 0.163 0.344 1.000 
ltlev 5142 0.151 0.089 0.163 0.000 0.656 
growth 5143 1.930 1.571 1.102 0.807 8.521 
assetmat 5143 12.319 11.533 4.971 2.438 35.344 
Note: Definitions for all variables are provided in Table A4. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Pearson correlation matrices 
 
tlev ltlev prop_stlev growth assetmat 
tlev 1.00     
ltlev 0.09* 1.00    
prop_stlev -0.09* -1.00* 1.00   
growth -0.12* -0.09* 0.09* 1.00  
assetmat 0.05* 0.13* -0.13* -0.11* 1.00 






Table 4.4 System GMM estimation results of leverage equations 




  (1) (2) 
tlevit-1 +  0.831
***
 
   (0.038) 











  (0.041) (0.046) 





  (0.042) (0.049) 












  (0.013) (0.007) 
tang  + 0.178
***
 0.077 
  (0.065) (0.076) 
vol - 0.220 -0.042 
  (0.164) (0.095) 
nontaxshd - -1.345 -0.938 




  (0.014) (0.006) 
Regional dummies  yes yes 
Industry dummies  yes yes 
Year dummies  yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  yes yes 
Observations  7860 6679 
Hansen test (p values)  0.115 0.283 
m1  (p values)  0.000 0.000 
m2 (p values)  0.109 0.331 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. For the 
system GMM regression, AR2 is a test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of 
over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We 
treat all right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility and dummy variables as potentially 
endogenous variables. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 











Table 4.5. System GMM estimation results of maturity equations 




  (1) (2) 
prop_stlev it-1 +  0.520
***
 





  (0.040) (0.031) 
growth + 0.001 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.006) 
assetmat - -0.005
** -0.004** 










  (0.005) (0.004) 
vol - -0.056 -0.068 
  (0.118) (0.096) 
nontaxshd + -0.996 0.637 
  (0.990) (0.469) 
firmage - -0.006 0.001 
  (0.011) (0.007) 
Regional dummies  yes yes 
Industry dummies  yes yes 
Year dummies  yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  yes yes 
Observations  7860 6522 
Hansen test (p values)  0. 653 0.286 
m1  (p values)  0.000 0.000 
m2 ( p values)  0.123 0.100 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. For the 
system GMM regression, AR2 is a test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-
identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat all 
right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility and dummy variables as potentially endogenous 
variables. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. See Table A4 







Table 4.5 Robustness checks: Dynamic system GMM estimation results of 























  (0.040) (0.119) (0.074) (0.045) 













  (0.055) (0.141) (0.038) (0.025) 





  (0.057) (0.152) (0.043) (0.041) 


















  (0.007) (0.022) (0.013) (0.008) 
tang + 0.078 0.124 0.097 0.053 
  (0.078) (0.163) (0.072) (0.061) 
vol - -0.005 -0.385 -0.006 -0.048 
  (0.104) (0.319) (0.148) (0.102) 
nontaxshd - -.997 .978 0.909 -0.604 
  (0.736) (.762) (0.826) (0.641) 
firmage - -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.007) 
Regional dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
Observations  5880 642 1890 4248 
Hansen test ( p values)  0.288 0.330 0.236 0.595 
m1  (p values)  0.000 0.0890 0.000 0.000 
m2 ( p values)  0.239 0.361 0.137 0.106 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. For the 
system GMM regression, AR2 is a test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of 
over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We 
treat all right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility and dummy variables as potentially 
endogenous variables. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 











Table 4.6 System GMM estimation results of maturity equations differentiating 















  (1) (2) (3) (4) 















  (0.033) (0.154) (0.020) (0.044) 
growth + 0.006 -0.008 0.005 0.008 




















  (0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.005) 
vol - 0.074 -0.085 0.003 0.066 
  (0.100) (0.332) (0.175) (0.135) 
nontaxshd + 0.434 -0.588 0.270 0.069 
  (0.493) (1.398) (0.841) (0.635) 
firmage - 0.003 -0.016 -0.025
*
 0.010 
  (0.007) (0.020) (0.013) (0.009) 
Regional dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects  yes yes yes yes 
Observations  5880 642 1890 4248 
Hansen test ( p values)  0.254 0.270 0.236 0.595 
m1  (p values)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 ( p values)  0.155 0.570 0.137 0.094 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. For the 
system GMM regression, AR2 is a test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-
identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat all 
right-hand side variables except firm age, volatility and dummy variables as potentially endogenous 
variables. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. See Table A4 






Capital structure and corporate performance: Evidence from 




The corporate finance literature widely recognizes that the levels of debt and 
maturity structure are important mechanisms for addressing the agency problems in a 
corporation. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that under perfect capital market 
conditions, capital structure is irrelevant to the value of a firm. However, in reality, 
the prevalence of a variety of market frictions (such as taxes, asymmetric 
information and the agency problems) affects the value of firms (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1963; Jensen Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984)
62
.  For 
example, while Modigliani and Miller (1963) show that the presence of corporate 
taxes affects cost of capital and thus the value of the firm, Jensen and Meckling, 
(1976) argue that even in the absence of taxes, debt capital can have significant 
effects on corporate performance. 
 
More specially, Jensen and Meckling‘s (1976) agency theory suggests that the 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, as well as between 
shareholders and bondholders create considerable agency costs for the firms and the 
economy as a whole.  According to the agency theory, agency costs of equity arise 
from the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders when the ownership 
and control of the firm are separated. In these circumstances, managers indulge in 
overconsumption of salaries and perquisites, and tend to expand the firm to enhance 
their reputations and compensation (empire building) at the expenses of owners, 
rather than taking value maximizing decisions. Yet, agency theory also suggests that 
debt financing can be an important governance mechanism to control the agency costs 
of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen 1986; Stulz, 1990). Debt financing works as a control mechanism 
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through the following channels:  (1) managers are closely monitored by debt-holders 
and more generally by the financial market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rajan and 
Winton, 1995; Stulz, 2000) (2) the fixed interest payments that need to be made to the 
debt holders reduce the free cash flow available for the managers‘ discretionary 
spending (Jensen, 1986) and (3) debt is a commitment device for executives 
(Zwiebel, 1996). Since the interest payment to debt holders is a legal obligation, the 
failure to meet this obligation has potential for risk of bankruptcy and the resulting loss 
of reputation and jobs for managers (Fama, 1980; Grossman and Hard, 1982; Williams, 
1987). This provides managers with an incentive to work hard and consume fewer 
perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Zwiebel, 1996).  
 
Nonetheless, using debt financing to deal with the agency costs of equity is not 
costless; it creates agency costs of debt, which arise from conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and debtholders. That is, when leverage is relatively high, a 
further increase in leverage may lead to conflicts between the two parties, due to 
higher expected financial distress or bankruptcy costs.
63
 These moral hazard 
problems suggest that leverage may negatively affect firm performance. The net 
effect of leverage on firm‘s performance is therefore an empirical issue.   
 
Theoretical and empirical corporate finance research also analyses the impact of debt 
maturity structure on investment and financial decisions, as well as on firm 
performance/value. For example, while Myers (1977) shows that short-maturity debt 
mitigates conflicts between bondholders and shareholders and thus underinvestment 
problems. Similarly, others argue that the incentive properties of short-term debt 
make it a more effective controlling mechanism than long term debt in reducing 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders.  Rajan and Winton (1995) and 
Stulz (2000) show that short-term debt can reduce the agency costs arising from 
managerial discretion, subjecting managers to more frequent monitoring. However, 
Hart and Moore (1995) show that short term debt provides managers an offsetting 
benefit, i.e., the flexibility to use assets in place to pursue empire building. 
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 Two agency costs of debt are well documented in the finance literature: shareholders‘ risk-shifting 
behavior/ asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and underinvestment or debt overhang 




Focusing on the empirical literature, although there is a relatively large number of 
studies in corporate finance that have examined the determinants of capital structure 
decisions (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Booth et al., 2001), only a handful of studies examine 
empirically the impact of capital structure on firms‘ performance in the context of 
developed economies. For example, using a large cross-sectional sample of US firms 
for the years 1976, 1986, and 1988, McConnell and Servaes (1995) find that for 
‗high-growth‘ firms, leverage is negatively related to Tobin‘s Q, whereas for ‗low-
growth‘ firms, leverage is positively related to Tobin‘s Q. By contrast, focusing on a 
sample of 557 UK firms over the period 1967 to 1989, Dessi and Robertson (2003) 
find no significant relationship between leverage and firms‘ performance when 
endogeneity and the dynamics of debt are controlled for by using instrumental 
variable approach in a dynamic framework.  Yet, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) 
report a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship for French manufacturing firms. 
 
In the case of debt maturity, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996), Schiantarelli and 
Jaramillo (1996), and Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1996) all estimate an augmented 
Cobb-Douglas production function with leverage and maturity and find that short-
term debt is not conducive to improve productivity, but long term debt helps 
improve firms‘ total factor productivity (TFP) for Italy and the UK, India, and 
Ecuador, respectively. By contrast, Baum et al. (2007) find a strong positive 
association between short-term debt and financial performance for German firms (a 
Bank based economy) but an insignificant effect for US firms.  They suggest that the 
nature of the financial system (i.e. whether countries are market based or bank based 
economies) plays an important role in determining the effect of debt maturity 
structure on performance. 
Even though there is no a single study focused on the effects of debt and maturity 
structure on firm performance of Chinese companies, Tian and Estrin (2007) and 
Firth et al. (2008) provide evidence on the impact of debt financing on agency costs 
faced by these firms. Both of these studies unanimously find evidence that the 
Chinese government‘s ownership of both banks and firms, and the resultant soft 
budget constraints make debt an ineffective governance mechanism in reducing 
agency costs for Chinese listed firms, and particularly SOEs. However, following a 
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series of reforms of the banking system
64
, the governance of the Chinese financial 
sector has significantly improved and banks now use more and more commercial 
judgment and prudence in their lending decisions (Cull and Xu, 2005; Ayyagari et 
al., 2008; Firth et al., 2009). Now loan officers in banks and other financial 
institutions are held responsible for their poor lending decisions (Allen et al., 2012). 
In light of these developments, recent research using data on Chinese listed firms 
suggests that bank financing no longer facilitates unwise investment and the 
overconsumption of perquisites in SOEs. By contrast, it now act as a governance 
mechanism that constrains managers‘ misconduct and thus help improve investment 
efficiency in both state controlled and privately controlled firms (Chan et al., 2012; 
Lin and Bo, 2012; Tsai et al., 2014). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no one has 
focused on examining the effects of debt and maturity structure on firm performance 
of Chinese companies for the post WTO accession period. This paper fills this gap in 
the literature.   
 
Using a large panel of non-financial Chinese listed firms over the period 2003 to 
2010 and using the system GMM estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
and the possible endogeneity of our regressors, we find clear evidence of a positive 
relationship between leverage and the proportion of long term debt, on the one hand, 
and firms‘ performance, as measured by ROA, on the other. These results may be a 
consequence of the recent significant developments in the Chinese banking system, 
aimed at improving efficiency and at encouraging banks to adopt prudence in their 
lending behavior.  
 
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
theories, and reviews previous literature that focuses on the relationship between 
capital structure and firm performance, as well as debt maturity structure and firm 
performance. Section 3 presents our hypotheses. The model specifications and 
estimation method are described in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe the data that 
we use in this study and provide some descriptive statistics. Section 6 discusses our 
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 For instance, these reforms involved the introduction of foreign ownership and management in 
Chinese banks and particularly, state owned commercial banks; as well as the listing of these banks in 




main empirical results, as well as some further tests. Finally, Section 7 provides 
conclusions. 
 
5.2. Review of the literature 
 
In this section, we first discuss the relevant theory namely, the agency theory and we 
then provide a comprehensive review of the previous empirical studies that link 
capital structure and corporate performance, as well as debt maturity structure and 
corporate performance. 
5.2.1. The agency theory  
 
The agency theory suggests that when the ownership and control of the firm are 
separated, the interests of the firm‘s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly 
aligned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, managers may exert insufficient 
effort, over-consume perquisites, and invest in unrelated businesses to build empires, 
failing to maximize firm value. Theory also suggests that leverage may help to 
mitigate these agency costs (the agency costs of outside equity). According to Jensen 
(1986)  debt is in fact  a valuable monitoring mechanism for firms with large cash 
flows and few growth opportunities since it commits managers to pay out a fixed 
interest payment to the debt holders, thereby reducing the free cash flow available to 
the managers‘ discretionary spending (empire-building investments). Therefore, a 
high debt ratio decreases the agency costs of equity financing and increases 
corporate value by encouraging managers to bring their interest in line with the 
shareholders‘ interest. In this situation, debt will have a positive impact on firm‘s 
performance.  
 
However, the use of debt capital in the capital structure itself creates agency costs 
resulting from conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders. When 
leverage is relatively high, further increases may lead to conflicts between them due 
to higher expected financial distress and bankruptcy costs. Managers acting on behalf 
of their stockholders might reject projects with positive net present values because 
risky debt absorbs a portion of stockholders‘ benefits. Myers (1977) thus argues that 
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there is a potential for an ‗under-investment‘ problem arising from the use of higher 
levels of leverage. Further, greater financial leverage increases the agency cost 
through the threat of default risk, liquidation, and bankruptcy. In this situation, debt 
will have a negative impact on firm‘s performance.  
 
On the other hand, Myers (1977) suggests that firms with more growth options are 
likely to employ shorter-maturity. Debt that matures before execution of investment 
options cannot lead to suboptimal investment decisions.  Given that underinvestment 
deteriorates profits in the long run, such behaviour implies a negative relationship 
between long term debt and firm performance. Further, Leland and Toft (1996) show 
that short-term debt can reduce the agency costs associated with the shareholders‘ risk-
shifting behavior (asset substitution) Thus, firms that employ more short-term debt are 
likely to have more growth option in their investment opportunities, resulting in 
increased firm‘s performance.  
 
Whereas traditionally it has been argued that managers will shun short-maturity debt 
to avoid the extra monitoring and liquidity risk associated with frequent capital 
market security issues, Hart and Moore (1995) show short-term debt can facilitate 
managerial empire building. More specially, they argue that, conditional on the use 
of debt financing to undertake a long-term project, managers may prefer to use short-
term financing in order to preserve the flexibility to use those ―assets in place‖ to 
fund a future negative NPV project and that only long-term debt is effective in 
limiting the ability of managers to build empires by financing new projects based on 
assets in place. Therefore, Hart and Moore (1995) show that the optimal debt 
maturity choice, from a firm‘s perspective, is ambiguous: it depends on the firm‘s 
existing leverage and requires a balancing of costs and benefits. The primary benefit 
of long-maturity debt is that assets in place are encumbered, thereby preventing 
management from using them to finance overinvestment or empire building. As we 
discussed above, the cost, however, is the risk of creating a debt overhang which can 





5.2.2 Review of empirical studies 
 
5.2.2.1. Existing evidence on the relationship between capital structure and 
corporate performance 
 
In the finance literature, a vast number of empirical studies have traditionally 
focused on the role of firms‘ profitability as a determinant of the level of debt in the 
capital structure. Most studies find a negative relationship between the two in line 
with pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, a 
limited number of empirical studies examine the effects of leverage on corporate 
performance and provide mixed evidence. For example, as one of the early empirical 
studies, using a large sample of US firms for the years 1976, 1986, and 1988, 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) find that leverage is positively related to corporate 
performance (which is measured by Tobin‘s Q) in low-growth firms,  whereas it is 
negatively related to Tobin‘s Q in high-growth firms.
65
 Their findings are consistent 
with their explanation that firms with low growth opportunities choose a high level 
of leverage in order to reduce the free cash flow available to the managers‘ 
discretionary spending (i.e. empire-building investments) (Jensen, 1986), whilst firms 
with high growth opportunities prefer a low level of leverage in order to solve the 
underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977). However, McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
do not take into account the endogeneity problem in their study. 
 
By contrast, using 400 large US firms for the year 1987, Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) examine the effect of leverage on firm performance (which is measured by 
Tobin‘s Q), including six other control mechanisms.
66
 They find a negative 
relationship between leverage and Tobin‘s Q when they estimate an OLS regression 
of performance on leverage and other control variables. However, the significant 
effect of leverage on Tobin‘s Q disappears when they estimate their regressions in 
the simultaneous systems framework. Therefore, they suggest that different control 
mechanisms such as leverage and other internal governance mechanisms are chosen 
effectively, in the light of both observed and unobserved firm characteristics.  
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 They split the data into a ‗high-growth‘ and a ‗low-growth‘ based on either the firm‘s P/E ratio or 
its sales growth (as a proxy for future growth opportunities) in each cross-section. 
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 The other control mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large block holders; 




Improving on previous studies, Dessi and Robertson (2003) analyze the effect of 
leverage on corporate performance, allowing for endogeneity and persistency in 
performance, by using Anderson and Hsiao‘s (1982) instrument variable approach.  
Focusing on a panel sample of 557 UK firms over the period 1967 to 1989, Dessi 
and Robertson (2003) find that debt has a significantly positive effect on firm‘s 
performance, (which is measured by Q), when they do not take into account the 
endogeneity of debt. However, the significant relationship disappears when they 
account for the endogeneity in both the static and dynamic models. Therefore, 
consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Dessi and Robertson (2003) also 
suggest that firms choose their capital structure optimally, in the light of their 
observed and unobserved characteristics. The latter two studies empirically show the 
importance of taking into account the endogeneity of debt when one examines the 
relation between capital structure and performance.  
 
While the previously mentioned empirical studies use data from non-financial firms, 
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) focus on the US banking industry to explore 
the relationship between leverage and performance. While the authors use an inverse 
proxy for leverage, namely the equity capital ratio (i.e. the ratio of equity to gross 
total assets), due to the nature of the banking industry, they employ profit efficiency 
to measure performance (i.e. frontier efficiency computed using a profit function). 
Using a sample of 7548 US banks over the period 1990 to 1995, they find a positive 
relationship between leverage and bank performance after controlling for the 
endogeneity of debt. 
 
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) employ a sample of French manufacturing firms over 
the period 2002 to 2005 to examine the impact of leverage on firm performance. 
Unlike the previous studies, they also examine the potential non-linear relationship 
between leverage and firm‘s performance, consistent with the argument that a lower 
level of leverage provides managers with the necessary incentive to improve 
performance but, at a   high level of leverage, the costs of debt (arising from asset 
substitution effects and underinvestment problems) may overwhelm the benefit.  
Using firm‘s efficiency as an indicator of firm performance, the authors find a non-
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linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between leverage and firm‘s performance, 
which is consistent with their hypothesis.  
 
Weill (2008) uses a sample of about 11836 medium-sized manufacturing companies 
from 7 European countries for 3 years: 1998, 1999, and 2000, to examine the 
relationship between leverage and corporate performance.
67
  Using frontier 
efficiency techniques to measure the performance of firms, the author finds that the 
relationship between leverage and corporate performance varies across countries, i.e. 
it is  significantly positive in five countries, namely Belgium, France, German, 
Norway and Spain, but significantly negative in Italy and not significant in Portugal, 
suggesting the influence of institutional factors on this link.  More specifically, the 
author suggests the efficiency of the legal system influences the relationship between 
leverage and corporate performance. In other words, the efficiency of the legal 
system is able to exert a reduction in the moral hazard problems between 
shareholders and lenders.  
 
Research focusing on emerging market also examines the impact of leverage on 
corporate performance. For example, Majumdar and Chhibber (1999) examine the 
relationship between the levels of debt in the capital structure and performance for a 
sample of 1000 Indian firms and find the relationship to be significantly negative.
68
 
They attribute this finding to the structure of capital markets in India, where both 
short-term and long-term lending institutions are almost completely state-owned 
(during the sample period) and do not effectively monitor their debt holders. 
 
As a follow up work of Majumdar and Chhibber (1999), Sarkar and Sarkar (2008) 
use a later period cross-sectional data set of Indian listed manufacturing firms for 
three financial years, namely 1996, 2000 and 2003, to examine the link between the 
leverage and firm performance. As found in McConnell and Servaes (1995) for the 
US firms, they observe a positive relationship between leverage and Tobin‘s Q, for 
firm with low growth opportunities and a negative relationship for firms with high 
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Germany, 4403 from Italy, 409 from Norway, 90 from Portugal, and 2312 from Spain. 
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 They collected (cross-sectional) data for each firm for one of the years between 1988 and 1994, 





 These results are consistent with the ‗free cash-flow‘ 
hypothesis of Jensen (1986), and with Myer‘s (1977) underinvestment problem, 
respectively. Moreover, their analysis indicates that in the early period of 
institutional change, debt did not act as a disciplining mechanism to mitigate 
conflicts between managers and shareholders in either standalone or group affiliated 
firms, but, in the later period, debt became as an effective disciplining device in 
constraining managers‘ opportunistic behavior when institutions had become more 
market oriented.  
 
5.2.2.2. Existing evidence on the relationship between debt maturity structure 
and corporate performance 
 
Previous studies on the relationship between debt maturity and firm performance 
show that debt maturity structure has an important impact on firm performance. For 
example, one of the early empirical studies is by Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 
(1996). Using a sample of 604 UK listed firms over the period 1976-1991 and 750 
Italian firms over the period 1977-1990, they investigate the impact of firms‘ 
maturity structure (measured as long term debt divided by the sum of long term and 
short term financial debt) on corporate performance (which is measured by log of 
sales divided by the capital stock). They find that there is a positive relationship 
between debt maturity (which is defined as the proportion of long-term debt) and 
firm‘s performance, suggesting that long-term debt allows access to better 
technologies and thus increases performance. Thus, they do not find support for the 
idea that short-term debt is conducive for improving firms‘ performance. 
Furthermore, they find evidence that leverage (the ratio of total debt to total assets) 
is negatively related to performance for both Italian and UK firms. Their results 
suggest that the use of high levels of leverage produce significant agency cost (such 
as bankruptcy costs and financial distress) and hence decreases the firm‘s 
performance.  
 
Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1996) use a panel data set of 731 Ecuadorian 
manufacturing companies over the period 1984-1988 to empirically investigate the 
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 The sample consists of 1,211 companies, 1,024 companies, and 1266 companies in 1996, 2000 and 
2003, respectively.  
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effects of firms‘ debt maturity structure on profitability for Ecuador. They measure 
the length of maturity by the ratio of total long-term liabilities to total liabilities. A 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated, with the logarithm of the 
real value of sales as a proxy for output and capital, labor and materials as inputs in 
addition to financial variables. They find that debt maturity is positively related to 
productivity. They suggest that long-term debt may improve firms‘ productivity 
because it may allow firms access to better and more productive technologies, 
which the firm may be reluctant to finance with short-term debt because of fears of 
liquidation. However, they do not find any relationship between the total debt to 
total assets ratio and firm performance.   
 
Similarly, using an unbalanced panel of public limited companies over the period 
1980/81 to 1989/90, Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1996) estimate a Cobb-Douglas 
production function to see the impact of maturity on firm level total factor 
productivity (TFP) for India. They find that while debt maturity is positively 
associated with firm performance, leverage is negatively related to performance. 
They suggest that the negative effect of leverage may be attributed to (i) the fact that 
with more leveraging, the moral hazard problem is exacerbated and there may be 
fewer incentives for controlling-shareholders to strive for efficiency since they reap a 
smaller fraction of the rewards; (ii) the fact that since rehabilitation packages and re-
financing are common for so called ‗sick‘ firms, high leverage may indicate an 
inherently bad firm/project.  
 
By contrast, using a large sample of 15,000 US manufacturing firms over the period 
1984–2005 and 125,000 German firms over the period 1988 to 2000, Baum et al. 
(2007) find a positive relationship between the proportion of short-term debt to tota 
debt, and German firms‘ profitability, but short-term debt does not have any impact 
on US firms‘ profitability, suggesting that the nature of the financial system (i.e., 
whether countries are market based or bank based economies
 
) plays an important 
role in determining the effect of debt maturity structure on ROA. Furthermore, they 
find that the performance of larger German firms is more sensitive to their short-term 
debt ratio compared to their smaller ones.  Similarly, the German firms with high 
short-term debt have a larger profitability compared to those with low short-term 
Therefore, the authors provide evidence that not only firm-specific characteristics 
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but also the nature of the financial system are important mechanisms through which 
debt maturity affects performance.  
 
Abor (2005) uses data from Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) during a five-year period 
(1998 -2002) and finds a positive relationship between short-term debt and 
performance (measured by ROE). He also notes that short-term debt is the major 
source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt 
financing. In a similar vein, using an unbalanced panel of 167 Jordanian companies 
over the period 1989 to 2003, Zeitun and Tian (2007) find a positive relationship 
between short-term debt and firm performance, suggesting that firms with a high 
growth rate use more short-term debt in order to avoid underinvestment problem and 
thus they exhibit a high performance.  However, these latter two studies do not 
control for potential endogeneity or persistency in firm performance. 
 
Although prior studies suggest that both firms‘ capital structure and maturity 
structures of debt play an important role in determining the corporate performance, 
to the best of our knowledge, so far, no single study has examined in this area in the 
context of Chinese listed companies. 
 
5.2.3. Our contributions 
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in many ways. First, we provide the 
first evidence on the effect of capital structure on performance for Chinese listed 
companies. Previous studies have in fact looked at the effect of capital structure on 
performance in the context of developed markets (see McConnell and Servaes, 1995; 
Dessi and Robertson, 2003). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no study has 
examined this issue in the context of China, the largest emerging economy.  
Second, although one paper examines the determinants of debt maturity in China 
(Cai et al., 2011), to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on the effect of 
debt maturity on performance in China. By analyzing this issue, we therefore add to 





Finally, for the first time, we examine the impact of capital structure decisions on 
corporate performance, differentiating between state-controlled and privately 
controlled firms. This distinction is particularly relevant in the Chinese context, as 
we discussed in previous chapters. 
 
5.3. Hypothesis development 
 
In this section, we develop our hypotheses by discussing how leverage and debt 
maturity (the proportion of short-term debt) are likely to affect Chinese firm‘s 
performance.  
5.4.1 Leverage and firm performance 
 
The agency theory suggests that leverage may help to mitigate agency problems 
arising from the conflict of interest between shareholder and managers. Jensen 
(1986) suggests that the fixed interest payment to the debt holders reduces the free 
cash flow available for managers‘ discretionary spending. (Grossman and Hart 1982, 
Jensen 1986, Williams 1987). Zwiebel, (1996) suggest that debt is a commitment 
device for executives .That is, since the interest payment to debt holders is a legal 
obligation, the failure to meet this obligation has potential for risk of bankruptcy and 
the resulting loss of reputation and jobs for managers (Fama, 1980; Grossman and 
Hard, 1982; and Williams, 1987). This provides managers with an incentive to work 
hard and consume fewer perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982 and Zwiebel, 1996).  
For example, Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Gilson (1990) show that financial distress 
or continuous low profits may lead to a shift of control of the firm to debt holders, 
which often  result in the replacement of incumbent managers.  Furthermore, debt 
financing also bring managers activities to a close monitoring of a third party (debt-
holders) and more generally by the financial market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rajan 
and Winton, 1995; and Stulz, 2000). These arguments suggest that debt financing help 
to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders and thus improve corporate 
performance.  According to these studies, increasing the level of leverage results in 
lower the agency costs of equity and thereby improves firm performance.  By 
contrast, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increase in leverage 
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increases the chances of bankruptcy or financial distress, resulting in decreased firm 
performance.  
However, empirical results on the relationship between leverage and performance 
are mixed. Some researchers (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996;  Dessi and Robertson, 
2003) show that debt is endogenously determined in light of both observed and 
unobserved firm characteristics in ways consistent with value maximization. Other 
researchers (e.g. Majumdar and Chhibber, 1999) find the relationship to be negative. 
By contrast, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, (2006) find a positive relationship 
between leverage and performance even after controlling for endogeneity. Weill 
(2008) finds that the relationship between leverage and corporate performance varies 
across countries, i.e. it is  significantly positive in five countries, namely Belgium, 
France, German, Norway and Spain, but significantly negative in Italy and not 
significant in Portugal, suggesting the influence of institutional factors on this link. 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2008) show that debt financing has become an effective 
governance mechanism for Indian firms with the improvement in the institutional 
environment which has become market oriented.  
 
In the context of Chinese listed companies, early empirical studies, for example Tian 
and Estrin (2007) and Firth et al. (2008) provide evidence consistent with the notion 
that the Chinese government‘s ownership of both banks and firms, and the resultant 
soft budget constraints make debt an ineffective governance mechanism in 
addressing agency conflicts, especially for SOEs. This is because lenders (it is often 
government owned banks) have no incentive to monitor managers/ controlling 
shareholders behaviour, since government would not allow to fail these both 
institutions. However, with a series of reforms of the banking system and 
improvement in the governance of the Chinese financial sector, banks now use 
commercial judgment and prudence in their lending decisions (Cull and Xu, 2005; 
Ayyagari et al., 2008; Firth et al. 2009) and loan officers are now responsible for 
their poor lending decisions (Allen et al., 2012). Therefore, we would expect banks 
to monitor their borrowers. In light of these developments, recent research on 
Chinese listed firms suggests that bank financing is more likely to work as a 
governance mechanism that constrains managers‘ misconduct and thus helps 
improve investment efficiency in both state controlled and privately controlled firms 
(Chan et al, 2012; Lin and Bo, 2012; Tsai et al. 2014). We thus expect to observe a 
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significant positive relationship between leverage and corporate performances. In 
this study, following Margaritis and Psillaki (2010), we measure leverage (TLEV) by 
the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets.  Based on 
the above arguments, we hypothesise that: 
 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between leverage and firm‘s 
performance.  
 
5.4.2 Debt maturity (proportion of short-term debt to total debt) and firm 
performance  
 
Myers (1977) suggests that conflicts of interest between shareholders and bond 
holders over the exercise of growth options can be mitigated by the use of short-term 
debt in the capital structure. This results in a reduction in the underinvestment 
problem and thereby in an improvement in firm performance. Firms with greater 
growth options face greater underinvestment problems. Therefore, firms with high 
growth options prefer short-term debt. If, instead, firms whose investment sets 
contain more growth opportunities chose a longer maturity of debt, this could raise a 
conflict between stockholders and bondholders, leading to an underinvestment 
problem, and hence resulting in decreased firm performance.  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that short-term debt is more effective than long term debt in 
disciplining managers by imposing a refinancing pressure on them. In particular, 
short maturity debt can serve as a mechanism to transfer control rights from debtors 
to creditors, (e.g., Diamond, 1991, 2004; Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998; Rajan, 1992; 
Sharpe, 1991). Short-maturity debt exposes the firm to the capital market when the 
firm needs to roll-over the debt.  
 
Despite of these incentive properties of short maturity debt, Hart and Moore (1995) 
show that short term debt provides managers an offsetting benefit, i.e. the flexibility 




Although Baum et al. (2007) find a positive effect of the proportion of short-term 
debt on German firms‘ (a bank-based economy) performance (ROA)
70
, consistent 
with Hart and Moore (1995), Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996), Schiantarelli and 
Jaramillo (1996) and Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1996) all provide empirical 
evidence that short term debt is not conducive to improve firm performance 
measured by total factor productivity. 
 
Following Baum et al. (2007), we use proportion of short-term debt (PROP_STLEV) 
as a proxy for debt maturity. Previous empirical studies on capital structure decisions 
show that for an average Chinese firm, about 86% of total debt is due within one 
year which implies that short-term debt is popular among Chinese firms (Table 5.2). 
Huyghebaert and Wang (2013) point out that Chinese banks try to curb their bigger 
exposure to firm-specific risk, arising from a more market-oriented lending policy, 
by shortening debt maturity. However, long-term debt may improve firms‘ 
productivity because it may allow firms access to better and more productive 
technologies, which the firm may be reluctant to finance with short-term debt due to  
high level of liquidity risk as argued in Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1996). Therefore, 
we would expect to observe a negative relationship between proportion of short-term 
debt and performance. We thus hypothesise that: 
 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between a firm‘s proportion of short-
term debt in total debt and its performance (equivalently, there is a significant 
positive relationship between a firm‘s proportion of long-term debt in total debt and 
its performance). 
 
5.4. Baseline specification and estimation methodology 
5.4.1. Baseline specification 
 
Following Baum et al. (2007) and Wintoki et al. (2012), we estimate the following 
baseline model (equations 5.1) to formally check the relationship between leverage,  
the proportion of short-term debt in total debt, and corporate performance.  
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 Yet, this relationship is not observed for US firms. 
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PERFit = β0 + β1PERFi-1 + β2PERFi-2 + β3TLEVit + β4 PROP_STLEVit + β5SIZEit + β6TANGit +       
β7SAGROWTHit + β8INVENTit + β9LIQit +β10FAGEit + vi + vt +  eit.                                               (5.1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
where i indexes firms and t, years. The error term in Equations (5.1) is made up of 
two components: vi is a firm-specific effect; vt, a time-specific effect, which we 
control for by including time dummies capturing business cycle effects. eit is an 
idiosyncratic component. The list of variables used in the paper, their definition and 
expected sign are summarized in Table A5. Finally, following Dessi and Robertson, 
(2003), Baum et al. (2007) and Wintoki et al. (2012) to account for persistency in 
performance and dynamic endogeneity of debt, we include two lags of our 
performance measures among our explanatory variables in equations (5.1).
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Following Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996), Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1996) 
and Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1996) we include both leverage and the proportion 
of short-term debt to total debt in our performance equation to see the impact of both 
leverage and its maturity on corporate performance. 
5.4.1.1. Performance Measures 
 
To assess the impact of capital structure on the performance of the Chinese listed 
firms, following Baum et al. (2007) and Wintoki et al. (2012), we use the return on 
assets (ROA) as our main firm performance measure. ROA is defined as operating 
income before interest, tax and depreciation divided by year-end total assets. In 
addition, return on sales (ROS) and productivity (PROD) are also used as additional 
performance measures. As in Wintoki et al. (2012), the ROS which is defined as 
operating income before interest, tax and depreciation to sales is used as an 
alternative measure of profitability.  Following Avivasian et al. (2005), we also use 
productivity (PROD), which is measured by real sales divided by total number of 
employees to measure efficiency of firms.
72
 These two attributes (profitability and 
productivity) are perhaps the most important indicators of Chinese firms‘ 
performance because enhancing the profitability and efficiency of the SOEs through 
the corporate governance reforms such as corporatization, partial privatization and 
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 Glen et al. (2001) and Gschwandtner (2005) analyse persistence in profitability and suggest that 
two lags are sufficient to capture persistence. 
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 Another study by Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) use profit efficiency (i.e. frontier efficiency 
computed using a profit function) for measuring corporate performance.  
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split-share structure reform were the main goals advanced by the government.  
 
Although economist prefer to use stock market performance measures such as 
Tobin‘s Q or the market to book ratio of equity to measure performance, we use two 
accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA and ROS) which are most 
commonly used in the literature, particularly in emerging markets.
73
 Using Tobin‘s 
Q as a measure of firm performance to study the relationship between governance 
mechanisms such as debt financing and performance can be problematic in the 
Chinese context for two reasons (Demsetz and Vilalongha, 2001; Wintoki et al., 
2012; Conyon and He, 2012a and 2012b). Firstly, Tobin‘s Q is normally defined as 
the market value of equity and debt to the replacement value of assets, and represents 
growth opportunities. Based on the empirical support provided by Boone et al. 
(2007), Linck et al. (2008), and Lehn et al. (2008), Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that 
growth opportunities can be considered as a cause, rather than a consequence, of 
governance structures. Secondly, it is argued that the lack of information 
transparency and opaqueness in the Chinese financial markets make accounting-
based firm performance measures rather than stock market measures more 
informative to shareholders in evaluating governance and performance relationship 
in China (Morck et al., 2000; Jin & Myers, 2006; Conyon and He 2012a and 2012b).  
5.4.1.2. Capital structure variables 
 
The main independent variables are total leverage (denoted by TLEV), and the 
proportion of short-term debt in total debt (denoted by PROP_STLEV), which are used to 
capture the effect of capital structure decisions on corporate performance in our 
specifications, equations 5.1. Following Dessi and Robertson, (2003) and Margaritis 
and Psillaki (2010), leverage is defined as the total debt to total assets ratio.  As in 
Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1999), Baum et al. (2007), we use proportion of short-
term debt in total debt (short-term debt divided by total debt) as a proxy for debt 
maturity. 
5.4.1.3. Control variables 
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 See, for example,  Zeitun and Tian (2007), Abor  (2005), Manawaduge et al. (2011). 
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Following previous studies (e.g., Majumdar and Chhibber, 1999; Dessi and 
Robertson, 2003; Baum et al., 2007; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010), we also include 
several additional variables to control for a set of firm-specific characteristics that 
are likely to be correlated with firms‘ performance in our specifications (equations 
5.1)   
4.1.2.1. Firm size  
 
Prior studies suggest that firm size is an important determinant of corporate 
performance and they find a positive relationship between firm size and 
performance, since larger firms are expected to have better technology, be more 
diversified and better managed than smaller firms. Large firms also perform better 
than smaller firms through economies of scale in monitoring top management and 
have a higher capacity for taking risks (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Greenaway et al., 
2007; Dixon et al., 2015). In line with these arguments, we also expect to observe a 
positive relationship between firm size (SIZE) and performance in our sample. 
4.1.2.2. Tangibility 
 
Tangible assets can be monitored easily and are often used as collateral for debt 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999). Thus, they mitigate agency problems. However, diverse 
relationships can be observed between firms‘ performance and tangibility depending 
on the degree of efficient utilization of tangible assets by the firm. If a firm utilizes 
its tangible assets efficiently, then we would expect a positive relationship between 
tangibility and performance, otherwise the relationship would be negative.  
 
 
Most of the previous studies report a positive relationship between tangibility and 
performance (see, for example, Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). In line with this, we 
expect to observe a positive relationship between tangibility and firm‘s performance. 
Following previous research (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010), we measure the 
tangibility (TANG) as the ratio of fixed tangible assets to total assets.  
4.1.2.3. Sales growth  
 
Majumdar and Chhibber (1999) suggest that sales growth can capture business-cycle 
effects and environmental volatility. Furthermore, since sales growth represents a 
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firm‘s growth prospects, they may able to generate higher profit, suggesting that 
there should be a positive relationship between the sales growth and corporate 
performance. By contrast, such growth opportunities may attract new entrants, quite 
a common occurrence in emerging markets, which may reduce average profits for all 
players.  Previous empirical studies report a positive effect of growth opportunities 
on firm performance (see Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010; Dessi and Robertson, 2003; 
Agarwal and Elston, 2001). In line with these studies, we expect to observe a 
positive relationship between sales growth and a firm‘s performance. Following 
Majumdar and Chhibber (1999), Margaritis and Psillaki (2010), growth opportunities 
(SALGROWTH) are measured by the growth of sales. 
4.1.2.4. Inventories 
 
This variable intends to control for industry-related effects since some industries 
need greater stockholding, but also help to account for business-cycle effects since in 
downturns (upturns) inventories tend to be accumulated (decumulated) (Majumdar 
and Chhibber, 1999). Since the stocking of inventories means a greater need for 
working capital, higher interest costs and, therefore, an erosion of profitability, there 
should be a negative relationship between inventory and firms‘ performance. In line 
with this explanation, we expect to observe a negative relationship between 
inventories and firms‘ performance. Following Majumdar and Chhibber (1999), 




Liquidity is used to control for industry-related and business-cycle factors. Cash 
requirements for a firm reflect industry practices as well as the overall economic 
climate, since in lean times, cash-flow crises can arise.  Furthermore, firm-specific 
attributes can also be captured by liquidity, since the management‘s ability to 
manage working capital and acquire a greater quantity of cash balances reflects 
superior skills which are also likely to be reflected in a firm‘s profitability. There 
should be therefore a positive relationship between corporate liquidity and 
performance. Previous empirical studies also report a positive effect of liquidity on 
firm performance (see for example Majumdar and Chhibber (1999) and Baum et al.   
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(2007)). Following Baum et al. (2007), liquidity (LIQ) is measured by the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalent to total assets. 
 
5.4.2. Estimation methodology 
5.4.2.1. Endogeneity 
 
Endogeneity is an important concern in our study. First, our estimates may be 
affected by reverse causality (i.e., not only capital structure affect firms‘ 
performance, but the firms‘ performance may also affect the capital structure). On 
the one hand, according to Jensen‘s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, debt may act as 
a valuable managerial incentive mechanism, because it commits managers to pay 
fixed interest payment to the debt holders, thereby reducing the free cash flow available 
to the managers‘ discretionary spending (i.e. empire-building investments). Thus, debt 
tends to increase firm‘s performance. On the other hand, more efficient firms are 
more likely to choose relatively higher levels of debt since the higher expected 
returns from the greater efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy and 
financial distress.  
 
A second source of endogeneity is that unobservable characteristics of the firm 
(firm-specific fixed effects) are likely to affect both the firm‘s capital structure 





Therefore, in order to address for the potential endogeneity issues, following Baum 
et al. (2007), we use the system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Please see section 3.5.2 
(Chapter 3) for a detailed discussion on the GMM estimator. We use all right-hand 
side variables (except firm age and the dummy variables) lagged twice or more as 
instruments in the first-differenced equation, and first-differences of these same 
variables lagged once as instruments in the level equation. 
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 These are stable over time but will change across firms. 
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5.5. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, we describe the dataset and sample that is used in our study and 
provide a discussion on summary statistics and correlation analysis of our variables.  
5.5.1. Data and sample selection 
The data used in this study are obtained from two Chinese databases, namely the 
China Stock Market Accounting Database (CSMAR) and Sino-fin for the period of 
2003-2010. The sample is composed of publicly listed non-financial firms traded on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Following the literature, we exclude 
financial firms from our analysis. To reduce the influence of potential outliers, we 
exclude observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. 
Since we use two lags of the dependent variable in our empirical model, we end up 
with a panel of 6271 firm-year observations on 1420 companies over the period 
2005-2010. The panel has an unbalanced structure. 
 
5.5.2. Summary statistics 
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the 
pooled full sample of firms. The pooled mean (median) return on assets (ROA) and 
return on sales (ROS) are 7.3% (7.2%) and 7.8% (7.4%), respectively. The pooled 
mean (median) productivity (PROD), measured as real sales per employee, is 0.50 
million RMB (0.25).  
 
The average (median) leverage to total assets ratio (TLEV) is 51.7 (52.5) per-cent, 
suggesting that about 50% of the firms‘ assets are financed by debt capital. We 
observe that the average (median) proportion of short-term debt to total debt 
(PROP_STLVE) is 86.6 % (92.6%).  The minimum and maximum values of the 
short-term debt (PROP_STLEV) ratios range from 36.0 % to 100 % with a standard 
deviation of 15.1%.  
 
With respect to the control variables included in our baseline model, average 
(median) size of the firms measured by natural logarithm of total assets is about 
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1.706 billion RMB (0.826 billion RMB)
75
. The average (mean) tangible assets ratio,  
proxied by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets is given by 0.29 (0.27). The pooled 
mean (median) value of sales growth, measured by the real annual sales growth rate, 
is 13 % (9%). While the average (median) inventory ratio is 44% (37%), the pooled 
mean (median) value of liquidity, measured as firm‘s cash and cash equivalent 
scaled by its total assets, is 16% (13%). Finally, the average (median) firm age 
measured by number of years from the establishment of firm is 11.73 (12) 
5.5.3. Correlation analysis 
 
Table 5.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. Total 
leverage (TLEV) shows a negative correlation with firms‘ performance measured by 
ROA and ROS, while it shows a positive and statistically significant correlation with 
firms‘ performance measured by PROD. The proportion of long-term debt 
(PROP_LTLEV) exhibits a significant positive correlation with ROA and ROS, while 
the proportion of short-term debt (PROP_STLEV) exhibits a significant negative 
correlation with ROA and ROS, as we hypothesized (H2).. 
    
Turning to control variables, as expected, firm size, sales growth and liquidity have a 
significant and positive correlation with ROA, ROS and PROD. While tangibility has 
a significant positive correlation with ROA, it is negatively associated with ROS and 
PROD.  Finally, it is interesting to note that inventory and firm age have a negative 
but statistically insignificant correlation with ROS, while they show a significant 
negative correlation with ROA.  
 
Finally, Table 5.2 suggests that given that the observed correlation coefficients are 
relatively low, multicollinearity should not be a serious problem in our study 
5.6. Empirical results 
 
5.6.1. The effect of leverage and maturity on firm performance 
 
                                                 
75
 It should be noted that although firm size is measured as the logarithm of total sales in the 
regression analysis, the figures reported in Table 2-the descriptive statistics are not in logarithms but 
as actual values. 
163 
 
The estimations of Equation 5.1 for all firms are shown in Table 5.3. Column (1) 
displays the results for all firms when the firm‘s performance is measured by ROA. 
Columns (2)-(3) report the results for sub-sample of firms when the firm‘s 
performance is measured by ROA. 
 
As can be seen in column (1), when endogeneity is controlled for using the system 
GMM estimator, the estimated impact of leverage (TLEV) on firm‘s performance is 
positive and statistically significant, in line with our hypothesis H1. This finding is 
consistent with the agency theory, which suggests that debt financing is an effective 
mechanism to control agency costs by bringing in external monitoring and curbing 
discretionary spending (i.e. the fixed interest payment to the debt holders reduces the 
free cash flow available to the managers‘ discretionary spending)  (Jensen, 1986), and 
thereby improves the firm performance. This finding is also consistent with findings 
of Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) for France and Weill (2008) for Belgium, 
France, German, Norway and Spain. Furthermore, calculating the economic 
significance from column (1), we find that incrementing leverage by one-standard 
deviation increases the firm‘s performance by 11 % of its mean.76 
 
More importantly, the estimated coefficient on long term debt/maturity (LTLEV) is 
positive and statistically significant, providing support to our hypothesis H2. 
Furthermore, calculating the economic significance from column (1), we find that 
incrementing the proportion of long-term debt by one-standard deviation increases 
the firm‘s performance by 10.7 % of its mean.77  This finding corroborate with 
findings of Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996), Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1996) 
and Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1996) who estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas 
production function with leverage and maturity and find that short-term debt is not 
conducive to improve productivity but long term debt help improve firm level total 
factor productivity (TFP) for Italy and the UK, India and Ecuador, respectively. This 
finding is also consistent with Hart and Moore (1995) who show short-term debt can 
facilitate managerial empire building thereby decreasing the firm performance, 
whereas long term debt plays an opposite role. Additionally, Schiantarelli and 
                                                 
76
 This figure is given by the estimated coefficient on leverage (0.044) times it standard deviation 
(0.188), divided by the mean value of performance (0.073). 
77
 This figure is given by the estimated coefficient on the proportion of long-term debt (0.052) times it 
standard deviation (0.151), divided by the mean value of performance (0.073). 
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Srivastava (1996) suggest that access to long-term debt may improve firms‘ 
productivity by allowing firms access to better and more productive technologies, 
which the firm may be reluctant to finance with short-term debt because of fears of 
liquidation and by removing the burden on the working capital, which may have 
adverse consequences on productivity. Furthermore, more recent research provide 
evidence suggesting that relaxing credit constraints and extending debt maturities 
can improve real investment in crisis period (Campello et al., 2010). Even in non-
crisis times, long term debt allows firms to mitigate the potential rollover risk related 
to short maturity debt, as in Diamond (1991). 
 
In addition, we verify how the impact of leverage (TLEV) and long term 
debt/maturity (LTLEV) on firm‘s performance differs between the sub-sample of 
state and non-state firms. As can been seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table, leverage 
(TLEV) and the proportion of the long-term debt (LTLEV) have a positive impact on 
firm‘s performance of private firms. Yet, this relationship is not observed for state 
firms.  
 
Turning to the control variables, the estimated coefficients of the log of firm size 
(SIZE) is not significant in all columns. Tangibility (TANG) is positively related to 
ROA in columns (1) and (2), but the coefficient is insignificant in column (3) The 
estimated coefficient of sales growth (SALGRTH) is significantly positive in 
columns (1)-(3). The inventory to assets ratio (INVENT) is negatively related to 
ROA in columns (1) and (2). The estimated coefficient on firm‘s cash and cash 
equivalent to total assets ratio (LIQ) is positively significant in columns 1 and 2). 
These results suggest that larger, more liquid firms with better growth opportunities 
are characterized by better performance. 
 
5.6.2 Robustness tests 
 
Our results in Tables 5.3 are also robust to estimating Equation 1 by replacing return 
on assets with our productivity measure (which is measured by real sales divided by 




Furthermore, we also distinguish the effects of debt and maturity structure on firms‘ 
performance between the pre and post–split share structure reform period. In an 
unreported results, we find that leverage and maturity mainly affect performance of 
Chinese listed firms in the post-reform period, suggesting that in the early period of 
institutional change, debt did not act as a disciplining mechanism to mitigate 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, but, in the later period, debt became as 
an effective disciplining device in constraining managers‘ opportunistic behavior 
when institutions had become more market oriented as observed in India By Sarker 





Corporate finance literature suggests that debt financing can be an effective 
mechanism to mitigate agency cost of equity by aligning interest of managers with 
that of shareholders.  However, it creates agency costs of debt, for example 
underinvestment problem stemming from the conflicts of interest of shareholders 
and bondholders. In addition, research also focuses on the effects of debt maturity on 
the agency conflicts and corporate performance. 
 
In this chapter, making use of a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 
2003-2010, we examine the impact of debt and debt maturity structure on corporate 
performance, which we measure by profitability measures (namely, return on assets 
(ROA) and return on sales (ROS)) and a labour productivity measure proxied by 
total real sales divided by number of employees. 
 
Using the system GMM estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and the 
possible endogeneity of our regressors, we observe a positive relationship between 
leverage and the proportion of long term debt, on the one hand, and firms‘ 
performance, on the other. When differentiating between state and privately 
controlled firms, we find that leverage and long debt maturity positively affect 
corporate performance for privately controlled firms, while long debt maturity 
negatively affects corporate performance for state controlled firms. Our results also 
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suggest that debt and debt maturity positively affects firm performance only in the 
post-2005 split-share reform period. 
 
Our research has significant policy implications it that it suggest that lenders such as 
banks may extend more long term credit to more productive private sector which 




Table A5 Definition of variables 




Performance:     
Return on assets ROA 
Operating income before interest, tax and 
depreciation/ year-end total assets. 
 
Return on sales ROS 
Operating income before interest, tax and 
depreciation/ sales 
 
Productivity PROD Real sales/ total number of employees  
 
Independent variables 
Leverage TLEV Total leverage/ total assets  +(H1) 
Short-term debt  PROP_STLEV Short-term liabilities/ total liabilities -(H2) 





Natural logarithm of total sales 
 
+ 
Tangibility TANG Fixed assets/ Total assets + 
Sales growth SALGRTH Sales/Total assets  + 
Inventory INVENT Inventory/ Total assets - 
Liquidity 
 
LIQ Firm‘s cash and cash equivalent scaled by 
its total assets 
+ 
State STATE Percentage of shares owned by the central 
government, local governments, or any 
entity representing the central or local 
governments. 
 
Firm age FAGE Logarithm of the number of years since the 
establishment of the firm 
 
Regional dummies  Dummies indicating whether the firm is 
located in the Coastal, Western, or Central 
region of China 
 
Year dummies  Year dummies for the years 2005 to 2010.  
Industry dummies  Dummies for the following four industrial 
groups based on the CSMAR B 
classification: Properties, Conglomerates, 
Industry, Commerce. Utilities and financial 
industries are excluded. 
 
Note: ‗+‘ means that the firm‘s performance increases with the variables, ‗-‘ means that the firm‘s performance 






Table 5.1 Summary statistics of Chinese listed firms over the period of 2003 to 
2010. 




Return on assets (ROA) 6271 0.073 0.072 0.066 -0.386 0.272 
Return on sales (ROS) 6271 0.078 0.074 0.177 -4.028 1.717 
Productivity (PROD) (million RMB)  5631 0.508 0.253 0.862 0.022 9.308 
Leverage ratio (TLEV) 6271 0.517 0.525 0.188 0.059 1.479 
Short-term debt  (PROP_STLEV) 6271 0.866 0.926 0.151 0.362 1.000 
Long-term debt  (PROP_LTLEV) 6271 0.134 0.074 0.151 0.000 0.638 
Total assets  (SIZE) (billion RMB)  6271 1.706 0.826 2.800 0.075 26.136 
Tangibility (TANG) 6271 0.295 0.272 0.167 0.004 0.760 
Sales growth (SALGRTH) 6271 0.131 0.091 0.342 -0.653 3.459 
Inventory (INTVENT) 6271 0.439 0.373 0.317 0.001 1.719 
Liquidity (LIQ) 6271 0.158 0.133 0.105 0.007 0.660 
Firm age (FAGE) 6271 11.736 12.000 3.865 3.000 26.000 




Table 5.2 Pearson correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ROA 1.00 
           2 ROS 0.63* 1.00 
          3 PROD 0.00 0.01 1.00 
         4 TLEV -0.33* -0.26* 0.14* 1.00 
        5 PROP_STLEV -0.06* -0.13* 0.01 -0.13* 1.00 
       6 PROP_LTLEV 0.06* 0.13* -0.01 0.13* -1.00* 1.00 
      7 TANG 0.13* -0.04* -0.22* 0.03* -0.25* 0.25* 1.00 
     8 SALGRTH 0.26* 0.18* 0.09* 0.05* -0.04* 0.04* -0.04* 1.00 
    9 INVENT -0.08* -0.00 0.18* 0.18* 0.12* -0.12* -0.44* 0.10* 1.00 
   10 LIQ 0.14* 0.11* 0.07* -0.28* 0.20* -0.20* -0.38* 0.04* -0.08* 1.00 
  11 SIZE 0.09* 0.08* 0.15* 0.18* -0.29* 0.29* 0.06* 0.09* 0.04* -0.03* 1.00 
 12 FAGE -0.08* -0.02 0.06* 0.15* -0.06* 0.05* -0.06* -0.05* 0.05* -0.05* 0.07* 1.00 







Table 5.3 Leverage, debt maturity and corporate performance measured by 
return on assets (ROA)  














 (0.034) (0.055) (0.113) 
ROAit-2 0.086
***
 0.056 0.032 














 (0.031) (0.063) (0.027) 
SIZE -0.001 -0.011 0.006 


























 (0.031) (0.067) (0.050) 
FAGE -0.005
*
 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
Regional dummies yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes 
Observations 6271 1990 4281 
Hansen test (p values) 0.369 0.736  0.205 
m1  (p values) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2 (p values) 0.155 0.179 0.191 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. All 
equations were estimated using the system GMM estimator, AR2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables except firm age and dummy 
variables as potentially endogenous. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 









While Modigliani and Miller‘s (1958) irrelevant theory shows that under perfect 
capital market conditions, capital structure is irrelevant to the value of a firm, 
subsequent refinements and developments in the relevant literature argue that the 
prevalence of a variety of market frictions (such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, 
asymmetric information and agency problems) make capital structure decisions 
relevant to the value of the firm (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). A 
great deal of theoretical and empirical research in corporate finance has thus focused 
not only on the determinants of capital structure decisions (i.e. debt versus equity 
choice) and debt maturity decisions (short-term debt versus long term debt), but also 
effects of these financial policy choices on corporate performance in the context of 
Western countries. Agency costs and asymmetric information theories are used as 
the dominant theoretical frameworks underlying corporate governance and capital 
structure research.    
In this study, we investigate the determinants of leverage and debt maturity choices 
and effects of these financing choices on corporate performance of Chinese listed 
firms. China provides us an interesting research setting. In line with China‘s wider 
economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, the government has taken various 
measures aimed at improving the corporate governance of former SOEs, on the one 
hand and the banking industry, on the other. In the early 1990s, government resorted 
to the partial privatization of selected former SOEs where the government or 
government agents still retained considerable ownership stakes. This lead to Chinese 
listed firms characterized not only by the separation of ownership and control but 
also by having a controlling/large shareholders (which is often state) who often 
control corporate affairs. These features of China‘s modern corporations resulted in 
agency conflicts not only between the managers and the owners, but also between 
the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In addition, these state 




soft budget constraints arising from government‘s dual role as owner of commercial 
enterprises and owner of banks, as well as from the fact that the government often 
tended to use firms to achieve its social and political objectives such as full 
employment (Lin et al., 1998; Kato and Long, 2006a, b, c and 2011). Furthermore, 
before the 2005 split-share-reform, the majority of shares which were owned by 
controlling shareholders were non-tradable; therefore, controlling shareholders often 
resorted to reap private benefits via tunnelling detrimental to minority shareholders‘ 
interests (Jiang et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2012).  
Yet, Chinese corporate governance system has undergone many changes during the 
last decade. In addition to the introduction of a corporate governance code and an 
independent director system, Chinese firms‘ ownership structures have changed 
tremendously following the 2005 split-share structure reform in which a large part of  
non- tradable shares have been converted to tradable shares. Furthermore, the 
number of privately controlled listed firms has steadily increased (Conyon and He, 
2011). As part of these reforms, managerial shareholding has also increased 
considerably after 2005. On the other hand, Chinese banking system has improved 
significantly and become more efficient in the recent years (Allen et al., 2012).
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In light of these developments, in this study, we have investigated the determinants 
of leverage and debt maturity choices and effects of these financing choices on 
corporate performance, especially from the agency costs perspective. Making use of 
a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010, we have focused our 
investigation on three main themes.   
Our first investigation focuses on the linkages between ownership and corporate 
governance structure and capital structure decisions. Although the use of debt 
financing in the capital structure offers many advantages, given the separation of 
ownership and control in modern corporations, the self-interested and risk adverse 
managers with the discretion to make decisions may be reluctant to use it. This is due 
to the fact that debt financing not only involves inherent financial risk (potential for 
bankruptcy) but also bring in external monitoring. Therefore, the capital structure 
decisions themselves are subject to an agency problem of discretion. It is expected 
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that managerial equity ownership and other governance mechanisms can be effective 
in aligning managerial and shareholder interest to reduce such agency problems 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Although a limited number of empirical studies have 
examined the relationship between corporate governance variables and firm‘s 
leverage in the context of Western countries, such as the US and UK, there is lack of 
research in this area in China. Our first empirical study (Chapter 3) uses a large 
dataset of Chinese listed companies over the period 2003-2010, to examine the 
impact of managerial ownership and other corporate governance variables on firm‘s 
capital structure decisions. This study uses the system GMM estimator as main 
estimation methodology since it is a powerful tool to account for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and the potential endogeneity of the regressors (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). 
Our second empirical study (Chapter 4) uses the same dataset to examine, for the 
first time in the Chinese context, the attenuation effect (i.e. lessening the negative 
effects of growth opportunities on leverage) and liquidity risk effect of short-debt 
maturity on leverage.  Although limited evidence is available from developed 
countries on this topic, to the best of our knowledge, no study has focused in this 
area in China. This study fills this gap. The system GMM estimator is used to 
estimate leverage and debt maturity equations, which control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of all regressors.  
Although previous studies have examined empirically the impact of capital structure 
choice and maturity structure decisions on firms‘ performance in the context of 
developed economies, to the best of our knowledge, there is no a single research 
research that has focused on this issue in China. In order to fill this gap, our third 
empirical chapter (Chapter 5) uses recent data over the period of 2003-2010, to 
examine impact of capital structure decisions and maturity structure on corporate 






6.2. Summary of main findings 
The main finding arising from the analysis in the first empirical chapter is that there 
is a liner relationship between managerial ownership and firms‘ leverage after 
controlling for potential unobserved firm characteristic and endogeneity. This is 
cconsistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
which suggests that greater managerial shareholding leads to a better alignment of 
the interest of insiders and outsiders, which in turn motivates managers to adopt 
more risky financial choices by using relatively more leverage. We also observe that 
state ownership is negatively associated with leverage. Furthermore, the proportions 
of independent directors/board composition and board size generally do not 
influence firms‘ capital structure decisions.  
When distinguishing the effects of managerial ownership on firms‘ leverage between 
state- and privately controlled firms as well as between the pre- and post-reform 
period, we provide additional evidence that managerial ownership works as an 
effective governance device influencing firms‘ leverage decisions of private firms 
while managerial ownership is positively related to leverage ratios only in the post-
reform period.  
Based on the empirical investigation undertaken in Chapter 4, we first document a 
negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. This result 
suggests that Chinese listed firms face underinvestment problem (debt overhang) due 
to the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders/lenders. Second, we 
find a positive relationship between leverage and growth opportunities interacted 
with measure of short-term debt, suggesting that the proportion of short-term debt 
attenuates the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage. Additionally, we 
also report that short-term debt is negatively related to leverage, suggesting that 
firms with a higher leverage ratio prefer a longer maturity of debt in order to avoid 
the liquidity risk problems associated with short-term debt. When we distinguish 
between state owned firms and privately controlled firms, we find evidence that 
these effects are only relevant to privately controlled firms. Surprisingly, we also 
find that even though Chinese listed firms use a large amount of short-term debt in 




them as opposed to the findings reported by Johnson for US firms. We suggest that 
these differences can be explained by the institutional environment in which these 
firms operate. 
In our third chapter, controlling for unobserved firm characteristics and endogeneity, 
we document that a direct relationship between leverage and the proportion of long-
term debt, firms‘ performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA), return on 
sales (ROS) or productivity. This study suggests that debt financing works as an 
effective governance mechanism through which Chinese listed firms can mitigate 
agency problems. When distinguishing between state and privately controlled firms, 
we find that leverage and the proportion of long-term debt only affect the 
performance of private firms.  
When distinguishing the effects of debt and maturity structure on firms‘ performance 
between the pre and post– split share structure reform period, we find that leverage 
and maturity mainly affect performance of Chinese listed firms in the post-reform 
period, suggesting that in the early period of institutional change, debt did not act as 
a disciplining mechanism to mitigate conflicts between managers and shareholders, 
but, in the later period, debt became as an effective disciplining device in 
constraining managers‘ opportunistic behavior when institutions had become more 
market oriented. 
 
6.3. Potential implications 
Our research has significant policy implications for managers, owners, potential 
investors and the government. First, our research provides evidence that managerial 
ownership has become as an important governance mechanism in the post reform 
period, which influences firm‘s leverage significantly. Managerial ownership 
provides managers with necessary incentives to take risky financial choices and thus 
use more debt in the capital structure. Our results therefore suggest that the Chinese 
government‘s recent ownership reform that encourages managerial ownership in 
listed firms have been successful. Yet, managerial ownership is effective in 




with our data which show that managerial ownership has increased significantly only 
in privately-controlled firms. Furthermore, our study shows that state ownership is 
negatively related to leverage. Main implication that arises from our first empirical 
analysis is that while managerial ownership should be further encouraged in the 
state-controlled sector which helps to overcome weak managerial incentive problem 
faced by them, the government ownership which still characterizes the majority of 
Chinese listed firms and weakens incentive mechanisms for managers in them 
should be further reduced so as to enable these firms to make appropriate financial 
choices.  
Second, we find that independent directors do not exert ant influence on capital 
structure decisions. Our findings therefore suggest that a strong independent board 
structure with independent directors having suitable qualifications and relevant 
business experience should be encouraged in the Chinese listed corporations in order 
to improve their corporate governance.  
Third, our study has important implication for Diamond‘s (1991) liquidity risk 
hypothesis in that our study shows that institutional factors have significant influence 
on the liquidity risk faced by firms when they use more short-term debt in their 
capital structure. In particular, our analysis shows that compared to their Western 
counterparts, liquidity risk arising from the use of larger proportion of short-term 
debt is economically has small effect for Chinese listed firms. This can be attributed 
to the fact that while state ownership in the state controlled firms provide implicit 
guarantee that government would not allow them fail whereas privately controlled 
firms use networks/personal relations, reputations and trust to rollover their debt 
without facing much liquidity risk problem (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2013). 
Finally, our study suggests that leverage works as an effective governance 
mechanism in mitigating agency conflict in China, thereby influence firms‘ 
performance. This suggests that the recent banking system reform has been 
successful in mitigating the political influence, soft budget constraints and inefficient 
lending practices which had been long standing issues in the Chinese banking sector. 
That is, Chinese banking system has become efficient in allocating resources to 




improved by further development of financial institutions outside the Big Four banks 
such as foreign banks and private domestic banks and extending more long term 
credit to more productive private sector.  
 
6.4. Limitations and suggestions for further research  
Whilst our research suffers from a number of limitations, these limitations stimulate 
a number of researchable ideas and open more avenues for future investigation.  
First, we do not examine the effect of stock options on leverage due to availability of 
limited data. Yet, Chinese listed firms have started using stock options in their 
incentive contracts to managers in a limited scale in recent years.  Future research 
may be able to examine impact of stock options on firms‘ leverage and other risky 
activities of Chinese firms.  
Second, in China, institutional investor types such as pension funds, insurance 
companies, mutual funds have been very small but are growing faster and play a 
vital role in corporate governances (CSRC, 2013). Future research can extend our 
study by examining how institutional shareholder types affect firms‘ capital structure 
by closely monitoring managers‘ behaviour and influencing firms‘ decisions. 
Third, since rating system in China has not been well developed (Allen et al., 2012), 
we are unable to see how importance of attenuation and liquidity risk effects differs 
between rated and unrated firms.  
Finally, in future research, we also plan to undertake a comparative analysis of the 
attenuation and liquidity risk effects of shorter maturity debt on leverage as well as 
effects of leverage and maturity on corporate performance in China, other emerging 
economies, and developed countries. This would enable us to clearly disentangle 
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